Originally Posted by Brian Rush

For example, a simplistic religious believer who undergoes a spiritual experience might explain it as, "God spoke to me in my heart and I understood that He and I are one." I would say that the person transcended the illusion of his or her small-scale identity, and merged with the cosmos, gaining understanding that his/her consciousness was that of the universe.

How is this account any different from the first? Use the word God for cosmos/universe and you get:

the person transcended the illusion of his or her small-scale identity, and merged with God, gaining understanding that his/her consciousness was that of God. The latter portion of this statement means the same thing to me as "having a personal relationship with Jesus Christ".

Since the significance of the experience is preserved, my account is not "explaining it away."

Your account isn't explaining at all. As far as I can tell, it says essentially the same thing as the religious person using terminology that is more aesthetically pleasing to you.

A consciousness cosmos has the same degree of external "realness" as God does. If you believe in one then you believe in the other.

Note I am separating belief in God from religion. Religion seeks to domesticate God. If you prefer God to be on the wild side then you would be a believer who eschews religion.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

As for God, I disagree with the characterization of God as an "axiom." This implies that God is a proposition, which is not the case. God is a description of certain experiences, and ideas explaining those experiences (not very well, in my opinion). Properly understood, God is not an axiom but a metaphor or parable -- a myth, in the deep psychological rather than the dismissive sense.

God as an axiom is the minimal characterization. This is how atheists characterize God. An atheist holds that God does not empirically exist, that is, He is undetectable, his existence must be assumed. The simplest and most basic function of God is that of the "uncaused cause" or "Prime Mover" or whatever term one wishes to use. That is, the use of God as an axiom for those things about the beginning of the universe that we have to assume (i.e. axiom). An atheist refrains from using the term God for these axioms for aesthetic reasons.
A believer in God will of course have more uses for God, such as a description of certain experiences.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

God as an axiom is the minimal characterization. This is how atheists characterize God.

An atheist, almost by definition, does not understand God and cannot be regarded as authoritative on the subject.

God as an axiom might be the minimal characterization if God were a proposition, but as he/she/it isn't, it's not.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

Your account isn't explaining at all. As far as I can tell, it says essentially the same thing as the religious person using terminology that is more aesthetically pleasing to you.

A consciousness cosmos

Was not mentioned. Please don't insert things that weren't said.

The significance of the experience is not connected with any alleged reality of its object. That was my point, which apparently was not conveyed.

EDIT: A better way to say the above is that the experience is not in the third person. It is not observation, but immersion. It is not a way of gaining knowledge about an object separate from oneself, as observation is. It is a way of gaining understanding, which is subtly different from knowledge, about oneself, one's relationship with the universe, and one's identity behind the illusion or mask we carry about. Focusing on the object as it is metaphorically described is a sure way to become confused.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

This is not complete. Before you can explain something you must first be able to characterize it. There can be no theory of telepathy without an operational definition of telepathy. To study telepathy there has to be some telepathy to study. Just as to study UFOs one has to produce a UFO (or compelling evidence of UFOs). For UFOs it has been recently established that these do not exist. I say this because with the rise of smart phones with cameras, huge number of people have the means to document and publish UFO sightings over time period too short for effective suppression. If UFOs were visiting the Earth (as claimed by numerous undocumented accounts by eyewitnesses in the past who did not have portable cameras with them) then hundred of cell phone pictures and videos of visiting aliens would have flooded the web as the video of the meteorite over Russia did recently.

Interesting, but I know there are thousands or millions of such pictures and reports. I go sometimes to our local MUFON where people share their pictures, evidence, reports, experiences and sightings, etc.

I would expect that such sightings by people with cameras have been posted.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzyhubOYft8
http://youtu.be/5iYHBfnzIt0

For telepathy, the way it has been described implies that it should be testable by experiments. Yet when this has been done the results have been inconclusive, like those involving cold fusion.

Telepathy research is very common as well; there is much evidence for it.
http://www.sciforums.com/showthread....-for-telepathy
Sheldrake's research:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...scientist.html
Tart's book:
http://www.noetic.org/library/public...d-materialism/
Does telepathy conflict with science? A summary of research.
https://realitysandwich.com/161239/d...flict_science/
Russell Targ on psychic research
http://www.espresearch.com/espgeneral/doc-AT.shtml
How ESP works
http://science.howstuffworks.com/sci...tions/esp2.htm

The chief issue is all of these "on the edge" phenomena have the property that they were first proposed when our powers of observation were miniscule compared to what we can perceive today and yet with this far greater resolving power they still remain out there on the edge of perception. If they were real they should have become visible.

