The complete current draft of my book, Generational Dynamics:
Forecasting America's Destiny is now available online, at:

http://www.ww2010.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?d=ww2010.book

Comments from people in this particularly knowledgeable audience are
welcome. I know that your time is valuable, but any time that you're
willing to spare reading and commenting on this draft will be greatly
appreciated.

Here are some chapters that people in this forum may find
particularly interesting:

Chapters 3 and 4 - The Principle of Localization

These two chapters contain the theoretical basis of Generational
Dynamics, and show, among other things, why it applies to all
societies and nations for all time -- something which several
people in this forum have disputed.

Chapter 4 also contains the "Generational Dynamics Forecasting
Methodology." This forms the basis for a new international
consulting business that I hope to get started. My own strengths
are in research and analysis, not business, so anyone who'd like
to get involved in this, especially if you have business skills or
know someone who'd like to invest some money, should contact me
privately.

Chapter 6 - Another Great Depression?

This chapter provides the generational evidence that we're now in
the midst of another 1930s-style Great Depression. The
analytical evidence will be found later in Chapter 11.

Chapters 2, 7 through 10

These chapters contain Generational Dynamics timelines for
history of various regions, going back as far as the Golden Age
of Greece, and the lives of Jesus and Mohammed. Timelines for
America, West Europe, East Europe (Islam versus Orthodox
Christianity) are presented.

Chapter 11 - Trend Forecasting

This is a somewhat technical chapter on various trend forecasting
techniques. I put a little red meat into this chapter -- a
mathematical proof of why socialism and communism can never work.

Chapter 12 - The Next Century

What's going to happen in the next century? This is something
we've been discussing in another thread of this forum. For those
who haven't seen that thread, I think you'll find the answer
provided by this chapter to be surprising.

I appreciate any input that anyone cares to provide. Feel free to
post comments publicly here, or e-mail them to me privately at
john@ww2010.com .

Thanks,

John

John J. Xenakis
40 Wilson Drive
Framingham, MA 01702
Phone: 508-875-4266
E-mail: john@ww2010.com
Web site: http://www.jxenakis.com/
Web site for Generational Dynamics: http://ww2010.com/

Interesting. But I have to disagree with one point (I haven't read the entire thing yet), and that is computers will be allowed to design better versions of themselves. I realize that it is possible, but it just doesn't seem likely to me.

Thanks for the preview.

Dear Leados,

Originally Posted by Leados

> Interesting. But I have to disagree with one point (I haven't read
> the entire thing yet), and that is computers will be allowed to
> design better versions of themselves. I realize that it is
> possible, but it just doesn't seem likely to me.

I assume you're referring to the last chapter, rather than to the
generational stuff. Who knows what computers will be able to do in
the future? If computers are used as weapons of war, then every
country will want its own computers to be as powerful as possible.

John

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> Thanks for the preview.

You're welcome. What do you think?

John

The point about the death and/or retirement of those who remember the last absolute war is elegantly simple. It's obvious that you read The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel Huntington. I read Generations before Huntington's book, so when he compare the Islamic Resurgence to the Reformation an alarm went off in my head. I suspect that this time around generational dynamics will interact with intercivilizational relations and resource shortages-and the Authoritarian Right's attempt to dominate-to create a global firestorm. Artificial Intelligence and the post-Crisis future...future technology is a highly speculative subject. Interactions during the next saeculum might be more akin to Richard Stock's Metaman or to The Economics of the Robot Revolution. ***

The point about the death and/or retirement of those who remember the last absolute war is elegantly simple. It's obvious that you read The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel Huntington. I read Generations before Huntington's book, so when he compare the Islamic Resurgence to the Reformation an alarm went off in my head. I suspect that this time around generational dynamics will interact with intercivilizational relations and resource shortages-and the Authoritarian Right's attempt to dominate-to create a global firestorm. Artificial Intelligence and the post-Crisis future...future technology is a highly speculative subject. Interactions during the next saeculum might be more akin to Richard Stock's Metaman or to The Economics of the Robot Revolution. ***

