I wasn't telling you how we think, but how computers think using raw force. Just think of every possibility that a human might do. Yes, computers can design things with set perameters, but the light bulb was not thought up of from set perameters. Inventions are the result of a need. Someone wasn't just sitting around with all the materials that could make a lightbulb and wonder what they could make with it. If computers self awareness is just "I am self" I struggle to believe they can recognize a need.

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Except that exactly how you pick up your fork has innumerable
> variations: right or left hand? Thumb and forefinger or ring and
> middle finger? Pinky up or pinky down? Handle end or prong end?
> Salad fork or ass-scratching fork?

There's nothing innumerable about that. Even if there are a million
different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and
computers are very good at enumerating things.

John

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Except that exactly how you pick up your fork has innumerable
> variations: right or left hand? Thumb and forefinger or ring and
> middle finger? Pinky up or pinky down? Handle end or prong end?
> Salad fork or ass-scratching fork?

There's nothing innumerable about that. Even if there are a million
different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and
computers are very good at enumerating things.

John

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Except that exactly how you pick up your fork has innumerable
> variations: right or left hand? Thumb and forefinger or ring and
> middle finger? Pinky up or pinky down? Handle end or prong end?
> Salad fork or ass-scratching fork?

There's nothing innumerable about that. Even if there are a million
different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and
computers are very good at enumerating things.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Scientific American ran an article on multiverses a couple months back. In it they quantified the number of possible states for the universe. It is a very large number, but certainly finite. Pretty wild stuff.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Scientific American ran an article on multiverses a couple months back. In it they quantified the number of possible states for the universe. It is a very large number, but certainly finite. Pretty wild stuff.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Scientific American ran an article on multiverses a couple months back. In it they quantified the number of possible states for the universe. It is a very large number, but certainly finite. Pretty wild stuff.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Scientific American ran an article on multiverses a couple months back. In it they quantified the number of possible states for the universe. It is a very large number, but certainly finite. Pretty wild stuff.

That all depends on what theory you believe.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Scientific American ran an article on multiverses a couple months back. In it they quantified the number of possible states for the universe. It is a very large number, but certainly finite. Pretty wild stuff.

That all depends on what theory you believe.

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

Originally Posted by Justin '77

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Even if there are a million different ways to pick up a fork, the ways can be enumerated, and computers are very good at enumerating things.

John.

This issue seems to come back, once again, to the question of whether or not one has infinite choices at any one point in time (since the universe you inhabit is slightly different at any point in time -- even if time is a quantum -- the set of choices will be unique and unrepeatable for each specific instant). Let us consider the most basic of all elements of choice: the thought (of which "ideas" are a subset). Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant. Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

Scientific American ran an article on multiverses a couple months back. In it they quantified the number of possible states for the universe. It is a very large number, but certainly finite. Pretty wild stuff.

That all depends on what theory you believe.

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> Do you assert that the set of "all possible thoughts" is
> ennumerable? And therefore, since all voluntary actinos are taken
> in response to thoughts, that the set of all actions is finite?

I think that we can address this subject using some fairly simple
mathematics. What do we mean by a "thought"? Well, it can mean a
lot of things, but let's restrict ourselves to thoughts that are
useful -- thoughts we can act upon. And for that category of
thoughts, I would require that any such "useful" thought must be
expressible in an English sentence. (If it takes 5 sentences, then
that's 5 thoughts.)

Now, if you want to disagree with that requirement, then please give
me an example of a useful thought which doesn't meet that
requirement. As soon as you try to give me the example, then you'll
have to express the thought in an English sentence, so you can't do
it. Ha!

OK, that answers your question. There are only a finite number of
English sentences; therefore, there are only a finite number of
thoughts. (To nail this down, let's require that each "useful"
thought be expressible in an English sentence of 100 words or less.
Then the number of sentences is something like 100000^100 = 10^500.

So the number of thoughts you can have is finite, but a very large
finite number. So we have to narrow it down some more.

Let's now define an "actionable" thought as one that can be put to
use immediately after thinking it. So, "type the letter T" is an
actionable thought for me, since I'm currently typing on my computer.
But "Read the Wall Street Journal" is not, since my copy of the paper
is in another room. The best I could do is something like "Get up
from the chair," followed by "walk to the next room," then "find the
paper," then "unfold it," then "start reading."

