Today, the Dow passed 9000, and Mideast Peace Plan took off. Those
events are good news for the economy and for peace, but they're also
an important test for Generational Dynamics, which predicts that we're
falling into a new economic depression and that the Mideast will still
have a major war soon.

Prior to the end of the Iraqi war, analysts were predicting that the
stock market would take off like a rocket. At first, the postwar
rebound seemed to fizzle (see here).

But now that rocket seems to have taken off. Since mid-March the
Nasdaq has risen 28 percent, the S&P 500 index has gained 23 percent,
and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) has gone up about 20
percent, closing today at 9039.

And on the world scene, things are looking rosy as well. Jordan's
King Abdullah says that he's optimistic about the peace process and
that it's "back on track."

Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has promised to dismantle the "illegal
outposts," the renegade Israeli settlements in the West Bank, making
it possible to have a "contiguous" Palestinian state next to Israel.

Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian Prime Minister, promised to end the
suicide bombers, and said, "we repeat our renunciation ... of
terrorism against the Israelis wherever they might be."

These were strong, positive words on all sides in support of
President Bush's Mideast Road Map, which is now creating enormous
worldwide hopes for a long-term peace in the Mideast.

Important Test for Generational Dynamics

Both the rising stock market and the increasing hopes for peace in
the Mideast set important tests for Generational Dynamics, which
predicts that at this time in history we're going in quite a
different direction.

Generational Dynamics predicts that we're in the third year of a
1930s-style depression. Specifically, the prediction is that the
stock market will fall to the 4,000 level by around 2006, and won't go
up above 6,000 again until after 2015. That means that the current
stock gains represent a new bubble, a bubble that will burst with
major adverse news.

On January 1 of this year, I predicted that the DJIA would be around
7000 or lower at the end of 2003. That's not as certain as the
prediction in the last paragraph, but I'm sticking to it for the time
being. The prediction of a new depression is based on analyses using
several different methodologies, all of which point to the same
unfortunate conclusion. (Click here for details.)


With regard to the Mideast, Generational Dynamics predicts that Jews
and Palestinians in the current generation are replaying the fault
line war that occurred from 1936-1949, and that a major new war will
break out before long. (Click here for further information.)

So today's events do indeed represent a major test for Generational
Dynamics. Even though I enjoy being right as much as the next guy
does, I still hope that Generational Dynamics is proven wrong, since
then we'll all be better off. But I don't think that's going to
happen.

John J. Xenakis

Nice topic, John. I thought I might as well drop this little ditty I worked up, in here. My analysis is based on the appendix information is S&H's first book Generations Note: Mike Alexander does not agree with me on this at all (though he is responsible for extrapolating the early genertional numbers via his keen intellect):

Originally Posted by Marc S. Lamb

Generational Power Trends 1775-2090
_________ U.S. House vs. Leadership Peak<table class='Wf' border=0 align='center' width='100%' cellspacing=0 cellpadding=3 nowrap><tr><td><pre>GENERATION HOUSE AGE YTP PEAK AVG YTT TURN AGE NEXT
Puritan 1651 48 24 1675
Cavalier 1681 48 23 1704
Glorious 1709 48 18 1727
Enlighten 1735 48 11 1746
Awakening 1760 48 13 1773
Liberty 1775 8 1782 50 12 1794
Republican 1789 35 10 1798 45 24 1822
Compromise 1812 33 13 1824 46 20 1844
GENERATION HOUSE AGE YTP PEAK AVG YTT TURN AGE NEXT
Transcndtl 1834 27 24 1858 50 2 1860
Gilded 1868 36 12 1880 48 6 1886 77 24
Progressive 1892 40 6 1898 47 10 1908 71 16
Missionary 1908 37 14 1922 51 7 1929 66 28
Lost 1936 44 6 1942 51 6 1948 77 16
GI 1952 39 12 1964 51 4 1968 70 22
Silent 1974 41 10 1984 51 4 1988 74 20
GENERATION HOUSE AGE YTP PEAK AVG YTT TURN AGE NEXT
Boom 1994 42 12 2006 54 3 2009 70 20
Xer 2014 43 10 2024 53 4 2028 72 18
Civic* 2032 39 12 2044 51 4 2048 72 22
Adapt* 2054 40 10 2064 49 6 2070 73 20
Idealist* 2074 39 12 2086 50 4 2090 70 --</pre></td></tr></table>
HOUSE is year when plurality in U.S. House is reached
AGE is median generational age when House plurality is gained
YTP Years to peak
PEAK year of Generational national leadership share reached
AVG is the median age of generation at peak power
YTT Years to turning
TURN is based on S&H till 1948, and estimates thereafter
AGE is youngest cohort of previous nuturing generation when nutured generation gains House plurality
NEXT is years till plurality is yielded to next generation
* Future projections based on past trends