The point about the death and/or retirement of those who remember the last absolute war is elegantly simple. It's obvious that you read The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by Samuel Huntington. I read Generations before Huntington's book, so when he compare the Islamic Resurgence to the Reformation an alarm went off in my head. I suspect that this time around generational dynamics will interact with intercivilizational relations and resource shortages-and the Authoritarian Right's attempt to dominate-to create a global firestorm. Artificial Intelligence and the post-Crisis future...future technology is a highly speculative subject. Interactions during the next saeculum might be more akin to Richard Stock's Metaman or to The Economics of the Robot Revolution. ***

Actually, John, I have to disagree about the "Great Depression" part. Not that I underestimate the hardship out there--I'm one of the unemployed masses as of this moment. But the numbers are nowhere near those of the Thirties.

Actually, John, I have to disagree about the "Great Depression" part. Not that I underestimate the hardship out there--I'm one of the unemployed masses as of this moment. But the numbers are nowhere near those of the Thirties.

Actually, John, I have to disagree about the "Great Depression" part. Not that I underestimate the hardship out there--I'm one of the unemployed masses as of this moment. But the numbers are nowhere near those of the Thirties.

Dear Tim,

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

> The point about the death and/or retirement of those who remember
> the last absolute war is elegantly simple. It's obvious that you
> read The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order by
> Samuel Huntington. I read Generations before Huntington's book, so
> when he compare the Islamic Resurgence to the Reformation an alarm
> went off in my head. I suspect that this time around generational
> dynamics will interact with intercivilizational relations and
> resource shortages-and the Authoritarian Right's attempt to
> dominate-to create a global firestorm. Artificial Intelligence and
> the post-Crisis future...future technology is a highly speculative
> subject. Interactions during the next saeculum might be more akin
> to Richard Stock's Metaman or to The Economics of the Robot
> Revolution. ***

I agree with what you say here, up to your reference to politics.

Generational Dynamics works because it doesn't depend on the
beliefs and attitudes of a single person, or a single group of
politicians. It works because it's based on the beliefs and
attitudes of the masses of people. Generational Dynamics says that
if Al Gore were president, then we would still be engaging in wars
around the world, just as we're doing under George Bush (and, in
fact, just as we did repeatedly under Bill Clinton). It's the people
who bring us to a "Fourth Turning," not a politician.

John

Dear Dominic,

Originally Posted by Dominic Flandry

> Actually, John, I have to disagree about the "Great Depression"
> part. Not that I underestimate the hardship out there--I'm one of
> the unemployed masses as of this moment. But the numbers are
> nowhere near those of the Thirties.

The particular forecast that I've made is that the Dow Jones
Industrial Average will drop to the 4000 range by the 2006 time
frame. This forecast is about as mathematically certain as it's
possible to have in things of this type. If this forecast is
substantially wrong, then a lot of other things I've been doing for
the last 30 years (as well as things a lot of researchers have been
doing) are also wrong. I see no reason today to change that forecast,
and I consider it to be almost a mathematical certainty.

The tools that I'm using are medium to long-range forecasting tools.
This means that I can tell you what our final destination is, but I
can't tell you what road we'll take to get there.

What does a big DJIA drop mean in terms of our lives? In the 1930s,
it meant massive unemployment and homelessness. The Fed is going to
try to prevent that by reducing the interest rate to 0% if necessary,
flooding the economy with money. How well will that work? That's an
unknown, but so far it hasn't helped the unemployment rate, which is
currently over 6% is and is expected to continue rising into next
year.

If you'd like me to take a guess -- and this part is not
mathematically certain -- then here it is: We're now in a stock
market bubble, and the economy today is as good as it's going to be
for many years. The economy is very fragile today, with no resilience
to withstand shocks. The next big shock, whatever it is, will cause
a big stock market drop and also a new jump in unemployment.

