I have been thinking long and hard about the topic, “Are we in a fourth turning and was 9/11/01 the trigger?”

Ever since the “Second Pearl Harbor” I have been back and forth on this issue like a ping-pong ball. For the first few months my answer was “very likely yes.” Then around January I wavered. I believed then, and still believe now, that if more serious terrorist hits had occurred in those special, raw months of late 2001, the transition to a fourth turning mood would have been absolutely certain. Yet the weeks turned to months, and the months to a new year, and Al Qaeda did not strike; it seemed to me that the usual third turning fare was returning in our politics and (especially) our culture so I switched sides and joined the “probably no” faction.

In June my intuition suddenly jolted me back to the yes column as I saw festering financial scandals, as I realized George W was DEAD SERIOUS about Iraq (rightly or wrongly) and as I saw the stock market plunging. “Oh my God, it’s the Great Devaluation” was my mind’s paranoid summer mantra. I put my house on the market. Time to cash out and circle the wagons (like any good 4T Nomad).

Yet . . . after the September 11th anniversary I faltered one more time, confused as ever. The political signs were hinting fourth, yet the cultural signs were screaming third, and economics shouted a hodge-podge of both. What is more, Strauss and Howe came out of the closet after a long silence and all but said we were now in a fourth turning.

I looked to history for comparisons. This didn’t help much. Bush II’s escalating crusade against Saddam Hussein could be an excellent example of a step in the “chain reaction” Struass and Howe identify as part and parcel of an early fourth turning “vertiginous spiral,” such as with the events that led up to Lexington & Concord, not to mention Bull Run. Then again, Silent involvement, as with Colin Powell’s multilateral insistencies, argued for serious third turning influence. Even Rumsfeld’s drum-beating was more reminiscent of the third turning, “Silent-style,” neo-conservative “swagger and dare [of] Clint Eastwood” identified by Strauss and Howe in Generations than the righteous fire the fourth turning Prophet.

At first glance our efforts at “Homeland Security” seemed Crisis material. Tom Ridge’s new department would be the largest reorganization of government since the late 1940’s (as a hangover from the last fourth turning). But then again, it was beginning to equally resemble in style if not in function President Wilson’s World War One era [i.e., third turning] War Labor Board. The various congressional authorizations against terrorism were fractal echoes of the Espionage, Sedition, and Enemy Alien Registration Acts, also of Word War One vintage. Moreover, John Ashcroft’s pursuit of internal enemies seemed to essentially resemble Mitchell Palmer’s raids against bomb-wielding anarchists in the years immediately following the Great War (something noted very clearly in this website).

As I dwelt on this seemingly (to me) state of saecular Limbo, a useful historical analogy finally came to me. Many reading this can no doubt guess where I am heading, considering the subject title of this entry. I am reminded of the gray state of being the people of Europe experienced during the months of September 1939 through April 1940 that we now call the Phony War (not that is was all that phony to the Polish, but that’s another matter).

I offer my epiphany to any and all readers: Whether we are in the transition/catalyst phase of a bonafide fourth turning [de-generacy, meltdown?], or in a last, particularly nervous and anxious phase of a third turning, these days I like to call this strange little time we have been sharing the “Phony Fourth.”

Now I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not confusing historical periods and I fully realize that the Phony War occurred deep into the prior fourth turning. My analogy does not have directly to do with saecular positioning in this instance, but rather with the dual-state nature I feel these two periods share in their own ways. In one case: War/ no war. The other case: Third/fourth turning.

When we look back on the Phony War today, we see it as the first, albeit strange, phase of Word War Two (in Europe anyway). War had been declared, but where was the fighting? Who at the time really thought a titanic struggle was directly underway (other than the Nazi high command, and perhaps Churchill)? If things had turned out just a little differently would September 1939 be the textbook historical nexus we see today? The Phony War is truly an example of a transitional period the ownership of which just happens to tip into one of the adjoining eras. Perhaps I am wrong on these last few points. I am not an expert on World War Two. But I think my main point is valid: It was some shade of gray, however dark or light.

Like with the declarations of war in September 1939, the events of September 11th 2001 seemed the natural starting point for a dramatically new chapter. But after the first several months how new did it seem? And how so now as 2003 begins?

Other than offering a name for our current sub-era, my actual thesis is that the Phony Fourth will be looked back upon as the Phony War – as the beginning of the new era. However, it will be seen as an unusually gradual start to a 3T-to-4T transition.

Strauss and Howe state that it is the constellation of generations that fundamentally determines turning moods. Nothing else. However turnings can be coaxed to arrive several years early due to intense stimulation from dramatic events and they can also linger several years beyond their predicted expiration date due a lack of such stimulation. Moreover, structural anomalies can affect timing. The Civil War Cycle is chock-full of fun stuff like this.

So on 9/11/01 how were the generations lined up? As almost everyone and their brother on this website have pointed out, we were a tad shy of what would be fertile ground for a change of turnings.

The length of the effective “youth” phase of life determines the length of generations. Strauss and Howe have pointed out how it has dropped from 25 to 21 over the centuries (indeed, I think it is possible, but not definite, that it could have gone a year below that in the past few decades). The multiples of this number create the bookends of all other phases. According to the authors, when the generations fully occupy the various life phases, then a turning has matured and the saeculum is ripe for a turning change. At such a point, the vanguard cohort of each generation should be 21, 42, 63, and 84 in ballpark terms.

