Using Kurt Horner's political ideology charts, we can broadly posit that the Armada victory (1588, end of 4T) was a mega-saecular cousin of V-J Day, in that it brought Britain to the rank of a world superpower almost overnight. Jamestown (1607) and Plymouth Rock (1620) possibly match American triumphs in the space race during the 1950s-60s (interesting fact -- the Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602 as the world's first multinational, four years before the Virginia Company; shades of Soviet-made Sputnik making it first?). Continuing the idea of Holland = the USSR, the British took New York in 1664, in the middle of the 3T, establishing Britain as the dominant power in the American colonies and issuing a severe (but not fatal) setback to Dutch world influence.

Someone also compared our current low-level but constantly flaring skirmishes with international Islamists to the Indian Wars of the late 1670s (I'm not aware that any Native tribe ever "attacked us", but the comparison is worth some thought -- many Muslims still see Israel as stolen land just as the tribes saw early New England settlements).

Anyway, that would all suggest a few things: first, that the American superpower is probably nowhere near its collapse (WWII ended British hegemony, and that was 357 years after the Armada, and even today, Britain is a respected diplomatic player). But we may gain some worthy competitors. The Spanish, vanquished briefly after 1588, came back to near-parity with the British during the 17th century (see: Japan after WWII) and didn't lose serious ground until the 1810s. The Dutch never recovered fully after dropping New York, and sank further after the French Revolution, but puttered along in the century-plus between the two events (so Russia won't fully disappear any time soon). And the French seem to have experienced a straight, slow but steady, upward trajectory on the world stage between 1605 and WWI. Is that China or India I hear?

The other intriguing parallel is that by the end of this 4T the American political alignment, as in Britain in the late 17th century, will be centered on the lower left (progressivism -- precise communal rules paired with a challenging attitude toward authority), while the visionary/leading edge will be toward Jeffersonian/classical liberalism (greater individual autonomy, challenging attitude toward authority), and the reactionary/trailing edge will continue the social communitarian ideas of the Culture Wars.

This struck me as interesting because I was aware, only obliquely, that the "personal liberty" seeds of the Enlightenment/Great Awakening 2T and (of course) American Revolution 4T were planted by the end of the Glorious Revolution. So I did some light Wikipedia-ing and discovered that the U.S. Bill of Rights is heavily based on a British Bill of Rights statute passed 100 years earlier, in 1689, which had been advanced through Parliament by William and Mary. Among the rights included: freedom of taxation by Royal Prerogative (Article I of the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the sole power to impose taxes based on this idea), freedom to petition the monarch (1st Amendment, anyone?), freedom from the standing army during peacetime (3rd Amendment), freedom for Protestants to bear arms (2nd Amendment), freedom of speech and debates (1st again), freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail (8th), and freedom from fine and forfeiture without a trial (sounds like the 6th and 7th).

The next Idealist generation will, Kurt's theory suggests, participate in the next Enlightenment, and the next Civics play out a new American Revolution. But might we all catch a sneak preview of that Revolution's overhauls by the end of this 4T? Since the rest of the 21st century may be increasingly concerned with what "liberty" now means, what sorts of rights and liberties will be enshrined into law by the 2020s? Freedom of privacy on the internet? A universal right to health care? Freedom of all consenting adults to marry? These may be somewhat left-of-center (though utterly mainstream) proposals today, but freedom of assembly and legislatively imposed taxes may too have been in the mid-1670s. (A century later, the radical Thomas Paine spoke of free public education, abolition of slavery, a minimum wage, and progressive taxation, all of which became the law of the land in the ensuing 150 years.)

Meanwhile, many of us hope to find a better solution to the "Middle East problem" than more bloodshed and eventual forced cultural values. Are we doomed to repeat the mistakes of our tribal interactions, or can we really learn from history on this subject? Finally -- this was brought up before -- will we see a new round of witch hunts in the latter part of this 4T? If so, who will see the wrong end of our circa-2020s justice system?

Originally Posted by 1990

Using Kurt Horner's political ideology charts, we can broadly posit that the Armada victory (1588, end of 4T) was a mega-saecular cousin of V-J Day, in that it brought Britain to the rank of a world superpower almost overnight. Jamestown (1607) and Plymouth Rock (1620) possibly match American triumphs in the space race during the 1950s-60s (interesting fact -- the Dutch East India Company was founded in 1602 as the world's first multinational, four years before the Virginia Company; shades of Soviet-made Sputnik making it first?). Continuing the idea of Holland = the USSR, the British took New York in 1664, in the middle of the 3T, establishing Britain as the dominant power in the American colonies and issuing a severe (but not fatal) setback to Dutch world influence.

Someone also compared our current low-level but constantly flaring skirmishes with international Islamists to the Indian Wars of the late 1670s (I'm not aware that any Native tribe ever "attacked us", but the comparison is worth some thought -- many Muslims still see Israel as stolen land just as the tribes saw early New England settlements).