What will the next shock be? That can't be predicted of course, but
here are some possibilities: (1) A war in Korea; (2) a new
international outbreak of SARS (expected by many experts during the
next flu season); (3) A financial collapse in Japan. (4) Islamist
overthrow of Musharaff in Pakistan, leading to an Indian-Pakistani war
over Kashmir; (5) an American military setback in Afghanistan, Iraq or
the Mideast -- and now we'd have to add Liberia to the list. When will
the job market improve? In the 2010s. The IT market that we used to
know is gone forever - gone with the wind.

I can't predict things on a day to day basis; if I could, I'd be a
magician. If you want three words of advice, it's this: "Dress for
rain."

John

To all:

An updated draft of my new book, Generational Dynamics:
Forecasting America's Destiny is now available online, at:

http://www.ww2010.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?d=ww2010.book

Many of the updates are responses to comments that I received from
the people in this forum.

Here are some of the specific updates:

(*) I've added a section to the end of the Preface describing some of
the limitations of Generational Dynamics. The purpose is to make the
book more credible by being precise about what it can and can't do.

(*) I've always been looking for a way to explain the flow of
generations. Chapter 1 (Basics) contains a number of graphics and
examples designed to show why the 80-year cycle occurs, based on
changes in generations.

(*) Chapter 3 provides additional explanation about the Principle of
Localization, and uses a neat graphic of Europe that I found in a
book.

(*) World War I is always a point of contention in Generational
Dynamics. Chapter 4 provides a great deal more theory about
Generational Dynamics, and adds a great deal of fascinating historical
information about why World War I was NOT a crisis war even for
Germany!

(*) Several people in this forum claim that Generational Dynamics
doesn't apply prior to the 1500s, a view that I disagree with
vehemently. Chapter 8 (Western Europe) now contains England's
timeline back to 1066, and Spain's timeline back to the 1300s.

As before, I appreciate any comments I receive from this particularly
knowledgeable audience, and I thank those of you who have provided
numerous extremely valuable comments on the first draft. Post
comments publicly here, or e-mail them to me privately at
john@ww2010.com .

Thanks,

John

John J. Xenakis
40 Wilson Drive
Framingham, MA 01702
Phone: 508-875-4266
E-mail: john@ww2010.com
Web site: http://www.jxenakis.com/
Web site for Generational Dynamics: http://ww2010.com/

To all:

I've now added the generational timelines for Russia and the Ottoman
empire to my book. The discussion goes back to the fall of
Constantinople in 1453, and the specific timelines start in the 1500s
and 1600s.

I've discovered that these timelines are getting easier to do, but
they're also getting more and more tedious.

Nonetheless, if anyone reading this is a scholar on Russia or the
Ottomans, I'd be very grateful to that person to read through the
material and tell me if it looks OK.

Here are the crisis wars that I determined for Russia:

> Livonian War, 1557-82
> Peasant Rebellions and Church Schism, 1649-70
> War with Ottomans and Pugachev's Rebellion, 1762-83
> Crimean War and Emancipation Edict, 1853-61
> Bolshevik Revolution, 1905-1927

And here are the crisis wars for the Ottomans:

> War with the Holy League, 1683-99
> War with Russia, 1768-74
> Crimean War, 1853-56
> Young Turk Revolution to Destruction of Empire, 1908 - 1922

The updated draft of the book, Generational Dynamics:
Forecasting America's Destiny is available online, at:

http://www.ww2010.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?d=ww2010.book

The timelines for Russia and the Ottomans are in Chapter 9.

The book is now very close to being complete. In fact, there's
little more to do than to get a bunch of things cleaned up. With any
luck, the book will be available on Amazon.com by the end of
September.