Marc, help me with this. What is this telling me?

John

Those were House leadership numbers, based on when each S&H generation gained a plurality etc. in the U.S. House.

I call it a "power zone" much like Dent calls his a "spending wave." Every "GENERATION" reaches a point of max power. This constitutes a "trend," imo, which in turn affects, I believe, S&H "turnings."

To take it further, let us consider the U.S. Senate. I wrote this just before the election last year:

In 1958, the GI's took the Senate. Twenty years later, the Silent claimed the hallowed hall. Now eighty-six years after the last Idealist generation gained plurality in the U.S. Senate, the Baby Boom looks poised to finally assume full power in Congress.

The current makeup of the Senate looks like this:
GOP: 3 GI (6.1%), 25 Silent (51.0%) & 21 Boom (42.8%)
DEM: 4 GI (7.8%), 22 Silent (43.1%) & 25 Boom (49.0%)
TOT: 7 GI (7.0%), 47 Silent (47.0%) & 46 Boom (46.0%)

Not only does the Silent's still rule the chamber, but together with their shadow, the vaunted GI's, the numbers stand at 54-46. And with the exception of the short-lived hysteria of the 104th Congress (when the Boom took the House), gridlock has ruled this, as David Broder called them yesterday, "Little Engine That Couldn't". I predict: that much, at least, probably won't change this year, even as the Boom are sure to finally assume command in Statuary Hall.

Unlike 1994, generational change in the Senate will not mark this, otherwise dreary, contest. The big story of this, will be that President Bush was unable to overcome the Jefford's switcheroore and thereby win back the Senate for the GOP.

Thus the new Boom-led Senate will look like this (with a net gain of one seat for the Democrats): 6 GI (6.0%), 45 Silent (45.0%), 48 Boom (48.0%) 1 Xer (1.0%)

It was eight years after they took the House, that the Missionary generation gained the Senate and thus assumed full command in Congress. That election spurred a big debate over America's entry into WWI during the presidential campaign of Woodrow "He kept us out of the war" Wilson. It maybe important to note that in between 1916 and 1922 (when the Missionaries peaked), America went to war, suffered a half million deaths (of mostly young, Lost gen members) to the Great Influenza, imposed federal Prohibition of Alcohol, endured the big Red Scare, essentially lost two presidents to death in office, and yet still, somehow seemed to "Return to Normacy" just before the "Dominate" Idealists peaked in 1922. Soon thereafter, we shut our doors on one of the greatest American success stories of the twentieth century: Immigration. It would be forty-one years before those doors would open to the world again.

Does this make any sense?

Dear Marc,

The data values you've tabulated are interesting and valuable from a
theoretical point of view because they address the twin questions: How
long does a cycle (or saeculum) last? And, when does the crisis
period start? These questions have been my personal focus because I've
been developing a methodology for predicting when regional wars
start.

What exactly does a "change of generation" mean? I've been playing
with different sets of words to describe it, and lately have been
settling on something like "the politicians, journalists, teachers,
leaders, and mentors of one generational all retire and die around
the same time, and are replaced by politicians, and so forth, of the
next generation."

This question becomes most important for the generation that follows
a crisis war, since it's this generation that drives the entire
saeculum, because the biggest generational difference is between
those with and without personal memories of the last crisis. The
awakening begins when this generation comes of age, and the next
crisis period begins when this generation takes charge.

So the next question is: What is the starting year for the generation
that follows a crisis? Strauss/Howes give this as three years
prior to the end of the crisis, which is 1943 in our case.

