Originally Posted by Felix5

What were "boomer values messages"?

Depends on what period of time we are talking about. In the sixties they were going on about freedom and peace. Now they seem to be more interested creating a police state and sending their children and grand-children off to the same sort of pointless wars they were unwilling to fight. It really depends on what they perceive to be in their best interests at the moment.

Originally Posted by Felix5

I was talking about the late Lost/early GI and their parents, not the Boomers. lol.

What were "boomer values messages"?


Pretty typical culture war stuff, "family values," abstinence, environmental concern, etc...the interesting thing is that all of this stuff was presented to us as an appeal to our emotions. For example, Ferngully. "can't you hear its pain?" Dear god, so it's not enough to actually just help the environment, I'm supposed to feel sorry for it? I'm supposed to feel sympathy for a damn tree? Whoa, that's just strange. (and I totally do feel sympathy for trees now...damn!) It's just little things like that, Captain Planet and any show on TGIF were the worst for that sort of thing.

I don't remember this; it was always a combination of fact and emotion, which is what we need. But I understand this was your experience, as you report it.

Originally Posted by Galen

Depends on what period of time we are talking about. In the sixties they were going on about freedom and peace. Now they seem to be more interested creating a police state and sending their children and grand-children off to the same sort of pointless wars they were unwilling to fight. It really depends on what they perceive to be in their best interests at the moment.

Again, using "they" to refer to a whole generation that did thus and so, seems pointless. The Bush administration sent people off to at least one unnecessary war, although he was unwilling to go to the war of his youth. But Cheney and Rumsfeld and all the signers of the PNAC document were involved in this decision, and Cheney, Rumsfeld and some others of that group were Silents. And Clinton, the previous Boomer president, who evaded the draft, did not send people off to unnecessary wars, and had a great record of using troops for good purposes. And what does "creating a police state" refer to? The Patriot Act? Again, one administration of mixed generations. Or what DO you mean? And as for Obama continuing and winding down the wars Bush started, is he a Boomer? That's unclear.

Originally Posted by Felix5

I was talking about the late Lost/early GI and their parents, not the Boomers. lol.

What were "boomer values messages"?


Pretty typical culture war stuff, "family values," abstinence, environmental concern, etc...the interesting thing is that all of this stuff was presented to us as an appeal to our emotions. For example, Ferngully. "can't you hear its pain?" Dear god, so it's not enough to actually just help the environment, I'm supposed to feel sorry for it? I'm supposed to feel sympathy for a damn tree? Whoa, that's just strange. (and I totally do feel sympathy for trees now...damn!) It's just little things like that, Captain Planet and any show on TGIF were the worst for that sort of thing.

Doesn't seen strange to me. *SHRUG* When I was little I cried and cried and cried when we lost a white pine tree in the back yard.

Originally Posted by Galen

Depends on what period of time we are talking about. In the sixties they were going on about freedom and peace. Now they seem to be more interested creating a police state and sending their children and grand-children off to the same sort of pointless wars they were unwilling to fight. It really depends on what they perceive to be in their best interests at the moment.

LOL...Galen, you always crack me up.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

Unlike a pure platonist as Plato so-well articulated it, I think the experienced empirical world is equally valid and foundational of truth and reality (in fact the empirical may be a bit more so). Neither one is derived from the other. I support a mix or fusion of empiricism and rationalism, not one or the other; though with a decidedly spiritualist bent.

[Moved from the 2012 election thread.]

So you have some non-epistemological first principles that exist alongside facts taken from observation? I'm curious as to what those might be.

To clarify what I mean by "non-epistemological," I'm referring to the branch of philosophy that decides how we know, how truth is determined. Empiricism and rationalism are both epistemological positions. One has to make assumptions in this sphere. There's no option, because unless one has decided how truth is to be determined, there is no basis for concluding anything else, and any such decision must be made without proof. That's because all proofs are based on one epistemological framework or another. For example, a scientific proof is only valid if the scientific method is valid; all scientists tacitly make the assumption that it is and don't question that. (As scientists anyway. As philosophers, of course they may.)

So we have unproven assumptions in the area of epistemology because we have to. But assumptions or a priori postulates can also be made in other areas. For example, we can assume that the physical world is objectively real, or that it isn't. Either one of these is a metaphysical assumption rather than an epistemological one and is not possible to prove in any empirical manner.