Even though the timelines are tedious, I have a whole bunch of them
in the book, and this adds greatly to the credibility of the entire
Generational Dynamics paradigm. Here's a list of all the timelines
in the book:

Code:

    Chapter 2 - American History
        America from Plymouth Rock, 1620
    Chapter 7 - Great Awakenings in History
        Golden Age of Greece, 5th century BC
        Life of Jesus, 1st century AD
        Life of Mohammed, 7th century AD
    Chapter 8 - History of Western Europe
        Medieval Spain from 1300s
        Medieval England from Normandy Conquest, 1066
        Western Europe from 1500s
    Chapter 9 - Islam versus Orthodox Christianity
        Russia, from fall of Constantinople, 1453
        Ottoman Empire, from fall of Constantinople, 1453
    Chapter 10 - History of Asia
        China, from White Lotus Rebellion, 1796
        Japan from Meiji Restoration, 1868
        Southeast Asia, from French Indochina, 1890s

I think this is a pretty good collection, and proves that the
generational paradigm is valid.

As before, I appreciate any comments I receive.

Thanks,

John

John J. Xenakis
40 Wilson Drive
Framingham, MA 01702
Phone: 508-875-4266
E-mail: john@ww2010.com
Web site: http://www.jxenakis.com/
Web site for Generational Dynamics: http://ww2010.com/

Some Comments on the Crises and Awakwnings In Russia:

Most of the Crisis Eras, until the most recent ones were pointed out correctly. For instance, the Livonian Wars and the later years of Ivan IV were most definitely a Crisis Era. However, being a Russian myself, I would like to slightly correct the most recent times. Personally, I think that the years of the Turning in the last century are slightly different.

Mr. Xenakis correctly wrote that Livonian War was a Crisis war. Due to that war, Russia was doubled in size, and compleley united. By then, Ivan IV began to call himself Tsar as opposed to the Duke of Moscow. Also, in 1560's and 1570's, Ivan IV punished and executed many boyars, similiar to stalinist purges. At that time, the Oprichina was created, similiar to the KGB, and Siberia was expored for the first time. It was the 1570's when criminals began to be exiled to Siberia, the traditional part of Russia for prisons.

Also, I agree that the 1650's was a time of Crisis, where Russia depended upon its survival. However, that Crisis did not go all the way until 1670. By 1670's, Russia was approaching an Awakening Era, as foreigners (mostly Germans) began to penetrate the backward nation and bring new Western ideas. These ideas were used by Peter the Great during his forced Westerinzation of Russia in early 1700's. Personally, I think that Peter I is Prophet/Nomad cusper (Russian generation Jones of the late 1600's), while retaining huge amounts of idealism, he was also very pragmatic in organizing the constuction of St. Petersburg and the modernization of Russia. Most likely, Russia was Unravelling around 1700, with Peter I still facing opposition, mostly from the boyars. His consolidation of power, foundation of St. Petersburg, and the execution of boyars was the catalyst of the Crisis.

Concerning the Great Norhtern War not being a Crisis War, I must disagree. It began while Russia was still Unravelling, and that war drove Russia into the Crisis. That was created many changes, including new capital, new army (instead of bowmen and spearmen, musketeers and gussars were created), new technology was introduced (firearms for example). That Crisis continued slightly after that war ended, and even some years after Peter I's death in 1725. By 1730, Russia controlled territory that included present day Crimea, Caucasus, Belorussia, and Poland. Those were the gains from the Great Nothern war and the additional wars silmoultaneously fought with Turks, Poles, and others.

Also, Catherine II was a Nomad, and her rise to power was pulling Russia close to a Crisis, but not yet. Still, Russia was Unravelling. Those early years of Catherine II were marked with sexual decadence in court and many plots from opponents. Catherine II was surrounded by weak Prophets, including her husdabd Peter III and after his death, her lover Potemkin. Once again, wars with the Ottomans began when Russia was still Unravelling, and they were the ones that pulled it into a Crisis. Pugachev's Rebellion might have been a catalyst of the Crisis, just the very beginning. That Crisis ended only by mid 1790's.

With the Napoleonic Wars not being a Crisis War for Russia, that was nailed on the spot!!! Most likely, Russia was not yet Awakening (otherwise they would have suffered complete defeat and even winter wouldn't save them). Back then, Russia was still going through a High, probably the latest part of it. Let's say that the Napoleonic Wars were the Russian Korean War. Then, after the war, the Awakening kicked in, and its most important moment was the Decembrist Revolt.