The chief issue today is likely suppression and ignoring by the mainstream culture which has recently become more close-minded towards these issues.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

This is confused. A spiritual experience is a subjective, internal thing. The only person who can "explain away" or dismiss it is the person who has that experience.

When a person who has a spiritual experience asserts it is real to another person, he is asking that person to believe in a subjective experience that he did not have.

Actually, there are many kinds of "spiritual experience." Some may be real only to the person having it, but others are experiences that reveal the nature of life and reality. When many people have the same experience, then that is validation; even if it is not objectively verifiable. In this case a person asserts a spiritual experience to another person, and the other person says "yes that is also what I experienced," then (s)he is not asking that person to believe an experience (s)he did not have.

For example, someone may experience connection to the environment and the cosmos, so that the identity of that person as (s)he experiences it must now at-least include the identity of the whole. This may be subjective, but this experience conveys information about what is outside the individuality of the person. Same with people who report experiences after death, and find that many others have had similar experiences. These people are not asking the others to "believe" anything they haven't also experienced.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Mike:

Yes, telepathy needs an operational definition before it can be studied. I would add that after it's given that definition and studies conducted, it further needs at least a wild-guess hypothesis about how it works, that can fit into an overall scientific paradigm. Failing that -- and so far those studying the phenomenon have so failed -- evidence in favor of its existence will meet with reactions from hostility to shrugs. Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, the flaw in parapsychology up to this point has been more theoretical than empirical. Parapsychologists have devoted all their efforts to proving the phenomena exist, without considering that, lacking a coherent theory or hypothesis, they were requiring the scientific community in general to believe in the supernatural, which of course they will not do (and rightly not).

When and if a coherent hypothesis is developed, the evidence already gathered will be found much less "inconclusive" than it is currently judged.

An operational definition does not require that it conform to current paradigms. Scientists might shrug, but then it is up to them to learn not to shrug if the evidence becomes sufficient for them.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

The simplest and most basic function of God is that of the "uncaused cause" or "Prime Mover" or whatever term one wishes to use.

I agree, and I think it opens up more than just an axiom. It may be that God is very simple like that, and yet is everything.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

I would expect that such sightings by people with cameras have been posted.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzyhubOYft8
http://youtu.be/5iYHBfnzIt0

There should be huge numbers of them and roughly half should be in daylight. I read about UFOs when I was younger. There were many photos in that time. Few were during the daytime and the best pictures (the ones with the most detailed images of the objects) had turned out to be fakes. These were from a time before cell phone cameras. Today, every year should be many thousands of daylight pictures with hundreds showing clear details of objects. And the best of these objects would have multiple independent videos from different phones taken from different perspectives. Sort of like that meteor in Russia was captured on high quality video by numerous cameras.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

How ESP works
http://science.howstuffworks.com/sci...tions/esp2.htm

Here's a quote from the above report:

The biggest problem with a lot of ESP research is it isn't reproducible. That is, one scientist may get results that another scientist can't get by replicating the experiment with different subjects.

This exact thing happened with cold fusion. Two researchers made a claim that was way more "out there" than UFOs or ESP. Others looked into it and could not reproduce the results. Eventually it was concluded that there was nothing there.

"The biggest problem with a lot of ESP research is it isn't reproducible. That is, one scientist may get results that another scientist can't get by replicating the experiment with different subjects."

This is what I meant by a spurious reason for rejecting the evidence -- an excuse, really, not an honest reason. Unless one is presenting telepathy is a universal ability like being able to tie your shoes, there is no reason to expect that it should be shown by all random samplings of test subjects, any more than we should expect a random sampling of people off the street all to be able to compose a symphony or run a four-minute mile.

That's actually quite obvious, and so when I see an objection like this being raised, it tells me that someone is not honestly evaluating the studies. Why is that? My hypothesis: because the data, if accepted, would seem to require a belief in the supernatural.