Hopefully that will make the distinction clear. So: setting aside epistemology, I'm curious as to what a priori assumptions you make about the world. What this sounds like to me -- and I may be reading too much here into what you're saying -- is that you have certain things you insist on believing and so assume those a priori, but accept observation so long as it does not contradict those specific ideas. Would that be a correct interpretation?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

[Moved from the 2012 election thread.]

So you have some non-epistemological first principles that exist alongside facts taken from observation? I'm curious as to what those might be.

To clarify what I mean by "non-epistemological," I'm referring to the branch of philosophy that decides how we know, how truth is determined. Empiricism and rationalism are both epistemological positions. One has to make assumptions in this sphere. There's no option, because unless one has decided how truth is to be determined, there is no basis for concluding anything else, and any such decision must be made without proof. That's because all proofs are based on one epistemological framework or another. For example, a scientific proof is only valid if the scientific method is valid; all scientists tacitly make the assumption that it is and don't question that. (As scientists anyway. As philosophers, of course they may.)

So we have unproven assumptions in the area of epistemology because we have to. But assumptions or a priori postulates can also be made in other areas. For example, we can assume that the physical world is objectively real, or that it isn't. Either one of these is a metaphysical assumption rather than an epistemological one and is not possible to prove in any empirical manner.

Hopefully that will make the distinction clear. So: setting aside epistemology, I'm curious as to what a priori assumptions you make about the world. What this sounds like to me -- and I may be reading too much here into what you're saying -- is that you have certain things you insist on believing and so assume those a priori, but accept observation so long as it does not contradict those specific ideas. Would that be a correct interpretation?

First, just to remind you, I wrote my Masters Degree paper on this topic, dealing with it in great detail, and I posted it online:
http://philosopherswheel.com/rrr.html

I studied Plato and admire his theory to an extent, and find it applicable to my interests in hermetic subjects; but I started out as very much a skeptic of his theory of forms, and that skepticism remains too. I approach the idea of forms differently from the greatest philosopher; I actually used an "empirical method" to validate to my satisfaction that forms "exist." We can experience forms in a consistent way within the world, and these forms have no other explanation than the presence of archetypes as part of the fabric of the universe. My conclusion was more radical than just that facts exist "alongside" first principles, but actually, when you get down to their basic nature, that these first principles are themselves also experiential, and depend on experience in order to exist; and yet also remain first principles. It is an unorthodox position; but on the other hand, if you look at the greatest 4 philosophers in history, 3 of them took a similar approach: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant. My approach is in line with theirs; that there is an interdependence and basic interrelation between first principles and empirical experience (or the existential). First principles exist, but they don't have any life, as it were, unless they are found within our experience, including in many cases our sense experience. The forms and experience are reflections of each other, rather than one being the reflection of the other, as Plato and Bergson thought.

These metaphysical principles I have taken to be the basis for the epistemological, because one's basic ideas of reality determine how you approach reality. The two are of course interdependent though, probably just different ways of saying the same thing, so which comes first may be almost irrelevant to me.

I of course do not see myself as "insisting on believing things;" that is reading too much into what I'm saying indeed. I don't believe things, but I have ideas that seem to me correct, based on my experience and understanding of things. The only assumptions I make in my paper are certain starting points that philosophers have made. I took the theories of Plato and Bergson and others as starting points, but I did not take them as beliefs or ideas that must be true despite observation, based on a priori reason, but took them and said, let's see what validity there is in them, and examined them in the way I thought was best. It is true though that, at least in this masters paper, I did not deal with or question my spiritualist standpoint, but took that as a given; although that too is open for examination in other contexts.

Several points, and then a question.

Point 1) -- I have a viscerally negative reaction to any such assertion that "these are the greatest X philosophers [or scientists or artists or whatever] in history." At best this is an arbitrary and pointless exercise, and at worst a set-up for an argumentum ad autoritandem.

Point 2) -- anyone, including myself, who says that he doesn't believe anything is fooling himself. Everyone believes things. You cannot take any action in life if you don't. For example, I believe that the money my bank says is in my account is actually there and when I go to buy breakfast with my bank card (which I'm about to do), I will be able to do that. I could be wrong, but if I sit here until I achieve an absolute certainty about the matter I will starve to death.

So yes, of course you have beliefs, as do I, as does everyone.