Sorry, but I must disagree with either the Crimean War, or the Revolution, or the current times being Crisis Eras. Rather the opposite. Even today, the Crimean was is remembered with the least amount of sympathy and with greatest humiliation. That war did nothing, but showed how weak Russia was compared to Britain, France, and even Turkey. It was fought fervently, but with little patience and little organization. That was most likely an early Unravelling war. Late Prophets like Tolstoy and early Nomads were the foot soldiers in that war. That war was one of Russia's greatest humiliations, and its soldiers walked away from the field with shame and never got respect.

What spaked that Crisis was the Liberation of the Serfs by Alexander II. That was the catalyst, and the peasant revolts and unrests that followed drove Russia into a Crisis. THere was a war, and it was a glory for Russia. That was the Russo-Turkish War (approx. 1877-9). Not only did the Russians win (although Crises don't need to end in victory), but they made gains of land. What today is Southern Ukraine and Moldavia are the gains of that war. More vitally, Russia reasserted itself as "The Policeman of Easter Europe," the image it lost in the Crimean War. Once again, nations like Serbia, Greece, Albania, and others began to seek Russia's support and reliance. After that war, Russia became the protector of the Slavic people, sort of hegemony that emerges after a Crisis. What ended that Crisis was the assassination of Alexander II in 1881.

More to come on the recent times. It's possilbe that I'm wrong, but I'll tell you about generational dynamics as my older relatives and I saw it.

More about the topic:

Most likely, I am wrong about identifying the Crises, perhaps mostly due to my misinterpretation of their original definition. It is possible that I tend to think that all Crises should be like WWII for US, full of triumph and victory. Still, though I know that Crises don't have to end in victory, I still somehow believe that Crises should have at least some major gains (even temporary), and should result in hegemony and in a mood that demonstrates a renewal of unity and collectiveness. However, please correct me if I give wrong information or inaccuracies.

After about 1880, the tsarist Russia emerged as a world power, and a protector of all Slavic interests in Europe. After the Russo-Turkish War, the Balkans were under its shadow. At the same time, all the wars in the Caucasus were won, as well as in Central Asia. By now, Caucasus and Central Asia were firmly under Russia's control. In my opinion, that started off the last tsarist High, perhaps it could be called Pan-Slavic High.

During the 1880's and 1890's, the regime was very oppressive, led by the tsar Alexander III. Most likely, Alexander III was a later wave Nomad, due to his reactionary actions. Everything was suppressed, but there were secret societies forming underground. There were no spontaneous or paranoic purges, but if peasants or secret societies striked, the price paid was very dear. In 1894, Alexander III was assassinated, and Nicholas II continued his father's politics. However, Nicholas II, Artist, was too soft to carry on with the old autocratic line.

Thus, Awakening in Russia only began around the turn of the century. In 1902, the strong nation was surprised by a workers' strike, but it was suppressed. However, the Prophetic generation was entering the Russian army, and only revolution and destruction of their fathers' order was on their minds. That became painfully evident when Russia lost the Russo-Japanese War, a superpower being humiliated by a small Asian country. The feeling that arose from that war is similar to what arose in US during Vietnam. At the same time, rioting peasants were shot at by the tsar's soldiers, and the Bloody Sunday became Russia's Kent State. In 1905, revolts and riots swept around the nation and more was to come. 1905 can be called Russia's 1968, if you want.

Around 1910, Stolypin initiated a series of reforms. At the same time, the Russian government became more democratic, with the advent of Duma, and thus, significantly lost its power. WWI was very similiar to today's War in Chechnya, by similiar, I mean that the moral effect was same. Like today's War in Chechnya, WWI for Russia started with a spark of enthusiams, only to later create apathy and opposition to it. THere were protests against WWI and mutinies. Like the drug use in Vietnam, there was a great amount of vodka and opium used by Russia's WWI soldiers.