However, there are several aspects to a crisis period -- the
financial crisis (like the Great Depression), the actual war, and the
post-war transformation (like creation of the US Constitution
following the Revolutionary War) -- and there's always a question as
to which of these aspects is to define the end of the crisis period,
as far as defining the post-crisis generation is concerned.

These three aspects may end up defining three different post-crisis
generations, to be used for different purposes.

For example, the 1990s stock market bubble was evidently caused by a
generational change -- from those with personal memories of the Great
Depression to those without it. For this aspect of the crisis, the
cutoff should be more like 1932 than 1943.

The data that you've collected puts a spotlight on one way of
measuring when a generational change has occurred: when the
percentage of legislators in the post-crisis generation exceeds a
certain percentage. This might be a useful tool for further
analysis.

Incidentally, with regard to the "awakening/unraveling" events that
occurred in the 1910s, I believe it's necessary to redefine the
generations following the Civil War. Strauss/Howe's work is
brilliant, but their treatment of the Civil War was a major error.
The Civil War turning should run from 1857 to 1877 (from Panic of
1857 to end of Reconstruction). I'm less certain of the following
turnings, but presumably starting the awakening with the 1886
Haymarket Riots, as Strauss/Howe do, seems to make sense. However,
since the Reconstruction affected the South much more than the North,
it may be best to begin the South's awakening period a few years
later, in the 1990s.

John

Dear Marc,

Because of your interest in World War I, I thought that you might
enjoy the extract below.

The extract comes from The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma,
Mourning, and Recovery by Wolfgang Schivelbusch, who analyses how
societies are affected by losing major wars:

>>>

It is well known that the United States's intervention in 1917
transformed the Great War into a world crusade. What is less well
known is the fact that the two men most responsible for this crusade
both came from the South and had both experienced the demise of the
Confederacy in childhood. Woodrow Wilson, whose name is forever
connected with the introduction of moral considerations into
international relations, was the first Southerner elected to the
presidency since the Civil War. Walter Hines Page, before becoming
Wilson's ambassador in London, had made a name for himself as a
leading spokesman for the New South reform program. And it was Page
who was the main driving force behind American intervention in World
War 1.

The careers of Wilson and Page help elucidate how losers learn from
their conquerors. For the United States, intervention in 1917 on the
side of the good (liberal-democratic) Entente against evil
(militaristic) Germany recapitulated Abraham Lincoln's crusade
against the South, which had sinned against both the North and
humanity. Wilson's call for the abolition of the Central European
military monarchy echoed the abolitionists' demand for the eradication
of slavery. Fifty years later, the opportunity arose to transfer
the moral blight incurred by the South onto the contemporary world
enemy Germany. By taking to the field of battle side by side with its
former conqueror against the new enemy of humankind, the South could
confirm its own long-coveted acceptance into the ranks of the
victors. This was the same mechanism that West Germany happily
applied after the demise of Nazism, in its passionate identification
with the West during the Cold War, and imposed even more happily on
East Germany after 1989, this time itself gleaming with the shine of
victory.

Losers imitate winners almost by reflex, as shown by the New South's
emulation of the Yankee model, the reforms of the French army and
educational system along Prussian-German lines, or the imitation of
America by Germany after 1918 and 1945. For decades, the New South,
of which Wilson and Page were both fervent adherents, had been little
more than a program of modernization and industrialization along
Northern lines. Page's nickname at the time, the "Southern Yankee,"
derisively underscored his obsession with learning lessons from the
victor, and figures similar to Page and Wilson emerged in France and
Germany to set the tone after those countries' defeats.

<<<

Incidentally, if you get the feeling that there's a sardonic
undertone to some of these remarks, remember that the author is
German.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Today, the Dow passed 9000, and Mideast Peace Plan took off. Those
events are good news for the economy and for peace, but they're also
an important test for Generational Dynamics, which predicts that we're
falling into a new economic depression and that the Mideast will still
have a major war soon.

.A Fourth turning can feature a Booming economy; a depressed economy is a necessary feature of a Fourth Turning. However institutional upheaval certainly is. There are areas of the world that aren't having an economic boom, Continental Europe and Japan for example. Continental Europe is clearly in a 3T and depending on your point of view Japan is either in a late 2T or late 3T.