However, in 2001 the leading-edge cohorts lined up as follows, including the distance from (theoretically) optimum turning-change age for those cohorts:

Code:

Silent (Artist):  	76	(-8)
Boomer (Prophet): 	58	(-5)
Xer (Nomad): 	     40	(-2)
Millenial (Hero): 	19	(-2)

My understanding is that the primary engine that drives a fourth turning mood shift is that fact the a Prophet generation has 1) achieved a powerful majority in terms of institutional authority and 2) has its vanguard cohorts reaching the edge of elderhood thereby seriously thinking about their own mortality and wondering if the last chance to manifest their dreams has arrived. Concurrent with that is the rapidly dwindling ability of the next-elder Artist generation to (politely) restrain the Prophets’ righteous fire as they, the Artists, begin to vacate institutions (and thereafter, this life).

Secondary to this, but still important, is the vanguard Nomad cohorts’ transition to caution and pragmatism and the vanguard Hero cohorts’ ability and eagerness to temporalize the Prophets’ spiritual agenda in their own freshly collegiate way. Note that the Civil War 3T/4T transition did not require these last two items, but that the above generational scripts played an important role in every other transition.

What jumps out from the 2001 leading cohort line-up above is that the two elder generations, the Silent and Boomers, were significantly short of the ages likely required to foment a fourth turning transition. The Silent’s leading cohort age is arguably not the important factor. Indeed, the age location of the eldest wave of any generation occupying elderhood is not crucial to a turning change. What is crucial is the where the boundary is between the one in elderhood and the one in midlife. This can indicate a lot about both parties: The relative power ratio between them in political and cultural life as well as the likelihood of the early wave of the junior generation beginning to contemplate an elder role.

In this case, the Silent/Boomer boundary suggests that in late 2001 the Silent still retained significant influence in society and therefore would be able to ameliorate any (literally) outrageous Boomer response. The boundary also indicates that older Boomers, though easily excitable as always, may not yet have been overly susceptible to viewing the terrorist attacks as something requiring a response of “last act urgency.”

What the line-up does make clear however is that the Culture Wars third turning was already quite mature and that a natural point of transition was just around the corner (Strauss and Howe state in the Fourth Turning , published in 1997, that 2005 would be the most likely transition year, give or take). Moreover the intensity and character of the events of that tragic day did seem to elicit a definite, if impermanent, Crisis mood (with Guiliani playing the role of Gray Champion better than Bush). I also think, as I mentioned earlier, that if the anthrax terror had blossomed into something an order of magnitude or two greater, or if a second spectacular Al Qaeda attack had occurred soon thereafter, then the mood probably would have set root.

It is my argument that, as it was, 9/11/01 did indeed shake something loose, something grim, and if it were not for the aforementioned slight immaturity in the dynamic then a full-fledged fourth turning mood would have been cut loose by that alone. What was released was premature and therefore muted.

But as Strauss and Howe have been pointing out, something has been set in motion. Bush’s foreign policy does seem to have become “more isolationist ... in its unwillingness to coordinate its affairs with other countries but less isolationist in its insistence that vital national interests not be compromised” as discussed in the Fourth Turning. And the more unyielding, righteous tone he has set is now much more likely to end in war, rightly or wrongly, than that set by the more overall Silentized administrations of Clinton or Bush the First. One sentence from this year’s State of the Union speech said it all. Though he was speaking about domestic budgetary matters, it sums up his administration’s overall mood: “We will not deny, we will not ignore, we will not pass along our problems to other Congresses, to other presidents and other generations.” And according to some polls, the Boomers are largely in tune with this new attitude.

Furthermore, Strauss and Howe have pointed to evidence that early-wave Xer’s have begun to settle down since 9/11/01 and I have seen polls indicating that Boomers may not be alone in their recent martial attitudes – the Millenials may be agreeing with them. It is the Silent and Xer’s who are relatively dubious about all this, which is indeed their saecular duty (to reign in the Prophet-Hero relationship dynamo --- oversimplified, but true).

So where are we now in early 2003? First lets take a look at the generational line-up of turning transitions of the recent past:

Code:

   1946	         1964              1984         Avg.
Lost   63       GI     64       Silent   59       62
GI     46       Silent 39       Boomer   41       42
Silent 21       Boomer 21       Xer      23       22
Boomer  3       Xer     3       Millenial 3        3

Now look at this year’s line up [below] and the average ages from the past three turning transitions. I did not include the last 3T/4T transition year in the average (above and below) because I feel it is still a holdout from a time when the youth stage was longer than it is now. I believe it would distort the data. The difference column (below) shows how 2003 is short of this average. Please note that the “Homelander” age is, of course, a pure guess.

Code:

              2003      Avg.from above      Change
Boomer         60             62               -2
Xer            42             42                0
Millenial      21             22               -1
Homelander      2              3               -1

The line-up still seems a little below the average overall, but if you compare it specifically to just the last transition, the one closest and the one so far most affected by the generational compaction of the past decades, the comparison becomes very interesting:

Code:

1984        2003            Change
  59          60             +1
  41          42             +1
  23          21             -2
   3           2             -1

As you can see, this last comparison is, for all practical purposes, spot on.

Even if one does not buy my argument that the fourth turning has in essence begun and believes rather that the Phony Fourth is the last chapter of the (3T) Culture Wars, I think we can all agree (at least those of us who subscribe to Strauss & Howes’ theory) that the next year or two have enormous potential for a full-blown fourth turning mood change.

Both the effects of 9/11 and the aligning of generations are, as Strauss and Howe would put it, “lower[ing] the energy threshold for ignition.” This is indeed what catalysts do. It’s like pouring gasoline on a pile of wood.