Anyway, that would all suggest a few things: first, that the American superpower is probably nowhere near its collapse (WWII ended British hegemony, and that was 357 years after the Armada, and even today, Britain is a respected diplomatic player). But we may gain some worthy competitors. The Spanish, vanquished briefly after 1588, came back to near-parity with the British during the 17th century (see: Japan after WWII) and didn't lose serious ground until the 1810s. The Dutch never recovered fully after dropping New York, and sank further after the French Revolution, but puttered along in the century-plus between the two events (so Russia won't fully disappear any time soon). And the French seem to have experienced a straight, slow but steady, upward trajectory on the world stage between 1605 and WWI. Is that China or India I hear?

The other intriguing parallel is that by the end of this 4T the American political alignment, as in Britain in the late 17th century, will be centered on the lower left (progressivism -- precise communal rules paired with a challenging attitude toward authority), while the visionary/leading edge will be toward Jeffersonian/classical liberalism (greater individual autonomy, challenging attitude toward authority), and the reactionary/trailing edge will continue the social communitarian ideas of the Culture Wars.

This struck me as interesting because I was aware, only obliquely, that the "personal liberty" seeds of the Enlightenment/Great Awakening 2T and (of course) American Revolution 4T were planted by the end of the Glorious Revolution. So I did some light Wikipedia-ing and discovered that the U.S. Bill of Rights is heavily based on a British Bill of Rights statute passed 100 years earlier, in 1689, which had been advanced through Parliament by William and Mary. Among the rights included: freedom of taxation by Royal Prerogative (Article I of the U.S. Constitution gave Congress the sole power to impose taxes based on this idea), freedom to petition the monarch (1st Amendment, anyone?), freedom from the standing army during peacetime (3rd Amendment), freedom for Protestants to bear arms (2nd Amendment), freedom of speech and debates (1st again), freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bail (8th), and freedom from fine and forfeiture without a trial (sounds like the 6th and 7th).

The next Idealist generation will, Kurt's theory suggests, participate in the next Enlightenment, and the next Civics play out a new American Revolution. But might we all catch a sneak preview of that Revolution's overhauls by the end of this 4T? Since the rest of the 21st century may be increasingly concerned with what "liberty" now means, what sorts of rights and liberties will be enshrined into law by the 2020s? Freedom of privacy on the internet? A universal right to health care? Freedom of all consenting adults to marry? These may be somewhat left-of-center (though utterly mainstream) proposals today, but freedom of assembly and legislatively imposed taxes may too have been in the mid-1670s. (A century later, the radical Thomas Paine spoke of free public education, abolition of slavery, a minimum wage, and progressive taxation, all of which became the law of the land in the ensuing 150 years.)

Meanwhile, many of us hope to find a better solution to the "Middle East problem" than more bloodshed and eventual forced cultural values. Are we doomed to repeat the mistakes of our tribal interactions, or can we really learn from history on this subject? Finally -- this was brought up before -- will we see a new round of witch hunts in the latter part of this 4T? If so, who will see the wrong end of our circa-2020s justice system?

With a country based upon the ability of the individual to prosper and participate within this Republic, new checks and balances of federal government role within society. Based upon the fact we have 50 state governments that have agreed to be part of the union, instate commerce, defense and representation to the world. The real choice in the 4T do we want a strong, central government or local state governments to become more responsible? It obvious that states no longer have the ability to run themselves with their services or collect taxes since we ceded too much to the Federal Government. Why should we give them more when the Federal Government (R/D) relaxed laws that should have prevented this from happening. Don't worry, again a Nomadic leader will save this Republic.

The ceding of state power to the Federal government was caused by two separate things, one a trap and one absolutely necessary.

The trap was the offering of federal money to the states for such things as highways, ostensibly without strings. I saw how false that clause was when Carter decided to pass the national speed limit. No state had to obey it. But if they didn't, they lost the federal highway funding. Then they started turning "loss of federal funding" into the punishment for such things as not following the feds' line on the War on Drugs.

There was a second trap, but no bait was offered the states. It was the extension of the Interstate Commerce clause to cover everything that might possibly affect interstate commerce. Are you dealing in fungible goods at the local level? Well, they might go interstate commerce. Or being sold here, allow others (as many links in the chain as you like) to go interstate commerce.

Now for the justified extension of federal power over the states. It had to do with their highly unconstitutional (no matter HOW the Supreme Courts of the period ruled) unequal treatment under the law of their minorities - mostly black in the South, but also Indian in states with a heavy Indian population and Asians on the West Coast. The courts only later intervened in the South, but close enough.

By unconstitutional I mean such things as laws forcing private entities to be segregated. Not permitting - forcing them to be. Or take the fundamental right to a trial by "a jury of your peers." By what fiction is trying a black person, who by law in those states was not the peer of the whites, by an all-white jury?