Now you can see that the number of actionable thoughts is really
quite limited. I doubt that there are more than an average of 100 or
so actionable thoughts to choose from at any time (perhaps sometimes
more, or sometimes less).

You can go on and on this way to talk about thoughts that represent
actions that make any sense, to limit the choices even further. But
I believe that in the end you can show that getting through the day
requires a series of actions each of which is selectable from a
fairly small menu of choices.

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> I see no evidence to support either the initial contention or its
> corrollary -- much less the final contention you make, which
> disregards the uniqueness and non-repeatability of each instant.
> Maybe you can expand on this a bit?

I gave the example of Edison's invention of the incadescent bulb, and
showed how it was really just selecting from various menus of options
and putting them together.

Here's another example -- the story of how Fermat's Last Theorem was
finally proved in the 1990s. Fermat's Last Theorem says that: You
can find solutions (in integers) to the equation x^2 + y^2 = z^2
(such as 3^2 + 4^2 = 5^2, or 9 + 16 = 25); but you can't find
solutions (in integers) to x^3 + y^3 = z^3, or to x^4 + y^4 = z^4 or
to x^5 + y^5 = z^5; and in fact, you can't find solutions (in
integers) to x^N + y^N = z^N for any integer N > 2.

Over the last two centuries, huge sums of money have been offered to
any mathematician who could prove or disprove FLT, but despite tens
of thousands of attempts, no one succeeded.

In the 1980s, Andrew Wiles took up the problem, using a mathematical
technique called "elliptical curves." He worked in secret, in his
attic, for seven years, telling no one except a few trusted friends
what he was doing. Finally, after 7 years, he had a proof, which he
presented to the mathematical community, to the sound of enormous
applause.

The proof was hundreds of pages long, and during the weeks that
followed his presentation, a flaw was discovered. The problem is
that in one of the obscure sub-sub-sub cases of the proof, he was
unable to construct an "Euler system," which was required for all
cases.

Here's the story of how he finally fixed his proof, from the book
Fermat's Last Theorem: Unlocking the Secret of an Ancient
Mathematical Problem by Amir D. Aczel, pp. 129-133:

Originally Posted by Amir D. Aczel

> By the tIme Katz found the error, other mathematicians throughout
> the world were aware of the exact same problem with Wiles' proof.
> There simply was no Euler System here, and there was nothing
> doing. And without the Euler System -- supposedly a
> generalization of the earlier work of Flach and Kolyvagm -- there
> was no Class Number Formula. Without the Class Number Formula, it
> was impossible to "count" the Galois representations of the
> elliptic curves against the modular forms, and Shimura-Taniyama
> was not established. And without the Shimura-Taniyama conjecture
> proved as correct, there was no proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. In
> short, the hole in the Euler System made everything collapse like
> a house of cards.

> The Agony

> Andrew Wiles returned to Princeton in the fall of 1993. He was
> embarrassed, he was upset, he was angry, frustrated, humiliated.
> He had promised the world a proof of Fermat's Last Theorem -- but
> he couldn't deliver. In mathematics, as in almost any other field,
> there are no real "second prizes" or "also ran" awards. The
> crestfallen Wiles was back in his attic trying to fix the proof.
> "At this point, he was hiding a secret from the world," recalled
> Nick Katz, "and I think he must have felt pretty uncomfortable
> about it." Other colleagues had tried to help Wiles, including his
> former student Richard Taylor who was teaching at Cambridge but
> joined Wiles at Princeton to help him try to fix the proof

> "The first seven years, working all alone, I enjoyed every minute
> of it," Wiles recalled, "no matter how hard or seemingly
> impossible a hurdle I faced. But now, doing mathematics in this
> over-exposed way was certainly not my style. I have no wish to
> ever repeat this experience." And the bad experience lasted and
> lasted. Richard Taylor, his sabbatical leave over, returned to
> Cambridge and still Wiles saw no end in sight. His colleagues
> looked at him with a mixture of anticipation, hope, and pity, and
> his suffering was clear to everyone around him. People wanted to
> know. They wanted to hear good news, but none of his colleagues
> dared ask him how he was doing with the proof. Outside his
> department, the rest of the world was curious, too. Sometime in
> the night of December 4, 1993, Andrew Wiles posted an e-mail
> message to the computer news group Sci math, to which several
> number theorists and other mathematicians belonged.