What’s more, the typical third turning, Artist-inspired modus operandi (whether of our society or others in same said turning) of postponement, deferral, and bureaucratic inaction has created a load of bone-dry tinder and kindling to add to that pile over the past 20 years: The growth of Al Qaeda, the survival of Saddam Hussein, the encouraged growth of a non-democratic China, the nuclear arming of the Indian subcontinent, the mounting debt problems of the Japanese financial system, the appeasement of North Korea, largely unrestricted immigration, continued dependence on oil, the Israeli-Palestinian problem, the continued hoax of a secure social security and other budgetary nonsense, growing income inequality, not to mention the (slight but disturbing) possibility of loose Soviet nukes and God knows what else.

I am not saying that all of the decisions made over the past two decades were all wrong or the underlying causes fully under our control, but on balance third turning behavior and actions (or lack thereof) have, cyclically, supplied us with an abundance of things that can trigger, exacerbate, or attract focus from, a fourth turning mood.

So there you have it. The Phony Fourth. I felt much better when I finally had a name for this twilight era. It is descriptive and it is flexible. We are in limbo – and this period we are in could possibly go either way, 3T or 4T, when history renders its judgement. Though, as I said, I am betting on the latter.

When will the Phony Fourth end? Where will we cross a threshold when we can say then, or in retrospect, that THAT was the point when the fourth turning mood became unequivocally established. Whether our western Blitzkrieg to end the phoniness (to keep with the Phony War analogy)? As I have argued above, we probably won’t have too long to wait. The looming war with Iraq and the subsequent potential for a wave of terrorist attacks and WMD exchange between Iraq and Israel could easily propel the transition out of this phony stage.

One last thing. I do believe Strauss and Howe are really on to something with their theory of the Saeculum. I do not believe it is the single prism through which to view everything, nor do I agree with everything they have said. But I believe the coming fourth turning will finally make mainstream historians and social scientists take note of what they have discovered. It may still take much time, but someday they may very well go down in history themselves. We at this website have helped contribute to this theory over the years (I used to spend a lot of time here in 1997 and witnessed a bunch) mostly in terms of nuance. My favorite contribution from someone at this site was the “Philpot Conundrum” (about the cycle possibly becoming self-aware), though that may not be much discussed now.

I would like to contribute the Phony Fourth.

Please let me know what you think.

It appears that you are conflating the idea that the seaculum exists as a real thing and Strauss and Howe's model that attempts to explain how the saeculum works.

It is possible that the saeculum exists and turnings have nothing to do with a phase of life or generational constellations.

In fact this is already the case. The first 10 turnings S&H list have an average length of 27 years, which is simply too long for their phase of life model to hold. S&H tacitly admitted this in T4T when they moved up their crisis projection from 2013-2020 in Generations to 2005 in T4T. In other words they suggested that turnings were now only 19 years long 19=(2005-1929)/4.

Just as 27 years is too long for a phase of life, 19 years is too short. A 19-year phase of life makes 57-year-olds elders and says that 76 years is the length of a long human life.

I proposed 18-year turnings back in 2000 and suggested that the crisis was nigh. 18-year turnings would suggest a crisis beginning in 2001: 18 = (2001-1929)/4. I submit that 911 makes a convenient start date. Obviously 18 years is too short for a phase of life and so I had to discard the S&H mechanism for the saeculum.

I do not have a mechanistic explanation for why 18 years, and not some other length. There is the Kuznets business cycle (discovered by economist Simon Kuznets in 1930) that was also 18 years long and which first appeared in 1819, right about when generation/turning length apparently dropped to 18 years. My guess is the two cycles reflected the same underlying process.

Since 1929 the saeculum has apparently be aligned with the Stock Cycle, which also (curiously) averages 18 years in length. Here are the Stock Cycle dates (arrived at completely independently from the saeculum):

1929-1949 (non-monetary bear)
1949-1966 (non-monetary bull)
1966-1982 (monetary bear)
1982-2000 (monetary bull)
2000-2018 (non-monetary bear)

Now the 18-year timing occurs independently in the Stock Cycle (after 1929), which shows up in stock index data, in the Kuznets Cycle over 1819-1933, which shows up in land values and construction activity, and apparently, in the turning length (after about 1820).

************************************************** ********
In 1995 I extrapolated the 1982-95 trend in the market to forecast the end of the great bull market for 2001-2004, depending on the final valuation reached. Were the market to get to extreme values, it would take until 2004 to get there--assuming it continued to rise at its trend rate.

The market did get to extreme valuations (and beyond). But it did not continue to rise at its trend rate. It accelerated. In 1997 Congress passed a capital gains tax cut. This was like throwing gasoline on a fire, it would necesarily produce a bubble in stock prices. It did. The result was to accelerate stock price rise so that the bull market could end four years early in 2000--right in line with the 18-year timing.

It is almost like the force behind the 18-year timing was playing master puppeter with Congress, making sure they did whatever it took to make the timing work out right. Of course, there is no puppeter. Congress did what they did because it reflected a set of beliefs held by many then (and by many today). But these beliefs are not always present in the same form. Their force and composition varies with position in the saeculum, and the behavior they elicit varies accordingly. To the extent that this behavior causes events to happen (like the '97 capital gains tax cut ended the bull market early) we can say that cyclical beliefs produce cyclical behavior which produces cyclical events (beliefs create history). But where do these beliefs come from? To the extent that they reflect experience (past events or history) we can say that (past) history creates beliefs.

So we have beliefs create history and history creates beliefs. Since memory is involved in belief formation, this process shows hysteresis, that is, it will naturally show some form of cyclical behavior. The timing of the cycle is not set by the mechanism, but phenomenologically it seems to be about 18 years.