Now, on to the question. I have an idea of what you probably mean, but let's verify that with an inquiry before going further.

Originally Posted by Eric The Green

My conclusion was more radical than just that facts exist "alongside" first principles, but actually, when you get down to their basic nature, that these first principles are themselves also experiential, and depend on experience in order to exist; and yet also remain first principles.

Can you give us an example of a first principle and how it is directly experienced? Thanks.

As a follower of the ideas of Karl Popper, IMO the source of an idea or hypothesis is irrelevant (note that I'm talking about the objective sphere of facts not the subjective sphere of values), what matters is that it actually solves problems in the real world. One could claim to have gotten the idea as revelation from a magical race of space faeries, it doesn't matter if the idea itself works better than previous hypotheses.

The archetypal example is the German chemist who discovered the molecular structure of Benzene as a result of dreaming of the mythical Ouroboros.

Originally Posted by Felix5

It is also informed by mystic experiences, scientific data, and for some more conservative prophets at least, theological and moral beliefs.

Right, you had me until about here. Mystic experiences? I'm not entirely certain what that means.

I take it that you've never had a mystic experience, then.

Originally Posted by Odin

As a follower of the ideas of Karl Popper, IMO the source of an idea or hypothesis is irrelevant (note that I'm talking about the objective sphere of facts not the subjective sphere of values), what matters is that it actually solves problems in the real world. One could claim to have gotten the idea as revelation from a magical race of space faeries, it doesn't matter if the idea itself works better than previous hypotheses.

The archetypal example is the German chemist who discovered the molecular structure of Benzene as a result of dreaming of the mythical Ouroboros.

Dreams are a pretty good source for knowledge about reality. I've always wanted to try to use lucid dreaming as what effectively amounts to a scientific workshop.

Apparently, it also works well if you are writing plays and want to envision them.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

anyone, including myself, who says that he doesn't believe anything is fooling himself. Everyone believes things. You cannot take any action in life if you don't. For example, I believe that the money my bank says is in my account is actually there and when I go to buy breakfast with my bank card (which I'm about to do), I will be able to do that. I could be wrong, but if I sit here until I achieve an absolute certainty about the matter I will starve to death.

Everybody has their own religion or metaphysic, so to speak.

It's a feature of being human.

Originally Posted by Odin

As a follower of the ideas of Karl Popper, IMO the source of an idea or hypothesis is irrelevant (note that I'm talking about the objective sphere of facts not the subjective sphere of values), what matters is that it actually solves problems in the real world. One could claim to have gotten the idea as revelation from a magical race of space faeries, it doesn't matter if the idea itself works better than previous hypotheses.

The archetypal example is the German chemist who discovered the molecular structure of Benzene as a result of dreaming of the mythical Ouroboros.

You're such a Civic.

~Chas'88

Citing the greatest philosophers shows at least that my approach is not so unusual, however it might appear to be; I'm not alone. That alone doesn't make my ideas right; people determine their ideas and opinions based on what they know and understand.

I don't have beliefs as dogmas or principles I assume to be true without any basis; I have beliefs that are best guesses, as in, "I don't know, but I believe so"; and faith is necessary, because we never know everything in the manifest world, even if we know some basic principles that apply everywhere, and if we did know everything life would be completely boring and pointless.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Can you give us an example of a first principle and how it is directly experienced? Thanks.

I gave a bunch of them in my paper, but the best starting point is probably colors. I've probably discussed this before here. Others may disagree, but I'm pretty sure that colors are determined by the form, not by wavelengths or sense organs, and that red as we experience it is universal, not socially determined or merely a name arbitrarily chosen. I could call a different color "red" than the one you do; but the colors remain the same whichever one I decide to call "red." There seems to be nothing material or existential that can account for the fact that color wheels exist, and the same applies also to musical octaves. There seem to be these patterns in nature; mathematical patterns, physical patterns like states of matter, psychological patterns like the 4 functions or the 4 generations; there's an archetypal aspect to them that can't be explained any other way. You can explain physical processes of how they may be transmitted or transformed into each other; that's all. There are principles to live by, spiritual or ethical laws and such too, but the patterns of nature are a good starting point.

Originally Posted by Chas'88

You're such a Civic.

~Chas'88

So was Popper!