Present a non-supernatural and coherent model of the phenomenon, and this objection disappears. It will then be possible for the scientific community to evaluate the data without bias. But it's the responsibility of parapsychologists to come up with such a model, not that of scientists in other fields, and they haven't. Their bad.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

"The biggest problem with a lot of ESP research is it isn't reproducible. That is, one scientist may get results that another scientist can't get by replicating the experiment with different subjects."

This is what I meant by a spurious reason for rejecting the evidence -- an excuse, really, not an honest reason. Unless one is presenting telepathy is a universal ability like being able to tie your shoes, there is no reason to expect that it should be shown by all random samplings of test subjects, any more than we should expect a random sampling of people off the street all to be able to compose a symphony or run a four-minute mile.

That's actually quite obvious, and so when I see an objection like this being raised, it tells me that someone is not honestly evaluating the studies. Why is that? My hypothesis: because the data, if accepted, would seem to require a belief in the supernatural.

Present a non-supernatural and coherent model of the phenomenon, and this objection disappears. It will then be possible for the scientific community to evaluate the data without bias. But it's the responsibility of parapsychologists to come up with such a model, not that of scientists in other fields, and they haven't. Their bad.

No acceptance of data should require any sort of belief. Science is concerned with knowledge; that's what the word means.

Originally Posted by Mikebert

There should be huge numbers of them and roughly half should be in daylight. I read about UFOs when I was younger. There were many photos in that time. Few were during the daytime and the best pictures (the ones with the most detailed images of the objects) had turned out to be fakes. These were from a time before cell phone cameras. Today, every year should be many thousands of daylight pictures with hundreds showing clear details of objects. And the best of these objects would have multiple independent videos from different phones taken from different perspectives. Sort of like that meteor in Russia was captured on high quality video by numerous cameras.

Such pictures are legion and have been reported by UFO researchers. Relying on what you read when you were younger may not be sufficient.

However, you have a point, since it is hard to find examples on you tube uploaded from personal cameras amid all the obvious nonsense and fakes.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

No acceptance of data should require any sort of belief. Science is concerned with knowledge; that's what the word means.

Nice ideal, but in reality it doesn't work that way. The more something seems to disrupt the current body of theory, or even (as in this case) require abandonment of precepts that make science even possible, the stronger the resistance to it will be. It's also not at all unreasonable to expect parapsychologists to have at least a working hypothesis of what they're demonstrating. "We found this weird anomaly, you guys figure it out" isn't going to fly.

It's also the case that some of the researchers had suspect motives. J.B. Rhine is an example. His research was conducted at a time when behaviorist psychology was the prevailing approach, and he wanted to refute it and support dualism, but that isn't the way to go about it. Over time, behaviorism has been nuanced and more or less abandoned in favor of cognitive and neurological approaches, which deal with the workings of the "mind" and don't restrict themselves to behavior, but without dualism. Rhine's experimental results can be explained without resort to dualism.

In fact, I had a long-running discussion about that (not about ESP but about dualism and whether consciousness can be explained in terms of classical materialism) with a hard-boiled materialist on Google+ that clarified my thinking about the subject. Consciousness, or anyway hard-problem consciousness, isn't a process but the entirety of first-person subjective experience. Every model in science, though, is third-person: set of circumstances A, observed in the third person, results in outcome B, also observed in the third person. You can't get from a third-person process to first-person experience by any logically coherent route, and that is always going to frustrate attempts to explain consciousness as a result of brain functioning. Every process in the brain that can be experienced in the first person can also be described in the third person, but the fact that it is experienced in the first person at all can't. Of course, that also means we have no objective evidence for first-person consciousness (only subjective first-person evidence), and it cannot be incorporated into any of our models, and a somewhat different approach will be required to develop concepts that take it into account.

ESP can also be described in the third person, and doesn't require consciousness (although as with everything in life, consciousness is involved in it), so Rhine was wrong in his thinking; his research didn't serve his real motivation. But his real motivation calls his efforts into question.

I also thought along these lines about epiphenomenalism (the idea that consciousness has no consequences, is impacted by measurable events but has no impact on them) and realized that this comes from improperly mixing third-person and first-person thinking. From a third-person perspective, there's no such thing as consciousness. From a first-person perspective, consciousness has consequences. It's not an epiphenomenon from either perspective; either it has an effect on reality, or it doesn't exist at all, depending on your viewpoint.

