Yeah. Sorry about that. The conversation has been so drawn out that I drifted back to the original point.
How is that not then an operational definition for consciousness? Individuals in whom we can detect a specific pattern of substrates is defined as being conscious. Kind of like using an IQ score as an operational definition of intelligence.My point is that in science all terms must be understood operationally, that is, in ways that lend themselves to observational or experimental testing (whether or not, as a practical matter, any such test could actually be performed given our current technology and circumstantial limitations). If no test can be performed as a practical matter, any discussion about the term will remain speculative, but if no test can even be conceived or described, then no scientific discussion can take place at all -- not even speculation.
When I ask you what test could be performed to determine whether a human being (other than oneself) is conscious, I don't mean to require that this test could be done as a practical matter. If it can't, but we can at least conceive of the test, then consciousness will become a scientific concept, even if it must remain a speculative one for the moment.
Regarding the Cambridge declaration, the key phrase is found in the first paragraph: "the neurobiological substrates of conscious
experience and related behaviors in human and non-human animals." It's possible to study those "neurobiological substrates," certainly, but in doing so we must assume -- without evidence -- that they actually are substrates, i.e. that they actually are the cause of consciousness.
If we use the "specific substratesattern" as our definition of consciousness, might we not then look for particular behaviors displayed by conscious organisms vs. no conscious?There is also no evidence whatever justifying the phrase "related behaviors," as we have no way to tell objectively whether a given behavior is related to consciousness or not -- or even whether consciousness is present.
[qupte]Of course, any such behaviors can themselves be studied, as can any behaviors whatever.
The paper goes on to discuss "neural substrates of emotions," and here they are on more solid ground, since "emotions" can be defined operationally and objectively (in behavioral terms emotion is known as "affect" and that would have been a better term to use). What we call "emotion" is a subjectively-experienced feeling. We also observe in ourselves certain behaviors associated with emotions that we feel. We observe the same behaviors in others in circumstances in which we would feel certain things. We reasonably (in terms of common sense) assume that the person behaving the same way in the same circumstances is feeling the same thing that we would feel, or something close to it -- we assume (again reasonably in terms of common sense) that the other person is feeling anything. But we cannot prove this, ever. All we can show objectively is that stimuli give rise to neural responses which give rise to behaviors.[/quote]
And couldn't that be your definition of consciousness?
Then perhaps consciousness,in common parlance, doesn't really exist?What's more, all of this work that these scientists are doing can be done and described without any reference to consciousness at all, and it would lose nothing in the way of objective, measurable, scientifically valid results.
I prefer to take the word of the researchers that they are attempting strip away the "unscientific" elements to get at what can possibly be measured. Would you argue that what they are looking for is so different from what you mean by the term that they should come up with something else to call it?The idea of consciousness adds nothing substantive to what they are doing here and in fact pollutes it with non-scientific elements -- and a non-scientific element corrupting science deserves the label "unscientific," which is a pejorative.
Can intelligence be observed? Is the study of intelligence outside the realm of science? Why is it different from consciousness?Any idea we have about consciousness itself, as opposed to its neural and behavioral accompaniments, must always be non-scientific in character; it must be philosophical or mystical or religious. This isn't "throwing up our hands in despair." It's simply recognizing that that which can't be observed is outside the realm of science, a tool of thought ideally suited to determining factual truths about observable reality but useless for any other purpose.
Once again, I'm mostly playing devil's advocate here. I can see what your points are, I'm just not sure that declaring consciousness to be completely unobservable is a wise choice given the long track record of science finding ways to observe past "unobservables".