About the Mid-East peace roadmap, it will fail like Clinton's peace initiative between the Arabs and Israel. The Arabs generally want Israel totally destroyed and will never accept any compromise, which is a fact. Once the Arabs realize they can?t destroy Israel, peace might be finally possible.

Mike Totten a former poster on this site said this

Three things must happen before peace between Israelis and Palestinians is possible.

The vast majority of Palestinians must accept that Israel has a right to exist and Israelis have a right not to be terrorized.

Hamas and Islamic Jihad must be wiped from the face of the Earth.

The Palestinian Authority must be reformed (for real) or demolished and rebuilt from scratch.

A lasting peace agreement otherwise has no chance at all.

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Marc,

Because of your interest in World War I, I thought that you might
enjoy the extract below.

The extract comes from The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma,
Mourning, and Recovery by Wolfgang Schivelbusch, who analyses how
societies are affected by losing major wars:

>>>

It is well known that the United States's intervention in 1917
transformed the Great War into a world crusade. What is less well
known is the fact that the two men most responsible for this crusade
both came from the South and had both experienced the demise of the
Confederacy in childhood. Woodrow Wilson, whose name is forever
connected with the introduction of moral considerations into
international relations, was the first Southerner elected to the
presidency since the Civil War. Walter Hines Page, before becoming
Wilson's ambassador in London, had made a name for himself as a
leading spokesman for the New South reform program. And it was Page
who was the main driving force behind American intervention in World
War 1.

Thanks for that.

Only recently had I really began to ponder Wilson's southern roots into the whole mess of that time period. Add to the names of Wilson and Page, must be that of House, the wealthy Texan and Democratic Party politico Col. Edward Mandell House. He's largely forgotten now, but Wilson once claimed "Mr. House is my second personality. His thoughts and mine are one."

In 1912, House published Philip Dru, Administrator: A Story of Tomorrow, which echoes much of the progressive mentality of the period. Conspiracy theorists have a field day with House and Dru, who they claim fortold of the rise of FDR in the thirties.

The bigger story, of course, is how the south and the Democratic Party was able to transform itself into a party capable of forging the New Deal coalition at a time of great stress in this country. It really is an amazing story of how the whole culture, as the author notes, changed in the aftermath of utter defeat.

Yet, not completely change. As much as the Democrats would love to pin the racists badge on the GOP, the Democrats remained a southern party into the seventies. It was the GOP who fashioned, albeit with Johnsons leadership, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Most Democrats voted against these reforms. Yet with Nixon's southern strategy, the GOP has shifted south, and with it most of the power base in this country. The political map has been completely transformed in the last thirty years. And, in my opinion, for the better.

My generational "power zone" trends are merely a gauge, a barometer of the weather, imo. The thing that stood out most to me was how every generation seemed to peak in a certain season, such as the Idealists peaking in a third turn. Which makes sense to me. Yet even given that S&H have determined that the Silent and Boom were so short, the Boom has yet to peak.

Thus I bank it as we be 3T. :wink:

Originally Posted by ....

Yet, not completely change. As much as the Democrats would love to pin the racists badge on the GOP, the Democrats remained a southern party into the seventies. It was the GOP who fashioned, albeit with Johnsons leadership, the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Most Democrats voted against these reforms. Yet with Nixon's southern strategy, the GOP has shifted south, and with it most of the power base in this country. The political map has been completely transformed in the last thirty years. And, in my opinion, for the better.

Those Southern Democrats did not vote against the civil rights bill, because they were Democrats, because they were Southern Whites (Northern Republicans on a hold supported the Civil Rights act).

The Southern Whites support for the Democratic Party was a reaction against the party of Lincoln, the Republicans. Once the democrats under LBJ passed the civil rights legislation, Southern Whites went on masse to the Republican Party. True attuites in the South towards race are changing, however old ways die hard.

Note: Until WW2 in many areas in the South, white people sat down when the Star Strangled Bander was played and rose up when Dixie was played.