Wikipedia is demonstrably a haven for science dogmatism. I reported above on this. I guess we need to keep this in mind when relying on it. No neutral statements about scientific research into the paranormal are allowed if it conflicts with the opinions of people like The Amazing Randi and the editors of The Scientific Inquirer. Wikipedia is certainly an instance of the dominance of a traditional materialist worldview in our society.

I suspect Vandal is one of the watchdogs on wikipedia to preserve the orthodox view.

I think a belief is not a hypothesis to be tested. A hypothesis is a statement of what you are studying and testing for. Does telepathy exist? In other words, can information be transferred between minds at a distance without the use of the senses? Define the subject, and ask whether the tests will demonstrate it. That seems to me to be the nature of a scientific empirical investigation.

Whether dualism, or materialism, or epiphenomena, or mystical or supernatural views of nature, etc., can explain the phenomenon, is a different question. Researchers may have one or another of these beliefs, which may motivate their research. We all have beliefs; guesses about the nature of reality. They may say that their research supports these beliefs. They are irrelevant to conducting the actual research though.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

I think a belief is not a hypothesis to be tested. A hypothesis is a statement of what you are studying and testing for.

This is incorrect. A hypothesis is a tentative model, and a model is a belief.

Does telepathy exist? In other words, can information be transferred between minds at a distance without the use of the senses?

That's a question. Turn it into a statement and you have a hypothesis, and also a belief. However, enough data exist to develop a model of telepathy that goes beyond the above bare-bones version, e.g.:

The phenomenon is describable as an alteration of probability involved in the indeterminate firing of synapses in the brain of the telepath. The "sender" impacts the brain of the "receiver" in this way and produces an effect, which can manifest in two ways. One, it increases the chance of the receiver "guessing" what the sender is sending from a fixed set of possibilities, producing a statistically significant but not terribly useful outcome. And two, it produces an emotional impact on the receiver which corresponds with the emotional state or sensory experiences of the sender, allowing the receiver to know what the sender is feeling with much higher reliability than the cognitive effect on tests such as card-guessing. The same phenomenon may allow for further applications such as psychological healing, since it appears to be a brain-to-brain effect and not something like vision or other passive perception. Finally, the same phenomenon in general (probability alteration) may allow for other effects, on indeterminate processes other than those in the brain.

Here we have not merely a bald statement of what is being looked for, but an actual model, which allows predictions to be made and further experimentation to be conducted as guided by those predictions. This sort of thing is what parapsychologists should have been doing once the initial results were in. Instead, they published those initial results, met with skepticism, and gave up (or else repeated the same efforts in the hope that stronger evidence would lead to more acceptance).

Whether beliefs are relevant to the research depends on whether they can be stated in operational form, like the above. If they can, they should be, and should be used to make predictions that will guide further testing. Science isn't just empirical. It's an interaction between ideas about what is observed, and observation itself. A "belief" of the religious-belief type, believed just because one wants to, has no place in science, but informed beliefs that are subject to empirical verification most certainly do.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

This is incorrect. A hypothesis is a tentative model, and a model is a belief....
Whether beliefs are relevant to the research depends on whether they can be stated in operational form, like the above. If they can, they should be, and should be used to make predictions that will guide further testing. Science isn't just empirical. It's an interaction between ideas about what is observed, and observation itself. A "belief" of the religious-belief type, believed just because one wants to, has no place in science, but informed beliefs that are subject to empirical verification most certainly do.

If we define a belief as a tentative model to be tested, that might work, but such a belief need not be materialist, just on the grounds that one's results are more likely to be accepted by current scientific opinion if you assert that belief as your model. That is not science, but conformity and fear of offending authorities, and not "wanting" to be ignored because your model is of one philosophical kind rather than another. There's no doubt that such a trend of scientific opinion exists (as the censorship in TED and wikipedia demonstrates clearly), but it is most unfortunate. Myself I would prefer your term tentative model over the term belief, which is akin to a religious or philosophical belief.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

If we define a belief as a tentative model to be tested, that might work, but such a belief need not be materialist

Let's take a look at that for a moment. Strictly speaking, you're right, and no scientific hypothesis is "materialist" in the sense of philosophical materialism, which is a metaphysical position that can never be proven. But in another sense, yes, it does. It goes back again to that first person/third person dichotomy. The scientific method has, as its bedrock, observation, which is to be contrasted with immersion. Observation results in third-person accounts. Immersion results in first-person or second-person accounts. A scientific theory always takes the form: conditions A as described in the third person give rise to outcome B described in the third person.