There is a term used by S&H for this odd "phony fourth" period you refer to. It's called "pre-regeneracy fourth" You saw it during the early part of the Depression (1930 and 1931), when people hoped that prosperity was "just around the corner". You saw it during the Revolutionary crisis, after the Boston Tea Party, when most people still believed that the quarrel with England would blow over and we would get on with being loyal subjects to George III.

The fact that the ages of the Prophet, Nomad, Hero, and Artist generations varies significantly in all three crises cited above (Revolution, Depression/WWII, and ours) lends support to Mike's thesis that something other than generational age is driving the cycle.

Mike Alexander wrote: "I proposed 18-year turnings back in 2000 and suggested that the crisis was nigh. 18-year turnings would suggest a crisis beginning in 2001: 18 = (2001-1929)/4. I submit that 911 makes a convenient start date. Obviously 18 years is too short for a phase of life and so I had to discard the S&H mechanism for the saeculum......I do not have a mechanistic explanation for why 18 years, and not some other length."

I have a explanation for why turnings may have shortened from 25 years in the seventeenth century to 18 years today. It is possible that the turnings, and therefore, the saeculum, are not determined by the length of a long human life, but rather by the length of one particular phase of life-- specifically, that of childhood.

S&H, in both Generations and T4T, assume that a human life is neatly broken up into four phases of equal length -- childhood, young adulthood, prime adulthood or midlife, and elderhood. But are those phases of life really of equal length? Assuming so certainly made the Authors' math alot simpler, but are the phases really equally long? Perhaps not.

If we define childhood as the period of life when most of us are completely dependent on our parents, we enter young adulthood when we emerge as independent thinkers and doers and begin to chart our futures separate from that of our families....by attending college, joining the military, starting an entry-level job right out of High School, often moving out of the house in the process. Today that happens at age 18, the age at which in all States a person can legally vote, be drafted (for males, anyway), buy cigarettes, drive a car, sign contracts and marry without parental consent. However, up until the last Awakening (and certainly during the last saeculum) people weren't considered adults until age 21. If the length of childhood has effectively decreased from 21 to 18 since the last Fourth Turning (possibly as a result of all those late-wave GIs and very early Silent marching off to war at that age), and a saeculum is determined by the length of time it takes four subsequent generations to come of age (as opposed to one generation living a long human life), we can see how genrational and Turning lengths may have been reduced to 18, and the length of the Saeculum to 18 x 4 = 72 years.

One of the areas where I felt that the Turning/Generation theory fell flat on its face in "T4T" was that the phases of life which supposedly governed generations didn't line up with phases of life before Industrial Revolution, and therefore seemingly could not be responsible for the Turnings. But consider this: Back in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when most people lived on farms or -- in towns and cities-- worked as apprentices to artisans or in family-run businesses. As a result, young people were completely dependent on their parents until about age 25-30. By this age, it was extremely likely that one, if not both, parents (or master artisan, their defacto legal guardian) would have died from childbirth, accident, illness, or whatever, and the eldest child would by necessity rise to the occasion and fulfill whatever role the deceased parent held in running the family enterprise --i.e. they became young adults rather than children. After entering young adulthood at age 26 or so, the other phases of life beyond childhood would have been essentially the same as today-- midlife at age 42, elderhood at 63, post-elderhood at 84 -- but if the saeculum is driven by the age when children assumed the mantle of young adulthood, its length was 25 x 4 = 100 years, give or take.

As the IR encouraged more and more young people to leave the family enterprise to work in factories, or attend college for the purpose of entering a different profession from their parents, the age of majority dropped from 25, to 21, and finally to today's 18-- as did the length of generations and turnings. The Saeculum, correspondingly, fell in length from 100 years, to 84 years, and finally to 72.

Simple yet clever!

Originally Posted by Kevin Parker '59

Mike Alexander wrote: "I proposed 18-year turnings back in 2000 and suggested that the crisis was nigh. 18-year turnings would suggest a crisis beginning in 2001: 18 = (2001-1929)/4. I submit that 911 makes a convenient start date. Obviously 18 years is too short for a phase of life and so I had to discard the S&H mechanism for the saeculum......I do not have a mechanistic explanation for why 18 years, and not some other length."

I have a explanation for why turnings may have shortened from 25 years in the seventeenth century to 18 years today. It is possible that the turnings, and therefore, the saeculum, are not determined by the length of a long human life, but rather by the length of one particular phase of life-- specifically, that of childhood.

S&H, in both Generations and T4T, assume that a human life is neatly broken up into four phases of equal length -- childhood, young adulthood, prime adulthood or midlife, and elderhood. But are those phases of life really of equal length? Assuming so certainly made the Authors' math alot simpler, but are the phases really equally long? Perhaps not.

If we define childhood as the period of life when most of us are completely dependent on our parents, we enter young adulthood when we emerge as independent thinkers and doers and begin to chart our futures separate from that of our families....by attending college, joining the military, starting an entry-level job right out of High School, often moving out of the house in the process. Today that happens at age 18, the age at which in all States a person can legally vote, be drafted (for males, anyway), buy cigarettes, drive a car, sign contracts and marry without parental consent. However, up until the last Awakening (and certainly during the last saeculum) people weren't considered adults until age 21. If the length of childhood has effectively decreased from 21 to 18 since the last Fourth Turning (possibly as a result of all those late-wave GIs and very early Silent marching off to war at that age), and a saeculum is determined by the length of time it takes four subsequent generations to come of age (as opposed to one generation living a long human life), we can see how genrational and Turning lengths may have been reduced to 18, and the length of the Saeculum to 18 x 4 = 72 years.