Originally Posted by Andrew Wiles

> > [i]In view of the speculation on the status of my work on the
> > Taniyama-Shimura conjecture and Fermat's Last Theorem I will
> > give a brief account of the situation. During the review
> > process a number of problems emerged, most of which have been
> > resolved, but one In particular I have not yet settled I
> > believe that I wIll be able to finish this In the near future
> > using the ideas explained in my Cambridge lectures. The fact
> > that a lot of work remains to be done on the manuscript makes
> > it unsuitable for release as a preprint. In my course in
> > Princeton beginning in February I will give a full account of
> > thIs work.

> > Andrew Wiles[i]

> The Post-Mortem

> But Andrew Wiles was prematurely optimistic. And whatever course
> he may have planned to offer at Princeton would not yield any
> solution. When more than a year passed since his short-lived
> triumph in Cambridge, Andrew Wiles was about to give up all hope
> and to forget his crippled proof.

> On Monday morning, September 19, 1994, Wiles was sitting at his
> desk at Princeton University, piles of paper strewn all around
> him. He decided he would take one last look at his proof before
> chucking it all and abandoning all hope to prove Fermat's Last
> Theorem. He wanted to see exactly what it was that was preventing
> him from constructing the Euler System. He wanted to know -- just
> for his own satisfaction -- why he had failed. Why was there no
> Euler System? He wanted to be able to pinpoint precisely which
> technical fact was making the whole thing fail. If he was going
> to give up, he felt, then at least he was owed an answer to why he
> had been wrong

> Wiles studied the papers in front of him, concentrating very hard
> for about twenty minutes. And then he saw exactly why he was
> unable to make the system work Finally, he understood what was
> wrong. "It was the most important moment in my entire working
> life," he later described the feeling "Suddenly, totally
> unexpectedly, I had this incredible revelation. Nothing I'll ever
> do again will" at that moment tears welled up and Wiles was
> choking with emotion. What Wiles realized at that fateful moment
> was "so indescribably beautiful, it was so simple and so elegant
> and I just stared in disbelief." Wiles realized that exactly what
> was making the Euler System fail is what would make the Horizontal
> Iwasawa Theory approach he had abandoned three years earlier work.
> Wiles stared at his paper for a long time. He must be dreaming, he
> thought, this was just too good to be true. But later he said it
> was simply too good to be false. The discovery was so powerful, so
> beautiful, that it had to be true.

> Wiles walked around the department for several hours. He didn't
> know whether he was awake or dreaming. Every once in a while, he
> would return to his desk to see if his fantastic finding was
> still there -- and it was. He went home. He had to sleep on it
> -- maybe in the morning he would find some flaw in this new
> argument. A year of pressure from the entire world, a year of one
> frustrated attempt after another had shaken Wiles' confidence. He
> came back to his desk in the morning, and the incredible gem he
> had found the day before was still there, waiting for him.

> Wiles wrote up his proof using the corrected Horizontal Iwasawa
> Theory approach. Finally, everything fell perfectly into place.
> The approach he had used three years earlier was the correct one.
> And that knowledge came to him from the failing of the Flach and
> Kolyvagin route he had chosen in midstream. The manuscript was
> ready to be shipped out. Elated, Andrew Wiles logged into his
> computer account. He sent email messages across the Internet to a
> score of mathematicIans around the world "Expect a Federal Express
> package in the next few days," the messages read.

So, now I've given you two different examples of "creative thought."
In each, the creative part came from selecting from a menu of
choices. In both cases, the process of "creative thought" could be
performed by computer software running on a sufficiently powerful
computer.

John

John,

Boy, oh boy. You must be a meteorologist; your models are unbelievably (and unjustifiably) limited.

I think that we can address this subject using some fairly simple mathematics. What do we mean by a "thought"? Well, it can mean a lot of things, but let's restrict ourselves to thoughts that are useful -- thoughts we can act upon.

No restriction at all. Not everything can be achived instantaneously; on emust include in "can act on" those things which one's actions may only lead towards. Now you have an infinite set of options again, since the end point of "lead towards" can stretch to infinity.

And for that category of thoughts, I would require that any such "useful" thought must be expressible in an English sentence. (If it takes 5 sentences, then that's 5 thoughts.)