(He was a late Civic who was born back when Austria was still on the Eastern saecular timeline, and it shows)

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

I'm pretty sure that colors are determined by the form, not by wavelengths or sense organs, and that red as we experience it is universal, not socially determined or merely a name arbitrarily chosen. I could call a different color "red" than the one you do; but the colors remain the same whichever one I decide to call "red." There seems to be nothing material or existential that can account for the fact that color wheels exist,

color-blind people would beg to disagree.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

Citing the greatest philosophers shows at least that my approach is not so unusual, however it might appear to be; I'm not alone. That alone doesn't make my ideas right; people determine their ideas and opinions based on what they know and understand.

Right, I was just short-circuiting any attempt to cite authority from the distant past. Personally, I feel no need to reference other people's ideas in order to add authority to mine. I may do so if they expressed them more clearly than I can, or if for some other reason I feel that doing so can aid understanding, but the mere fact that what I am saying was also believed by Plato or Aristotle or Kant or Wittgenstein or whoever

means

absolutely

squat.

And the same is true for you. Your ideas must stand on their own.

I don't have beliefs as dogmas or principles I assume to be true without any basis

Of course you do. Everyone does. It's unavoidable. At minimum, we have to assume, without proof, a means of proving other claims. Any proof of the basis for knowledge is inevitably circular, because it must assume the conclusion before proceeding. For example, one cannot prove the scientific method itself scientifically, because all scientific proofs assume the validity of scientific method a priori and so a scientific proof of scientific method assumes the conclusion and is therefore invalid.

I gave a bunch of them in my paper, but the best starting point is probably colors. I've probably discussed this before here. Others may disagree, but I'm pretty sure that colors are determined by the form, not by wavelengths or sense organs, and that red as we experience it is universal, not socially determined or merely a name arbitrarily chosen. There seems to be nothing material or existential that can account for the fact that color wheels exist, and the same applies also to musical octaves. There seem to be these patterns in nature; mathematical patterns, physical patterns like states of matter, psychological patterns like the 4 functions or the 4 generations; there's an archetypal aspect to them that can't be explained any other way. You can explain physical processes of how they may be transmitted or transformed into each other; that's all. There are principles to live by, spiritual or ethical laws and such too, but the patterns of nature are a good starting point.

This sounds like it might be related to Kant's "categorical imperative." You seem to be talking about ways in which we instinctively look at the world and divide it up.

I should point out, picking nits, that musical scales aren't universal and that different musical theories arose from different cultures. Other languages divide color up differently than we do, too. Also, just to be clear, this really has nothing to do with any scientific models of perception and so those should be set aside and not considered here. I think you're dealing with a basic philosophical concept here and so the wavelength/optic nerve/etc. model of color perception isn't of significance; we're discussing the ways in which the mind recognizes a distinction between one color and another and divides the color scale (which for physics is a single unbroken wavelength continuum) into more or less discrete sections.

Adjusting for that, and recognizing that we do my nature divide up the world into systematic parts for clearer understanding, let me present a question. Do these categories exist in the world itself, or are they functions of the brain and how we perceive and think? What test would answer that question?

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Right, I was just short-circuiting any attempt to cite authority from the distant past. Personally, I feel no need to reference other people's ideas in order to add authority to mine. I may do so if they expressed them more clearly than I can, or if for some other reason I feel that doing so can aid understanding, but the mere fact that what I am saying was also believed by Plato or Aristotle or Kant or Wittgenstein or whoever

means

absolutely

squat.

And the same is true for you. Your ideas must stand on their own.

yes, perhaps "I may do so if they expressed them more clearly than I can, or if for some other reason I feel that doing so can aid understanding"

Of course you do. Everyone does. It's unavoidable. At minimum, we have to assume, without proof, a means of proving other claims. Any proof of the basis for knowledge is inevitably circular, because it must assume the conclusion before proceeding. For example, one cannot prove the scientific method itself scientifically, because all scientific proofs assume the validity of scientific method a priori and so a scientific proof of scientific method assumes the conclusion and is therefore invalid.

The phenonemological method, for example, seeks to avoid any assumptions at all. I don't think I need to make any assumptions about method, because all methods (especially the scientific ones) are up for question. In philosophy we need to examine all assumptions, whereas in science a method is assumed.

This sounds like it might be related to Kant's "categorical imperative." You seem to be talking about ways in which we instinctively look at the world and divide it up.