One of the areas where I felt that the Turning/Generation theory fell flat on its face in "T4T" was that the phases of life which supposedly governed generations didn't line up with phases of life before Industrial Revolution, and therefore seemingly could not be responsible for the Turnings. But consider this: Back in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when most people lived on farms or -- in towns and cities-- worked as apprentices to artisans or in family-run businesses. As a result, young people were completely dependent on their parents until about age 25-30. By this age, it was extremely likely that one, if not both, parents (or master artisan, their defacto legal guardian) would have died from childbirth, accident, illness, or whatever, and the eldest child would by necessity rise to the occasion and fulfill whatever role the deceased parent held in running the family enterprise --i.e. they became young adults rather than children. After entering young adulthood at age 26 or so, the other phases of life beyond childhood would have been essentially the same as today-- midlife at age 42, elderhood at 63, post-elderhood at 84 -- but if the saeculum is driven by the age when children assumed the mantle of young adulthood, its length was 25 x 4 = 100 years, give or take.

As the IR encouraged more and more young people to leave the family enterprise to work in factories, or attend college for the purpose of entering a different profession from their parents, the age of majority dropped from 25, to 21, and finally to today's 18-- as did the length of generations and turnings. The Saeculum, correspondingly, fell in length from 100 years, to 84 years, and finally to 72.

I toyed with the idea that the time of childhood dependence was the key. But the mechanism S&H propose (its in the Appendix in Generations) is dependent on a constellation of different generations occupying different phases of life. So the phase of life really has to apply to the older folks too and that makes 27-year (or 18-year) generations problematic for their model.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

I toyed with the idea that the time of childhood dependence was the key. But the mechanism S&H propose (its in the Appendix in Generations) is dependent on a constellation of different generations occupying different phases of life. So the phase of life really has to apply to the older folks too and that makes 27-year (or 18-year) generations problematic for their model.

Then perhaps the Theory is in need for some...adjustment. If the Authors chose to do so in their next book, it wouldn't be the first time that they made a few small repairs....there are subtle differences between the theory as outlined in Generations and how it was presented in T4T. While they're at it, they might explain more fully how the modern saeculum got started in the first place...the English Retreat From France in 1435 wouldn't seem monumental enough to get things rolling after centuries of medieval stagnation.

But The Black Death most certainly would have provided such a Catalyst. The first three waves of the plague epidemic in Britain, between 1348 and 1382 would have amounted to one humongous 4T. The first High, then, would have begun after the third wave of the Black Death subsided around 1383, and the generational archetype progression would have begun based on who filled what phase of life just prior to that time (children=Artists, young adults=Heroes, midlifers=Nomads and elders=Prophets).

I'm not certain what event might have triggered the first Awakening circa 1410-- perhaps the attempted deposition of the Avignon and Roman popes in 1409? Would that have affected England as much as France and Italy?

According to Mike Alexander, there were periodic peaks of religious activity- Awakenings-during Medieval centuries. The idea is that the Black Death created a Crisis in place of an Awakening. At the end of the Crisis, the shell shocked survivors experienced something akin to a High. (Steve Ryan posted that the survivors of the Irish Potato famine experienced something like a High in the aftermath, though he referred to it as a "Low"). The high mortality rate had broken the Medieval stagnation, and the survivors enjoyed new opportunities and a higher per capita wealth. I speculate that by the end of the High(?) a spiritual starvation manifested itself. The Awakening of 1245-1272 was far in the past. But if the S&H generational archetypes had not yet appeared, the Medieval stagnation had nevertheless been shattered.

Posts on the Russian thread by bg115 indicate that Russia has at times experienced periods that have felt like turnings associated with the S&H paradigm, and generations distinct but lacking the S&H archetypes. Perhaps the missing ingredient is a sense of progress after traditionalism has been shattered. The Arthurians were distinguished as a Hero generation by their triumph in the War of Roses.

A question comes to mind-during the decades between the Black Death and the Retreat From France, could England have had generations that were distinct but lacking fully developed archetypes?

Originally Posted by Jenny Genser

There is a term used by S&H for this odd "phony fourth" period you refer to. It's called "pre-regeneracy fourth" You saw it during the early part of the Depression (1930 and 1931), when people hoped that prosperity was "just around the corner". You saw it during the Revolutionary crisis, after the Boston Tea Party, when most people still believed that the quarrel with England would blow over and we would get on with being loyal subjects to George III.

I agree with your assement on this Jenny,

Good question right now to ask is when will the regeneracy will occur and how it will occur.

Sean: Your assessment has the ring of rightness to it. I like the analogy of the Phoney Fourth. A good example of clear thinking. I have several times tried to put myself into the era circa 1930 and then wondered how it felt. We have the luxury of history for previous 4Ts. But, to those who live it as a present it just feels like real life. Only in looking back can we say things like, it is obvious this or that was the trigger event.

To those of us who have the benefit of prescient awareness given to us by S&H, we have a leg up when attempting to fit events into the chaos which is our present world. Yes, I believe that we inhabit that grey predawn time before the full force of the fourth turning comes crashing down upon us.

Wow, so many reponses in one day.

Mike,

Thank you for your feedback. I may be inappropriately conflating the saeculum with Struass and Howe’s explanation for it. However, it is the only theory that I am aware of that has identified the saeculum with focus and specificity (and with the most authority). In that light, it is the only toolbox with which I have to work with to deal with the saeculum, and overall I believe it goes far to adequately explain that which it first fully identified. I am very open to the idea that other cycles and trends (both linear and non-linear) are also in play that some interact with the saecular cycle while others do not but rather override it. But that is not why I posted this topic.