Again, no restriction at all (so far as I can tell). English is a very versatile language, and one can always make-up words like laser and robot.

OK, that answers your question. There are only a finite number of
English sentences; therefore, there are only a finite number of thoughts.

BZZT!. See above. I can make up new words to express new concepts; the potential number of words in the english language is not even necessarily bounded. How, then, can the number of sentences be any less?

(To nail this down, let's require that each "useful" thought be expressible in an English sentence of 100 words or less. Then the number of sentences is something like 100000^100 = 10^500.

You have absolutely no reason for picking this number. 101 is just as valid a cutoff as 100, as 99 -- which is to say, invalid. Of course, even allowing the 100 cutoff, the number of potential words in the english language being unbounded, one is still left with {infinity}^100 = infinity. No limit at all.

Let's now define an "actionable" thought as one that can be put to
use immediately after thinking it. So, "type the letter T" is an
actionable thought for me, since I'm currently typing on my computer.
But "Read the Wall Street Journal" is not, since my copy of the paper
is in another room. The best I could do is something like "Get up
from the chair," followed by "walk to the next room," then "find the
paper," then "unfold it," then "start reading."

But even "get up from the chair" is not a discrete action by your definition. What you've done, in fact, is re-derive Xeno's Paradox -- motion is impossible, since before one can move from A to B, one must first move from A to A', halfway between A and B; before one can move from A to A', one must first move from A to A'', halfway between A and A'. Etc.
Of course, motion does happen, so the paradox is an invalid model. Mathematics is not reality. Just because you can get away with considering your "horse" to be a "sphere" doesn't mean it will roll down a hill :wink: .

Quote:
OK, that answers your question. There are only a finite number of
English sentences; therefore, there are only a finite number of thoughts.

BZZT!. See above. I can make up new words to express new concepts; the potential number of words in the english language is not even necessarily bounded. How, then, can the number of sentences be any less?

Smutmom asks, "What about 'My what an attractive scrotum'"? That is a
thought which has never been thought.

And just to throw a monkey wrench in everything..What about thoughts and expressions which have no words, yet God and lovers know the meaning?

Dear Justin and Max,

The point of this discussion has been to show computers will be much
more intelligent than humans within a few decades.

I've given you two separate examples of "creative brilliance" --
Edison's invention of the incadescent bulb, and Wiles' proof of
Fermat's Last Theorem -- and showed in both cases that creative
brilliance amounted to selecting choices from finite menus of things
that are already known. This is how new things are invented -- at
least new things that actually matter.

Now, maybe you're right. Maybe on that day in 2073 when there is
only one human being left on earth, and he sees the super-intelligent
computer heading towards him to put a bullet in his brain, just
before the bullet penetrates his skull he'll think up a brand new
word and a brand new thought that expresses love and tenderness and
all that's wonderful. However, it won't make any difference to the
final result.

If you want to prove that I'm wrong, then come up with an example of
a thought or invention that a computer won't have but which actually
matters.

John

How are the computers going to build the infrastructure that allows them to become independent of humans? Or will this be more like Colossus:The Forbin Project, a computer dictatorship?

While computers may process more information, will they become as clever as humans, as clever as Odysseus?

John,

The problem your perspective has is in the lack of understanding what constitutes 'intelligence'. You posit, not that computers will have greater processing speed than human beings -- arguably, of course, they even now approach that benchmark -- but that they will be more "intelligent" than human beings. It is quite important to ask what exactly "intelligence" means. Is it merely "problem-solving ability"? How about the ability to identify and correctly define problems to be solved? That would be a critical element in the mix. Then further, consider the ability to decide where to look for problems. Potential soluble problems exist everywhere and will until the heat death of the universe, at least.

As I consider it, I believe you are positing aware computers. Certainly, given the above, an entity would need to be aware to be considered at all intelligent. Mere calculating power is not sufficient to attain awareness (after all, without any inputs, even a homo sapien would likely not attain sentience / awareness even of self). Whatever it is that pushes an entity into awareness, I doubt that the increase in calculating power over the last / next few decades is likely to bring computers a whole lot closer to it.

As for a thought a computer won't have anytime soon, how about "I am"?

Dear Monoghan,

Originally Posted by monoghan

> How are the computers going to build the infrastructure that
> allows them to become independent of humans? Or will this be more
> like Colossus:The Forbin Project, a computer dictatorship?