Perhaps so; as I indicated, there might be some similarity. Kant laid the groundwork for much of our knowledge of this topic today. I don't assume that's he's correct, or not subject to modification; on the other hand, there's no need to reinvent the wheel if another philosopher has already covered the territory.

I should point out, picking nits, that musical scales aren't universal and that different musical theories arose from different cultures. Other languages divide color up differently than we do, too. Also, just to be clear, this really has nothing to do with any scientific models of perception and so those should be set aside and not considered here. I think you're dealing with a basic philosophical concept here and so the wavelength/optic nerve/etc. model of color perception isn't of significance; we're discussing the ways in which the mind recognizes a distinction between one color and another and divides the color scale (which for physics is a single unbroken wavelength continuum) into more or less discrete sections.

Exactly my point, I think. The nickpick is correct too, but it doesn't discount the fact of the circular "form" appearing, that can't be explained by differences in how the circle is divided. My friend Robert Place pointed out in his book on The Tarot that the octave, fourth and fifth tones ARE universal.

Adjusting for that, and recognizing that we do my nature divide up the world into systematic parts for clearer understanding, let me present a question. Do these categories exist in the world itself, or are they functions of the brain and how we perceive and think? What test would answer that question?

I don't know; the only philosophical "test" is to look at the world intuitively and phenomenologically to understand these ideas, or else someone can try to use scientific measurements to see if the brain functions that way. Someone else besides me would need to conduct the latter "test" using those materialist assumptions. Kant of course thought that the mind (not "the brain") supplies these categories a priori, but that they depend on experience in order to have any application.

Aristotle has a good corrective which we have forgotten; the idea of the 4 causes. There is not only the material and efficient cause, which materialist scientists typically restrict themselves to today, but also the formal and final causes. Forms and categories of the mind are one of the 4 causes of phenomena, according to him. Plato thought that these forms are not part of the sensible world, but are perceived in the rational mind (and do not exist in time and space). You can't perceive them with the senses; the world can't be measured or stopped from changing enough ever to see them. In my own view, I avoid this dualist tendency by thinking of the forms as interdependent with the sensible and experienced world; they only exist as aspects of it, not as a prior realm that is imperfectly reflected in the world, as Plato thought. I also bring the rational and empirical together from the inner perspective of our experience of ourselves, taking up where Plato and Bergson left off in that respect. The Greek philosophers may have left a dualist element in their views, but their followers in the alchemical tradition fully articulated the "divine marriage" as the goal of their quest, and that is definitely the marriage of the rational and the empirical (or essential and existential).

I wrote in my paper: "There is only one reality in this universe. There is nothing beyond the concrete reality that we know existentially, when we leave behind the prison of dead mechanical reason and get in touch with our feelings and intuition. And there is nothing completely chaotic in the world, nowhere where we cannot find some manifestation of forms. On the outside things may appear to fall short of the perfection of Plato's forms, but when we see things from the perspective of our own souls in their concrete flux, where absolute stability and absolute fluidity blend as one, we will not fail to see forms in them."

Bergson made the salient point that our consciousness is always changing and yet always the same. The uncertainty principle enunciates a similar idea, the relation between "position" and "momentum." That gave me the starting point to reconcile the rational and empirical. If you don't want to go there though; if for you feelings or the changing flux of our minds are not "consciousness" (etc.), there may be some research about the nature of the brain, and how its tendency to see categories is inbuilt into its operation. Philosophers like Bergson as well as yogis and spiritual teachers say that too. That may well have been done in science; however, it would not really answer the question of whether these categories have validity on their own, or are just a reflection of our thinking. THAT is the basic question, which Plato and Bergson and their followers and colleagues answer oppositely.

The Final Cause only applies to sentient entities (humans, higher animals, etc), because only sentient entities can have the concept of "purpose". Nothing has any inherent purpose, it just IS, "purpose" is a creation of sentient beings with goals and intentions. Aristotle's teleological mindset came from his study of living organisims, but that appearance of purpose is an illusion created by natural selection.

Originally Posted by Odin

color-blind people would beg to disagree.

So colors only exist in the minds of people who have the equipment to perceive them?

Those who don't need to see a faith healer.

Or maybe the Acid Queen. Tommy the deaf, dumb and blind kid found God.