I do not believe that the quarter century or so length of turnings in the early Modern era nullifies the generational/phase of life mechanism that S&H propose. I would LOVE to explore that in another topic area on this website. Can you suggest one that already exists? Should we create a new one?

And I agree that S&H admit to a shortening of turnings and generations occurring over the 18th through 20th centuries, but they attribute that young people reaching physical and (relative) cultural maturity earlier as the modernity developed. Again, this is something I would be very excited to explore with you in another place—along with your very interesting theories and data regarding economic cycles and the importance of an 18 year cycle (I have popped over to your site a few times in the past and seen your charts).

Jenny (Wonk?),

I know about a “pre-regeneracy” period (though I admit, I never saw S&H specifically use the term –is it a LifeCourse thing?). Actually, I get more jazzed by calling it a “Degeneracy” or a “Breakdown”. My point is that this “Phony Fourth” period (thus far) has not unfolded like the other pre-regeneracy periods, assuming 9/11 was the trigger (which is a partially open assumption to me). We are now a year-and-a-half past that alleged trigger. If you look that far beyond John Brown’s raid, or the Boston Tea Party, or the various events of 1675, you see a society clearly cascading and changing and (at least in retrospect) on a course for Regeneracy.

Though I may be dead wrong, my understanding is that even around April 1931, people could tell that something was SERIOUSLY wrong (I will venture into the topic thread started for that soon to see what people are saying about that). I do not get that impression with the public today, or at least anything extraordinary by the standards of the past few turnings. Like I said in the earlier post, society’s current reaction is some ways very similar to our reaction to events from 1917-1921, which was third turning in nature. That was an intense reaction, but still overall a third turning reaction.

But as I said, it’s not that simple. Even with the similarity between Palmerism and Ashcroftism (if you will) there are some interesting differences, not the least of which is the partial suspension of the writ of habeas corpus – now THAT’s a big deal.

The whirlwind I associate with the post-trigger, pre-regeneracy periods of the past fourth turnings does not seem to have taken place. Though I believe that is about to change. Big time. Like this month.

Another summation of the second half of my thesis (the first half being that this early fourth turning has been extraordinarily mellow) is that 9/11 did start the transition, but it was slowed down and muted by the relative immaturity of generational dynamic.

You correctly point out that the relative ages of the Prophet, Nomad, Hero, and Artist archetypes has been significantly different over the past crisis transitions. But that does not necessarily mean that a generational mechanism is not propelling it. It is at least as likely than anything else that the same general mechanism has been at work, but that generational compaction (and therefore shorter turnings and slightly altered stimulatory generational age-locations) has occurred due to the physical shortening of the juvenile stage. Come to think of it, maybe this is the webthread to discuss this, Mike.

Thanks again for your reply Jenny. I have always enjoyed reading your contributions here.

Kevin,

I agree with you. In fact, I think S&H were saying exactly that in The Fourth Turning. On pages 54 and 55 they say, “

What determines the length of a life phase is not so much the typical age of dying as the social and biological dynamic of living. Over the last two centuries, as the average life span has lengthened, this dynamic has actually changed in the other direction. It has speeded up, resulting in a slight shortening of the first three phases of life. This occurred over the same span of time in which the saeculum has also shortened from a full century to eighty to eighty-five years . . . . The age of biological adolescence (first female menses and male puberty) has dropped by an estimated three years over the past two centuries. The typical age at which young people begin to vote, sign contracts, incur debt, and enter the market economy has likewise fallen.”

Then later on page 57,

“Where the season’s length is determined by the time from solstice to equinox, the length of each life-cycle phase is determined by the span of time between birth and the coming of age into adulthood. In American society, the ritual acknowledgement today occurs at twenty-one, the age of college graduation and initial career launch.”

I would suspect, as I said in the first post, that we might be talking about even less than the age of 21 now. It seems like the source of generational/turning compaction is getting stronger and stronger. As a completely unscientific, anecdotal observation, it seems like kids today become like teenagers in their “tweens”. I am in the 1968 cohort, and therefore was a teenager in the 1980’s, and I would like to think that was not a heck of long time ago. But even in that time . . . it seems like something has happened.

Anyway, thanks again for your input. I look forward to more discussion.

Sean Love (formerly contributed as "Metanoos")

Thanks Buzz,

I did not yet see your response when I was writing above.

Well, it could indeed be as simple as it's hard to see the tempest when you're smack dab in the middle of it -- in the eye of the hurricane.

Food for thought.

Originally Posted by Sean Love

Jenny (Wonk?),

I know about a ?pre-regeneracy? period (though I admit, I never saw S&H specifically use the term ?is it a LifeCourse thing?).

God, Satan and the Media
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF Columnist, The New York Times

Claims that the news media form a vast liberal conspiracy strike me as utterly unconvincing, but there's one area where accusations of institutional bias have merit: nearly all of us in the news business are completely out of touch with a group that includes 46 percent of Americans.
That's the proportion who described themselves in a Gallup poll in December as evangelical or born-again Christians.

What a tacit admission from the liberal elite of The New York Times, folks!

As Kristoff notes, this is, of course, "inexcusable" on the part of the left. Yet, it would be an even graver mistake to think that evangelicals don't know this, or see it for what it is. For all the claims to such high and lofty notions of "multiculturalism," and "diversity," and "inclusion" the liberal establishment make, evangelicals know that is all just bunky b.s. -- It is the big lie.