It's a pity there was no clause in the Constitution forcing the several states to abide by the Bill of Rights and leaving them free in all other respects. Because the rights of individuals were being violated wholesale in some states and that had to be corrected.

For those who cry out "State's Rights!" - there is no such thing. There is only the rights on the individual.

However - meddling successfully to clean up an obvious evil set a bad precedent. Though oddly enough meddling successfully to clean up an obvious evil abroad has been in our playbook at least from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush. Probably beyond - time will reveal that.

If we are Britain, then the Revolution of 2100 should be fought against us, likely several space colonies. Also, we don't have any settlements in space right now, unlike the many American colonies that were in existence by 1680. So I don't think that we will necessarily travel down that road. I don't know much about what happened in England during that Crisis. Any good sources?

Originally Posted by 1990

Using Kurt Horner's political ideology charts, we can broadly posit that the Armada victory (1588, end of 4T) was a mega-saecular cousin of V-J Day, in that it brought Britain to the rank of a world superpower almost overnight.

The Dutch were more successful after the Armada war than the British. In just a few decades they had systematically captured the Portuguese trading empire, and were challenged the Portuguese in Brazil. They were also moving in the Carribean and North America as were the British and French.

Although the British founded their East India company before the Dutch version, the latter was more successful early on. The balance of power started to shift around the 1660's. Great Britain emerged as the leading power after the next Crisis, but not a superpower.

The closest thing to Britain as superpower was in the decades immediately after Napoleon's defeat.

WWII ended British hegemony, and that was 357 years after the Armada

I wouldn't put British hegemony as that long. If you accept Paul Kennedy's thesis in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers that military/diplomatic influence is underpinned by economic and financial power, hegemony should be seen in terms of all three of these things.

Britain became the leading (European) trading nation in the first half of the 18th century. It's economy was still smaller than France's, although it was able to defeat her larger rival in most of their wars by using her greater financial strength to subsidize continental allies in their French wars. When fighting a land war against some combination of European states and a colonial war against Britain, the later was able to prevail. In their one conflict in which the French avoided a European theatre, they defeated the British. I would describe Britain as a leading nation in the 18th century, but not hegemonic in the way America has been since WW II.

After the Napoleonic wars Britain's influence was at its peak. Britain continued to be considered the top power until WW I. After WW I, America was the de facto world power, but chose not to act the role, leaving this role for a Britain no longer strong enough to perform it. Nevertheless the last major British-dominated military operation would probably in 1942. By 1943 the America share of the Anglo-American war effect was probably larger. So let's date diplomatic/military hegemony from 1805 (Trafalgar) to 1942 (WW II, North Africa campaign).

I believe Britain had surpassed the Dutch as the top financial power by the financial crisis of 1782, so we can put that date in for the beginning of financial hegmony. The British lost their position as top financial power in 1914-15 when they liquidated much of their overseas assets to pay for the war. So we can put approximate dates of 1782-1915 for financial hegemony.

The British economy did surpass that of France during the Napoleonic war, thanks to the industrial revolution. Let's put 1805 down for that. American surpassed Britain in the 1880's. So let's put down economic hegemony as 1805-1885.

Hegemony by these three definitions lasted 137, 133 and 80 years, which average to 117 years. A "long century" would be a better description for the duration of British hegemonic status than 357 years as you imply.

For America these three measures give 67, 94, and 124 years, which average to 95 years. So based on the British model, American hegemony probably still has some legs.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Hegemony by these three definitions lasted 137, 133 and 80 years, which average to 117 years. A "long century" would be a better description for the duration of British hegemonic status than 357 years as you imply.

For America these three measures give 67, 94, and 124 years, which average to 95 years. So based on the British model, American hegemony probably still has some legs.

That's only a 23 year difference -- barely one turning. If the Crisis has just started, then U.S. hegemony is likely to collapse during this Crisis.

In Britiain's case, the 4T was the Napoleonic wars rather than a British Revolution. [The needed reforms came later, during the subsequent awakening and ("Reform") crisis].

Originally Posted by Kurt Horner

That's only a 23 year difference -- barely one turning. If the Crisis has just started, then U.S. hegemony is likely to collapse during this Crisis.

If we go with the timing I use (see table 2) America entered a new cycle with the beginning of another world power phase (1991-2008) roughly equivalent to 1918-1945. The next phase is the deligitimation phase (2008-ca. 2026, roughly equivalent to 1945-1963) which should see the rise of regional powers (China and Russia certainly and perhaps India). After that comes the deconcentration phase when the hegemon's power visibly declines (ca. 2026-2044, roughly equivalent to 1963-1983). After that comes the crisis period when hegemony shifts to a new player. So the new hegemon is still something like 40 years away. Indeed, it will take that long for China to become a rich nation, at which point is cannot help but perform the hegemonic role.