This is a good question, and the answer is that we'll build the
infrastructure ourselves (or have the computers do it, with our
blessing). Consider:

(*) We'll want super-intelligent computers to move around, because
we'll want them to do stuff that humans don't want to do -- cleaning
up environmental waste sites, mining for coal in dangerous mines,
even providing 24 hour health care for the old and ill.

(*) We'll want super-intelligent computers to be lethal, because
we'll want to use them in wars. If we don't, then our enemies surely
will.

(*) We'll want them to be more intelligent than we are, because we'll
be competing with labs around the world to create the most
intelligent computers.

(*) We'll want them to be as creative and inventive as possible,
becaus we'll want them to create and invent new things that will make
all our lives easier.

> While computers may process more information, will they become as
> clever as humans, as clever as Odysseus?

You'll have to help me with regard to the particular act by Odysseus
that you're referring to, but as to the general question: Yes,
they'll become much more clever than humans. Take a look at some of
my earlier postings in this topic.

John

Dear Justin,

Originally Posted by Justin '77

> As for a thought a computer won't have anytime soon, how about "I
> am"?

Why not?? That's the EASIEST thing to do. It's only software. Just
have the computer say, "I am," and it's done. In fact, tell me what
it means to be "self-aware," and I'll tell you how to do it in
software.

Have you ever seen the program Eliza? It was written in 1967 in
Basic, and people at the time who used it thought it was a real
self-aware human being.

There's a version of Eliza online at

http://www.manifestation.com/neurotoys/eliza.php3

Play around with it for a few minutes, and tell me if you really
still think that a computer can't be "self-aware" -- or at least as
self-aware as necessary for all practical purposes.

That particular version is implemented as a 500 line Javascript
program.

This is a really dumb program (remember, it was written in 1967), but
it still gives the appearance of being "self-aware."

That's why I say: Self-awareness is the EASIEST thing to do.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Have you ever seen the program Eliza? It was written in 1967 in Basic, and people at the time who used it thought it was a real self-aware human being.

Thinking a thing doesn't make it so. I played with the Eliza link. Try entering "Zvest Brzk Mzdest" five or six times. Obviously, the computer has a set number of responses from which to select, based on parameters like certain code words, repeated inputs, and periods of time passing without input. This is exactly what one would expect from a non-aware device -- regardless how many calculations it could perform per second.

Being able to fool a casual observer is far from a standard of proof -- were it otherwise, we could say that street performers really perform magic.

This is a really dumb program (remember, it was written in 1967), but it still gives the appearance of being "self-aware."

That's why I say: Self-awareness is the EASIEST thing to do.

Incorrect. The appearance is not the same as the thing, itself. (Are you sure you're not a meteorologist?)

John, yes, I'm really sure a computer can't appear to be self aware:

Here is my conversation with Eliza:


* what should i do about my butt
> Are such questions on your mind often?
* well only when my butt is itchy what should I do
> Why do you ask?
* because i need some advice
> I'm not sure I understand you fully.
* I need some input about my sore butt, what should I do, I thought you could help me.
> Oh... could help you?
* no because you are not real and don't posess any real intelligence if you did you would tell me to scratch that itch.
> What makes you think I am not real and don't posess any real intelligence if me did me would tell you to scratch that itch?

On the other hand Eliza has the same average intelligence of your average Liberal.

to wit':


* i want to talk about my hepatitis
> Suppose you got to talk about your hepatitis?
* ok
> OK... "i want to talk about your hepatitis". Tell me more.
* it's a blood thing
> That is quite interesting.
* why
> Why do you ask?
* because you said it was interesting, you tell me
> We were discussing you, not me.

* How many inches are in a foot?
> What is it that you really want to know?
* How many feet are in a mile?
> What do you think?
* I think you are not real
> Do you sometimes wish you were not real?
* No
> You are being a bit negative.
* Why am I negative?
> Why do you ask?
* You said I was
> Oh... said you were?
* Yes
> Are you Sure?
* no
> Are you saying no just to be negative?
* yes
> I see.
* ok
> OK... "You said you was". Tell me more.

If I can make a device that whenever asked "Who are you?" it would respond "I am self." does not make it self aware. All it did was look for certain speech patterns and when the correct key was identified it made a preset action. Voice recognition does exactly this, does that make it self aware?