It is true that the Revolution had elements of a crisis, but it did not resolve many permanent conflicts that a Crisis is supposed to resolve, victory or loss. All that Revolution did was weakening tsarist institutions, and except for superficial governmental change at the top, no real change happened. Most of the land was still in the hands of the gentry, there was no real industrialization or working class. In my pinion, the Awakening only ended around 1921.

That year, Lenin took a drastic turnaround with NEP, basically cancelling many of the Revolution's achievements. It was then the only real thing to do, but it can be compared to Reaganomics cancelling the Great Society's effect. There was rich and decadent business class, and there were oligarch kulaks, and both controlled the NEP economy. The yuppies, if you will.

Thus, the 1920's and most the 30's comprised the Unravelling, which could be called the Socialist Unravelling. WIthin the party, there were many factions, and after Lenin's death they were fighting for power very fiercely. At the same time, Communists were waging guerilla wars with the Whites, the Mensheviks, the Ukranian nationalists, the wealthy nobles of Central Asia. Most of these struggles continued past WWII into 1950's. Only did the mid 1930's see the emergence of stalin as the Grey Champion. He defeated Trotsky, Kirov, Kamenev, Zinovev, and other, now, at the end of the Unravelling, posed as the uniter of the Soviets.

It is hard to identify whether the purges are late Unravelling or early Crisis. Perhaps, a catalyst, but it destroyed millions of innocent lives due to a Prophet's paranoia, only to accomplish nothing but sheer destruction. Still, the purges were a fervent paranoia of a Prophet Grey Champion against late wave Prophets and Nomads. Many Red generals were killed, and in 1941, USSR was totally not ready for the nazi invasion.

It is possible that the Crisis in USSR only began with its entrance into WWII. It is by no means a mid cycle war , not even for USSR. Russia's attempts to delay the nazi invasion, its Soviet-nazi non-agression Pact look like pacifism of a late Unravelling and late 3T wish to hide a little more away from reality. After WWII, Russia once again acquired hedgemony over Eastern Europe. The Soviet block consisted of Eastern European sattelites, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as Central Asia, and after 1949, China. However, the Crisis was far from over. While America's WWII generation came home to the sound of marching bands and settled into the suburbs, Russia's WWII gneration came into broken houses, with no comfort, and with a very realistic fear of being purged. In fact, Russia's WWII fighter were mostly Nomads, like the American soldiers in US Civil War or in today's Iraq. Few Heroes (those born under USSR after 1918) came of age early enough to serve in WWII, but their energy was used in the "recuperating process": building broken homes, canals (such as BAM), fixing what was destroyed by WWII, and thus, turning USSR into a super power.

In my poinion, the Crisis in Russia ended only in 1960's, when Khruschev was ousted. Being a late wave Prophet, and second Grey Champion for USSR, Khrushcev was slightly more pragmatic and down-to-earth than stalin. Still, he had vision, and he was the one who promised Russians "a communism by 1980." In 1964, the siniter and Nomadic Brezhnev came to power, thus, ending any opposition within the Party.

Brezhnev's 18 year rule is called the Stagnant Era. That was essentially the Soviet High. In 1972, USSR achieved miliraty and nuclear parity with US, and while US was suffering from Energy Crises and stagflation, USSR had a very robust economy. Today, many Russians have nostalgia for the Stagnant Era, but the young generation tends to point out its weaknesses. Indeed, weaknesses included complete repression of freedom, the strength of censorship, and overly rigid hierarchy. Toward the later years, bribery arose, and became quickly incorporated into the political machine.

USSR began to shed its Soviet mentality around the time of Brezhnev's death. There emerged underground dissidents (and weren't there dissidents in US in 1950's also?), and the Soviet society was thrown into a hunder for reforms to give the rigid system some fresh air. In 1985, Gorbachev came to power and the perestroika began. Personally, I was born in 1984, and I remember very well all the generational dynamics in Russia since where we left off. That will have its own post later.