Now, theories in that format do not require philosophical materialism, that's true. But they are always mechanistic in nature, because that's what's being described: how things work, not what they mean, how they feel, or what should be done.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Let's take a look at that for a moment. Strictly speaking, you're right, and no scientific hypothesis is "materialist" in the sense of philosophical materialism, which is a metaphysical position that can never be proven. But in another sense, yes, it does. It goes back again to that first person/third person dichotomy. The scientific method has, as its bedrock, observation, which is to be contrasted with immersion. Observation results in third-person accounts. Immersion results in first-person or second-person accounts. A scientific theory always takes the form: conditions A as described in the third person give rise to outcome B described in the third person.

Now, theories in that format do not require philosophical materialism, that's true. But they are always mechanistic in nature, because that's what's being described: how things work, not what they mean, how they feel, or what should be done.

I stick to my "strictly speaking." Mechanistic is too loaded a term; that's materialism. Is there a better term?

It is third person, because it means verification by more than one observer. There is a model or definition being tested.
"How things work" does not extent further than this. It is not what things mean, feel or direct.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

I stick to my "strictly speaking." Mechanistic is too loaded a term; that's materialism. Is there a better term?

Not really. Scientific theories aren't materialistic, but they are mechanistic. I get the sense sometimes that that's your objection, especially when it comes to theories of mental functioning. Describing those in the third person doesn't include the subjective, first-person aspect and can make it look soulless and as if all the living, human parts of the mind are excluded.

It is third person, because it means verification by more than one observer.

No, that's what makes it objective. Third person here means exactly the same as in literature: he, she, it; not I or you.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Not really. Scientific theories aren't materialistic, but they are mechanistic. I get the sense sometimes that that's your objection, especially when it comes to theories of mental functioning. Describing those in the third person doesn't include the subjective, first-person aspect and can make it look soulless and as if all the living, human parts of the mind are excluded.

As they tend to be.

Most such observations of mental functioning rely on first person accounts. (S)he needs to be asked what (s)he is experiencing in order to explain it.

But mechanistic is a materialist word; it is part of philosophical materialism. It says events are caused by prior events, not self-caused, spontaneous, uncertain or random. If we are testing for some model, there's no need to assume a materialist type of mechanism. An explanation might be a better term. Science seeks to explain things. But they are not necessarily mechanistic explanations. To say so is to fall within the scope of the dogmas that Sheldrake explained; dogma #1: Nature is mechanical or machine like.

No, that's what makes it objective. Third person here means exactly the same as in literature: he, she, it; not I or you.

Being objective is the point, though.

Originally Posted by Eric the Green

But mechanistic is a materialist word; it is part of philosophical materialism.

No, I don't agree. "Mechanistic" describes a type of account or causation, and it is entirely third-person. Mechanistic causation is to be contrasted with teleological causation, which tends to be first-person. For example, I can say, "I was hungry, so I ate lunch," and that's a causal statement, but it involves teleological causation rather than mechanistic causation: I ate lunch for a purpose, to make it so I no longer felt hungry. A mechanistic description of that process would be, "His hunger response and feeding instinct caused him to eat lunch." This is mechanistic because it has condition A (hunger response and feeding instinct) giving rise to outcome B (eating lunch) mechanically rather than purposefully. Which account is correct? Both of them. The first one is what I experience in the first person, while the second is what is observed in the third person.

Materialism is the belief that the material world as we observe it is ontologically "real," and that no non-material reality exists. While those who prefer mechanistic causal accounts do tend to be materialists, there is no logical requirement that they be. Scientific theory does not imply materialism (in fact, materialism is unfalsifiable and therefore non-scientific entirely), but it does imply mechanistic causation.

It says events are caused by prior events, not self-caused, spontaneous, uncertain or random.

No. Spontaneous, uncertain, and random outcomes can be a part of mechanistic causation and that's what chaos math is all about. In a sense, all of those are also self-caused, at least in part. What it does exclude, though, is any description in the first person.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

No, I don't agree. "Mechanistic" describes a type of account or causation, and it is entirely third-person.

And you are saying "third person" is not "objective." I don't get that.

You can disagree; I understand that.