Originally Posted by Odin

The Final Cause only applies to sentient entities (humans, higher animals, etc), because only sentient entities can have the concept of "purpose". Nothing has any inherent purpose, it just IS, "purpose" is a creation of sentient beings with goals and intentions. Aristotle's teleological mindset came from his study of living organisms, but that appearance of purpose is an illusion created by natural selection.

But if everything in the world is sentient, then that limit does not apply. A universe that produces sentient beings, is sentient at some level. I tend to think therefore that the Final Cause is valid, though it doesn't bear on the issue of the Formal Cause.

It's true his starting point was biology, but that does not a priori discount what he ends up with. It's true though that his views are more organic, like most people of the ancient West and of the Orient. That view is correct IMO, and the Darwinian mechanical view is wrong or at least insufficient. One idea from Aristotle's physics that has been adopted by modern physics is his idea of the potential and the actual.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

The phenonemological method, for example, seeks to avoid any assumptions at all.

I don't know what you mean by "the phenomenological method." Are you referring to the branch of philosophy called "phenomenology"? If so, then it does have founding assumptions. If you mean something else, I think I need some clarification.

I don't think I need to make any assumptions about method, because all methods (especially the scientific ones) are up for question.

You do if you're going to conclude anything about what we can know and how, even if your conclusion is that we can't know anything any way.

I don't know; the only philosophical "test" is to look at the world intuitively and phenomenologically to understand these ideas

Well, let's do some considering. (Scientific tests on the brain might provide us with a mechanism whereby we instinctively think this way, or more likely on the particulars of how we categorize.)

We look at the world and we see it in color. According to the models of physics, color is the way that we distinguish different wavelengths of light in the visible spectrum. When long-wavelength light hits our retina, it produces a signal that our visual cortex interprets as red or orange; a short-wavelength light is seen as blue or purple. But the important thing is that we are applying to the world of phenomena this categorization of color. On a more esoteric level, science does the same thing by dividing light from the rest of phenomena and assigning the concept of wavelength or frequency, but that's an artificial creation and we're discussing things that are more natural and instinctive (or so it seems to me).

Here is the test that I was thinking of when I asked that. Suppose that a non-human intelligence endowed with vision were to perceive the world -- an alien, say, or a sophisticated artificial intelligence. Consider the AI in particular. It has vision, that is, it can process information derived from reflected light. It does not however have a human brain, and so it does not (unless programmed to do so) see the world in terms of "color" as we understand that. For it, there is no particular reason to include 650 nm squared with 720 nm squared in the same category and call it "red." "Red" for it might be a direction, a relative value, as we speak of "red-shifting."

Can you think of any reason why such a way of perceiving the world would be impossible? On the other hand, an alien might have a completely different visual spectrum than our own, depending on the light of its own star, which could be hotter or cooler (and hence bluer or redder) than ours. Would the alien not have a completely different perspective on the matter? Or what if the alien didn't even have color sense, could perceive differences in the amplitude (i.e., brightness) of light, but not its frequency (i.e., color)? What if it didn't even have sight, but relied instead on other long-range senses such as sonar?

The fact that we can conceive of such things, even though we have no actual examples of them, suggests to me that we are dealing with ways in which we perceive the world, part of the mental net through which we experience reality, rather than anything inherent in reality itself (except of course that we are part of reality, so the fact that WE do so is part of reality -- and yet a particular rather than a general feature).

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

I don't know what you mean by "the phenomenological method." Are you referring to the branch of philosophy called "phenomenology"? If so, then it does have founding assumptions. If you mean something else, I think I need some clarification.

Sure, that's it. Their method is to put all assumptions into a epoche or bracket and just describe experience. If you want to call that "an assumption" I can't stop you. But in philosophy, all assumptions are up for examination, just out of curiosity. That curiosity I would not call an "assumption" but just a condition of being human and having a mind.

But the important thing is that we are applying to the world of phenomena this categorization of color.

Yes, because that's what we see. Categories in this sense are descriptions.

Here is the test that I was thinking of when I asked that. Suppose that a non-human intelligence endowed with vision were to perceive the world -- an alien, say, or a sophisticated artificial intelligence.

Why would I want to go there and "suppose"? (not very empirical is it?)

Consider the AI in particular. It has vision, that is, it can process information derived from reflected light. It does not however have a human brain, and so it does not (unless programmed to do so) see the world in terms of "color" as we understand that. For it, there is no particular reason to include 650 nm squared with 720 nm squared in the same category and call it "red." "Red" for it might be a direction, a relative value, as we speak of "red-shifting."