And Kristoff's admission is one of the big reasons why I laugh every time I read of these claims, made by liberal posters here, that "regeneracy" is just around the corner. Regeneracy hell! You people are completely out of touch with nearly half the population of the U.S.! Not only that, you can't wait to make fun of and denigrate them. It is often said that during the American Revolution, one third os the people were with King George and one third were against him. And none of the others gave much of a thought to it either way.

That's the kind of "regeneracy" we're most likely gonna see in this country. Especially if it's "just around the corner." Wake up, liberals! You're living in a dream land, a "Phony Fourth."

I expect that Tristan will be posting about the grey predawn-or would that be twilight?-of the Australian Phony Fourth.

Originally Posted by Sean Love

Jenny (Wonk?),

Yes, we are the same. I am "Wonk" when I post at work and "Jenny Genser" when I post at home. :wink:

Sean Love Wrote:

I know about a “pre-regeneracy” period (though I admit, I never saw S&H specifically use the term –is it a LifeCourse thing?). Actually, I get more jazzed by calling it a “Degeneracy” or a “Breakdown”. My point is that this “Phony Fourth” period (thus far) has not unfolded like the other pre-regeneracy periods, assuming 9/11 was the trigger (which is a partially open assumption to me). We are now a year-and-a-half past that alleged trigger. If you look that far beyond John Brown’s raid, or the Boston Tea Party, or the various events of 1675, you see a society clearly cascading and changing and (at least in retrospect) on a course for Regeneracy.

I believe that such a cascade reaction has occurred, Sean. Witness the domino effect of Sept. 11, 2001-- the subsequent plummetting of the dot-com-driven stock market (which actually began in March '01), rising unemployment, the anthrax attacks, the Enron collapse, the Washington DC snipers' reign of terror, the countdown to war in Iraq and now, the nuclear threat from North Korea. Each of these incidents has ratcheted the level of Crisis up a notch in the collective American psyche, but it is the current Iraq situation that has locked us on course for a Regeneracy in 2004-05. This will happen one of two ways (or a little of both)--

President Bush leads America to a quick victory in Iraq, stares down the North Koreans and forces them to back down (and possibly reunify with South Korea), and in the aftermath the economy roars back into prosperity (even as other 4T storm clouds are seen gathering in the distance). Under this scenario the public will rally around the President as the new Grey Champion, and will go wherever he leads with minimal protest as those aforementioned storm clouds continue to approach.

The other way is that everything will go horribly wrong-- by Fall 2003, 100,000 smallpox-infected, nerve-gassed troops return home in body bags, the U.S. in response detonates a hydrogen bomb over Baghdad-- flattening the city and its people into glowing plexiglass. Meanwhile NK's Kim Jung Il, fearing that he is our next target anyway, decides to go out in a blaze of glory and nukes San Francisco-- leading to his nation's erasure from the very globe and the US cast as a pariah state. Mideast oil slows to a trickle as the Arab nations deal with fallout (literally and figuratively) from the Iraq debacle, and the global economy sinks into a full fledged Second Great Depression......then, who knows? Perhaps GWB is made a scapegoat by the Republican Party and fails to even be nominated for Reelection in '04....the Democrats scramble to take advantage of the situation but still can't come up with a coherent message to take to the people....and out of nowhere comes an Independent GC who cuts through all the BS, reassures the Nation, and handily wins the Presidency-- only to use Bush-era Homeland Security laws to turn us into a full-fledged police state.....it all becomes rather grey at this point.

Originally Posted by Jenny Genser

There is a term used by S&H for this odd "phony fourth" period you refer to. It's called "pre-regeneracy fourth" You saw it during the early part of the Depression (1930 and 1931), when people hoped that prosperity was "just around the corner". You saw it during the Revolutionary crisis, after the Boston Tea Party, when most people still believed that the quarrel with England would blow over and we would get on with being loyal subjects to George III.

The fact that the ages of the Prophet, Nomad, Hero, and Artist generations varies significantly in all three crises cited above (Revolution, Depression/WWII, and ours) lends support to Mike's thesis that something other than generational age is driving the cycle.

From my perspective, technology shift has driven the modern cycles as much as generation mechanics. Science leads to technology which leads to new buisiness opportunities. Buisiness leaders profiting from the new industries seek political power in order to shift policies away from old ways. In opposing traditional power bases, the progressives gain a following using human rights and democracy.

I agree we are in a 'denial' phase. We can see profound set of problems. We cannot see and agree on the profound economic, ecological, political, moral and cultural changes required to resolve these problems. Thus, we are attempting to use violence to suppress those agitating for change. We are attempting to avoid addressing the underlying causes.

I see a couple of problem areas. Traditionally, the industrialist ruling elites and the democracy / human rights advocates allied in seeking change. This time around, the agricultural traditionalists elites might not be a visible enough evil for the People and Capitalists to unite. A key to the crisis might be The People attempting to use majority rule to clip the wings of the ruling elite. This is not new of itself, but in the past the Industrial Elites have been more the heroes than the villains.

Also, so long as we can avoid addressing the underlying causes, we will. While it seems plausible that the War on Terror can be won, the stagnant divide between progressives and liberals will continue to deadlock resolution of the underlying causes. Things have to get very ugly indeed before society considers remaking itself. Society never wants to remake itself. It happens only as a last resort, when all other methods have been exausted.

I have never been too thrilled with the generational stereotypes. I take any astrology like system which lumps all people into groups which think alike with a grain of salt. I believe the 'cycles' are running faster because the rate of technological change is ever increasing.