I've occasionally wondered if a 'false Crisis' late in the 3T could at least partially immunize us against seeing the real thing for what it is, when the 4T does start for real, with potentially CATASTROPHIC results for us and our society.

Originally Posted by Titus Sabinus Parthicus

I've occasionally wondered if a 'false Crisis' late in the 3T could at least partially immunize us against seeing the real thing for what it is, when the 4T does start for real, with potentially CATASTROPHIC results for us and our society.

This post reflects a common misunderstanding of what a crisis is. A crisis is a social moment that results in a re-ordering of the secular world. There is no requirement for a catastrophe. It is true that the most recent crisis did feature a catastrophe for the Western world, but the others did not. It is true that the Civil War was very bad for the US, but it was very mild for Britian (and not too bad for the rest of the West). Similarly, the Revolutionary Crisis was invigorating for the US, somewhat depressing for the British and a catastrophe for the French. The three previous crisis were quite mild for Britain (even the War of the Roses, which had basically no impact on the non-nobility). Yet all of these crises radically transformed the Anglo-American world.

Now I am not saying that this Crisis will be catastrophe-free. It is already a catastrophe for most of Africa. But it doesn't have to be a catastrophe everywhere, (like last time). And I doubt it will be particularly severe here (so far its not been all that horrible).

Originally Posted by Titus Sabinus Parthicus

I've occasionally wondered if a 'false Crisis' late in the 3T could at least partially immunize us against seeing the real thing for what it is, when the 4T does start for real, with potentially CATASTROPHIC results for us and our society.

That is kind of what happened in 1930 and 1931. Because there had been a more severe economic downturn about ten years before, many people didn't think there was something seriously wrong.

Dear Tristan,

Originally Posted by Tristan Jones

> About the Mid-East peace roadmap, it will fail like Clinton's
> peace initiative between the Arabs and Israel. The Arabs generally
> want Israel totally destroyed and will never accept any
> compromise, which is a fact. Once the Arabs realize they can't
> destroy Israel, peace might be finally possible.

I agree that some Arabs want Israel totally destroyed, but I would add
that it's a generational thing. Yasser Arafat does not want to see
Israel destroyed because he understands the magnitude of the
destructive war that would result from that attempt. It's mainly the
new "Young Guard," the younger generation of militant Palestinians
just coming of age today, that wants Israel elminated. However, these
young militants will hold back, for the most part, out of respect of
Arafat, as long as he's around. For some time, I've considered it an
enormous irony that it's American policy to get rid of Arafat, even
though getting rid of Arafat will signal the generational change
probably leading to the next major Mideast war, and possibly to the
fabled "clash of civilizations."

> A lasting peace agreement otherwise has no chance at all.

I would remove the word "otherwise."

John

Dear Titus,

Originally Posted by Titus Sabinus Parthicus

> I've occasionally wondered if a 'false Crisis' late in the 3T
> could at least partially immunize us against seeing the real thing
> for what it is, when the 4T does start for real, with potentially
> CATASTROPHIC results for us and our society.

A major point of the Fourth Turning paradigm is that when the postwar
generation comes to power, they're surprised by things that would not
have surprised the generation that was just replaced.

Two examples that we're seeing today:

(*) Americans have become way overconfident in their ability to bring
Truth, Justice and the American Way to villains around the world.
Thanks to spectacular successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, this
overconfidence has reached the point of hubris. Things will really
get back for America as we continue to overextend our resources. The
shock will be the day that America loses a major battle or conflict.
This will trigger an American desire for retribution, causing us to
overextend further. If that's the sort of thing you mean by
"catastrophic," then I would agree.

(*) Americans have become way overconfident in the ability of the
economy to recover from the 1990s bubble. We're facing a major
economic crisis, and few analysts seem to see it. (Thank goodness
you've got me to tell you!!)

John

Dear Mike,

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

> And I doubt it will be particularly severe here (so far its not
> been all that horrible).

It's always nice to have an optimist around!!

John

Dear John,

Originally Posted by John Taber 1972

> That is kind of what happened in 1930 and 1931. Because there had
> been a more severe economic downturn about ten years before, many
> people didn't think there was something seriously wrong.

That's exactly right. The parallels between today and the early 30s
are stunning and eerie.

John