In my view AI does not "perceive" but just reacts to stimuli.

On the other hand, an alien might have a completely different visual spectrum than our own, depending on the light of its own star, which could be hotter or cooler (and hence bluer or redder) than ours. Would the alien not have a completely different perspective on the matter? Or what if the alien didn't even have color sense, could perceive differences in the amplitude (i.e., brightness) of light, but not its frequency (i.e., color)? What if it didn't even have sight, but relied instead on other long-range senses such as sonar?

The fact that we can conceive of such things, even though we have no actual examples of them, suggests to me that we are dealing with ways in which we perceive the world, part of the mental net through which we experience reality, rather than anything inherent in reality itself (except of course that we are part of reality, so the fact that WE do so is part of reality -- and yet a particular rather than a general feature).

You and Odin raised the same point; of course he is always very brief, and we are long-winded. But if I don't have the same equipment to see things in the same way, does that change what is seen? I don't think so; it just means we might see less or very little of what another sees. Blue is still blue, and white is still white, although one might see different parts of the spectrum than another. And seeing different colors does not change the fact that colors are seen.

Maybe I might have more thoughts on this later. It may be that you are taking an idealist view and myself a realist one; an ironic switch, but Plato is considered a "realist" in the older terminology, and I am taking his side on this one. But even from the idealist view, just because one person does not hear the tree fall in the forest, does not mean another observer might not hear it instead.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

Sure, that's it. Their method is to put all assumptions into a epoche or bracket and just describe experience. If you want to call that "an assumption" I can't stop you. But in philosophy, all assumptions are up for examination, just out of curiosity. That curiosity I would not call an "assumption" but just a condition of being human and having a mind.

Either phenomenologists are making claims about reality or they are just experiencing it. In the former case, they have assumptions on which, along with experience, their claims are based. If they are just experiencing it, they are saying essentially nothing, so I doubt that is the case.

Why would I want to go there and "suppose"? (not very empirical is it?)

We have the capacity to imagine possible experiences that haven't happened yet. To do so is not a violation of empiricism. To treat the imagined reality as if it were known to be real is.

In my view AI does not "perceive" but just reacts to stimuli.

That's a cop-out, Eric. If we "perceive" (that is, experience subjectively) and don't just "react to stimuli," nevertheless all descriptions of how we perceive the world describe reaction to stimuli, and as that would be shared by an AI, whether it actually subjectively experiences what it perceives is irrelevant. After all, I have no way to verify for certain that YOU actually experience things subjectively. I take your word for it, and I would be inclined to do the same with an AI. I could be wrong in either case, but it doesn't matter.

You and Odin raised the same point; of course he is always very brief, and we are long-winded. But if I don't have the same equipment to see things in the same way, does that change what is seen? I don't think so; it just means we might see less or very little of what another sees. Blue is still blue, and white is still white, although one might see different parts of the spectrum than another. And seeing different colors does not change the fact that colors are seen.

It seems to me that you are taking elements of our own perceptual apparatus ("blue," "white") and assigning them to what is seen. Also, I might refer you to the distinction between phenomena and noumena; "what is seen" in the sense you are describing here is unknowable. It's true that we cannot perceive all possible elements of what we are observing. Not only in the ways we've been talking about, but it's also possible that there are ways of perceiving reality, other senses, of which we literally know nothing. "How do you know but every bird that cuts the airy way, is an immense world of delight, closed to your senses five?"

"What is seen" is not the same as "what is," and therefore the answer to your question, [I]f I don't have the same equipment to see things in the same way, does that change what is seen?" is yes. It doesn't change what is, but it does change what is seen.

But even from the idealist view, just because one person does not hear the tree fall in the forest, does not mean another observer might not hear it instead.

Agreed, but then again, he would not hear it with the same ears or the same brain, and to the extent his are different from yours, he would not hear the same sound.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

So colors only exist in the minds of people who have the equipment to perceive them?

Those who don't need to see a faith healer.

Or maybe the Acid Queen. Tommy the deaf, dumb and blind kid found God.

The wavelengths of light exist regardless of anyone's ability to perceive them. But as pure experience, the colors exist in the minds of those who can see them. Unless, of course, you're postulating Platonic Forms, which I'd say would *be* the wavelengths of light.