My crystal ball shows a war in Iraq, clean victory by the US in rural areas, ugly victory with many civilian deaths in urban areas, and a surge in terror world wide. Winning the peace will be harder than winning the war. Democracy requires culture shift. Democracies have an advantage over autocratic forms of government, but it takes generations for the people to come to believe enough in democracy for it to work. We can't occupy Iraq for generations.

Meanwhile, our own belief in democracy is coming into question. If the people do not believe the ballot box can force the politicians to work in the interests of the People, we could get into basic trouble.

And our industrial age economic systems is fond of 40 hour work weeks. As agricultural efficiency increased, people were forced off the land, into the cities and suburbs. As industrial efficiencey is increasing, people are being pushed from manufacturing to service sectors. The problem being, many services are luxuries. In a true economic pinch, will people continue to purchase fast food, attend health clubs, hire landscaping companies, send kids to cheerleading camps, practice martial arts, and otherwise keep the service sector humming? As more and more services can be accessed through the web, what happens to the humans that used to handle things? How important is 'consumer confidence', really?

No one really wants to address basics. No one ever does. Things have to get bad enough that one has no choice.

With the threat of global war looming, now might be a good time for American companies that shipped manufacturing overseas in the 80s and 90s to save money to start pulling their operations back to the home front. With luxury services such as those Mr. Butler describes about to be rendered unimportant, people are going to need jobs in manufacturing goods necessary at home (like clothing) and for the ongoing war effort. This will mean Americans paying more necessary goods than they've been used to lately, and for fat-cat CEOs to earn merely comfortable livings rather than exorbitant ones. So be it.

And I still doubt Bush even wants Iraqi war (as he has had over a year to get war declared - and even 1 1/2 mos from the last SOTU but still hasn't done so...)

If he just keeps on stalling as I said and maybe does a bombing for show between now and the election, his behavior will seem just as 3T-ish as Clinton's 1998 Iraqi adventures...

Originally Posted by mmailliw

And I still doubt Bush even wants Iraqi war (as he has had over a year to get war declared - and even 1 1/2 mos from the last SOTU but still hasn't done so...)

If he just keeps on stalling as I said and maybe does a bombing for show between now and the election, his behavior will seem just as 3T-ish as Clinton's 1998 Iraqi adventures...

I am neither betting on that, William, nor holding my breath! So far as I can see, it's gonna be one hell of a St. Paddy's Day this year.

Originally Posted by Kevin Parker '59

Originally Posted by mmailliw

And I still doubt Bush even wants Iraqi war (as he has had over a year to get war declared - and even 1 1/2 mos from the last SOTU but still hasn't done so...)

If he just keeps on stalling as I said and maybe does a bombing for show between now and the election, his behavior will seem just as 3T-ish as Clinton's 1998 Iraqi adventures...

I am neither betting on that, William, nor holding my breath! So far as I can see, it's gonna be one hell of a St. Paddy's Day this year.

Hmm. Do you guys think that I should push my local synagogue for additional security for the March 17 Purim revelries? We're only a couple of miles from the Pentagon. :o

I'm afraid that Kevin Parker's pessimistic speculations about the next year or two (smallpox in Iraq, H-bomb for Baghdad, S.F. getting nuked...although I'm rather fearful that it might just be Seattle) are pretty close to my own dark musings when all of this is getting me down.
Drudge Report today has a link to an article about how high gasoline prices are changing people's lifestyles. I also read an article about problems with trade shows in N.Y.C., this one was specifically about the Apple Computer East coast show in the summer but was applicable to anything else.
"As a result of the 9/11 attack, insurance premiums at Javits have soared. For example, property insurance premiums have increased 800%, employee unemployment insurance jumped 300% and liability insurance premiums have doubled. Although some of the costs have been absorbed by Javits Center, much of the new costs have been passed on to IDG World Expo and then on to exhibitors. On top of skyrocketing exhibitor costs, costs for staff accomodations, travel expenses and various other essentials are also escalating, making the New York event something exhibitors are thinking twice about."

Originally Posted by alan

"As a result of the 9/11 attack, insurance premiums at Javits have soared. For example, property insurance premiums have increased 800%, employee unemployment insurance jumped 300% and liability insurance premiums have doubled. Although some of the costs have been absorbed by Javits Center, much of the new costs have been passed on to IDG World Expo and then on to exhibitors.

"jacob javits I'd like to thank you for everything
primarily your glass house"


sorry, that was almost entirely unrelated.


TK

Originally Posted by Kevin Parker '59

Originally Posted by mmailliw

And I still doubt Bush even wants Iraqi war (as he has had over a year to get war declared - and even 1 1/2 mos from the last SOTU but still hasn't done so...)

If he just keeps on stalling as I said and maybe does a bombing for show between now and the election, his behavior will seem just as 3T-ish as Clinton's 1998 Iraqi adventures...

I am neither betting on that, William, nor holding my breath! So far as I can see, it's gonna be one hell of a St. Paddy's Day this year.

Well, it's only 7 days away (actually a little less...) so we can see who's right soon enough

I've imagined our Crisis being somewhat similar to Japan's at the end of WWII. But instead of having to rebuild entire cities, our effort would be a massive overhaul of our infrastructure in the face of resource shortages;a crash program to shift away from imports to a sustainable autarky. (S&H did concieve that a Crisis could be mainly economic). A vast army of Rosie the Riverters, but building cryogenic pipelines, windmills, nuclear plants, hydrogen fueled airliners, etc.