Mechanistic causation is to be contrasted with teleological causation, which tends to be first-person. For example, I can say, "I was hungry, so I ate lunch," and that's a causal statement, but it involves teleological causation rather than mechanistic causation: I ate lunch for a purpose, to make it so I no longer felt hungry. A mechanistic description of that process would be, "His hunger response and feeding instinct caused him to eat lunch." This is mechanistic because it has condition A (hunger response and feeding instinct) giving rise to outcome B (eating lunch) mechanically rather than purposefully. Which account is correct? Both of them. The first one is what I experience in the first person, while the second is what is observed in the third person.

Yeah, I look upon the mechanistic explanation as you described it, as a model that is tested of an explanation. I don't disagree with it as one of the correct explanations, as you said. Other scientific explanations might not be mechanistic, and the purposive one is not scientific because it is not a study of hunger, but just a statement by one person of an experience unverified by others.

Materialism is the belief that the material world as we observe it is ontologically "real," and that no non-material reality exists. While those who prefer mechanistic causal accounts do tend to be materialists, there is no logical requirement that they be. Scientific theory does not imply materialism (in fact, materialism is unfalsifiable and therefore non-scientific entirely), but it does imply mechanistic causation.

Then it would imply materialism. "Mechanism" as I understand it requires matter impacting other matter, operating by necessity and force. "Mechanism" implies machine-like. Machines were invented by humans, not by the universe. The universe can also be seen (more correctly IMO) as an organism, which is different.

No. Spontaneous, uncertain, and random outcomes can be a part of mechanistic causation and that's what chaos math is all about. In a sense, all of those are also self-caused, at least in part.

I would not agree with that definition of "mechanistic." I would just call these random, spontaneous, uncertain and self-caused. Machines don't operate on the basis of "random, spontaneous, uncertain and self-caused." We would not buy machines like that!

Eric, the meaning of "third person" and "first person" that I'm using here is exactly the one used in literature. I wrote The Stairway to Nowhere in the first person. It begins, "As I woke to the sound of dogs growling and the wind moaning through my open front door . . ." I wrote Goddess-Born in the third person. It begins, "On a fateful morning, Tranis of D'Anrith awoke in the arms of his goddess." First person is all I, me, mine. Third person is all he, she, it, they.

All scientific theories are in the third person in exactly that sense. This has nothing to do with confirmation by multiple observers. That is something completely different.

As for the term "mechanistic," while it may have derived from the concept "like a machine," that's not exactly what it means anymore.

EDIT: Let me see if I can say some things about "mechanistic" models that you will agree with.

1) They are all past-to-future. Causes precede effects. In teleological cause, effects can precede cause; I do something in order to make something happen in the future.

2) They don't include the concept of purpose or intention. The sun doesn't intend for its heat to evaporate water, that's just the way it works.

It's a fact that many types of mechanistic causation have statistical outcomes rather than indeterminate ones. A causes B, C, or D with known probabilities for each, rather than simply A causes B. Get past very simple physics, concern yourself with biological process, behavior, or turbulent systems and you're always dealing with probabilities and statistics. If we exclude that from our conception of "mechanistic" explanations, we'll exclude most of science.

Originally Posted by Brian Rush

Eric, the meaning of "third person" and "first person" that I'm using here is exactly the one used in literature. I wrote The Stairway to Nowhere in the first person. It begins, "As I woke to the sound of dogs growling and the wind moaning through my open front door . . ." I wrote Goddess-Born in the third person. It begins, "On a fateful morning, Tranis of D'Anrith awoke in the arms of his goddess." First person is all I, me, mine. Third person is all he, she, it, they.

All scientific theories are in the third person in exactly that sense. This has nothing to do with confirmation by multiple observers. That is something completely different.

I'm sorry, I don't understand the difference in regard to scientific theories. The important consideration there, is the confirmation by multiple observers, or objectivity. I understand scientists may use third person language to describe this.

As for the term "mechanistic," while it may have derived from the concept "like a machine," that's not exactly what it means anymore.

I know that some people here refer to a "mechanism" of Generation Theory, involving how children are raised in response to historical events, etc. This is obviously not a "mechanism" like a machine works, but it is a causal explanation of some sort. If I understand you, you are saying that any causal explanation is a "mechanism," even self-caused or random. Myself, I prefer the word explanation for this, since "mechanism" to me does indeed imply "like a machine."