Thus, here is what I think:
Crises
a). Livonian War (1560's and 1570's)
b). Peasant Revolts and War With Ukraine (1640's and 1650's)
c). The Great Northern War Era (1710's and 1720's)
d). Peasant Revolts and War With Turks (1775-1800)
e). End of Serfdom and Russo Turkish War (1860-1880)

Subsequent Turnings:
1T Pan-Slavic High 1881-1902
2T Revolutionary Awakening 1902-1922
3T Socialist Unravelling 1922-1941
4T Great Patriotic Crisis 1941-1961
1T Soviet High 1961-1982
2T Glasnost Awakening 1982-2001
3T ????? Unravelling 2001- Present

I'll post more material in Russia/China Topic. If you disagree, please write back about that.

Dear Billy,

Thank you very much for posting your analysis of Russian crisis wars,
and for checking what I've written. I'm certainly not an expert on
Russian history, so your contributions are very valuable.

Now, I'd like to address the areas where you found it necessary to
disagree, and in particular what the difference is between a crisis
war and a mid-cycle war.

I've struggled for a long time over this. There's no simple one-line
definition, but rather a set of criteria. I've listed them in
chapter 4 of my book, with some extensive examples in chapters 4 and
5.

The important thing is that everything in Generational Dynamics is
determined by the beliefs, attitudes and actions of the masses of
people, not by a single individual, or a group of politicians. So
questions like whether Peter was a Prophet or Catherine was a Nomad
are not even among the factors that I consider in trying to determine
whether a war is a crisis war or a mid-cycle war.

A crisis war is not necessarily a victory. After all, if one side
wins, then the other side loses, doesn't it? I don't use the word
"high" to describe the period following a crisis war - I use the word
"austerity," which I think is more accurate, especially for the
losing side.

Also, a crisis war does not necessarily settle things or resolve
permanent conflicts. During a crisis war, the masses of people fight
because they have visceral feelings that their entire existence is at
stake. The war may end from sheer exhaustion, under terms dictated
by the victors or by the terms of some compromise. The compromise
then unravels during the next unraveling period, leading to the next
crisis war.

An example of this is the United Nations imposed partitioning of
Palestine that created the state of Israel following WW II. No one
was really happy with that enforced compromise, but they all finally
accepted it, and have had only limited mid-cycle wars since then.
But the compromise is unraveling quickly these days, and that will
lead to the next Mideast crisis war. (The war will spread to the
India/Pakistan fault line over Kashmir. Russia will come in on the
side of India and Israel, as will America and England. The Arab
states will, of course, come in on the side of Pakistan and the
Palestinians.)

WW I caused Russia to give up its 500 year old tsarist government,
and with it the commitment to assume the mantle of the Roman Empire,
the commitment to be protectors of the Christians in the Ottoman
Empire and even its commitment to Jerusalem. Furthermore, the
Bolshevik Revolution period was driven by the Russian people, and
destroyed much of the Russian Orthodox infrastructure. After being
an extremely religious state for centuries, it became a godless
state. That's a lot more than a simple change at the top.

Nothing anywhere near comparable happened to Russia in the Great
Patriotic War.

The Great Northern War, Napoleon's Russian invasion and the Great
Patriotic War were all mid-cycle wars, and it's remarkable how much
they have in common: In each case, the invading army (Swedish, French
and German, respectively) got crippled or destroyed by the Russian
winter.

I don't see how it's possible not to count the 1660s and early 1670s
as a crisis period. The Great Schism in the Russian Orthodox Church
was a bloody crisis close to a civil war, and twenty years of peasant
rebellions were climaxed by Razin's revolt in 1671.

I agree that the Crimean War is difficult to fathom, and I do have
the feeling that I'm missing something there that requires further
study, but I still believe that it was a crisis war for both Russia
and the Ottomans. I don't see how it's possible that the 1878
Russia-Ottoman war was a crisis war, since both countries were very
clearly in an awakening period in 1878, with students promoting
anarchy and socialism in Moscow and pan-Islamism in Istanbul. However,
the Crimean War was a major humiliation to both the Russians and the
Ottomans, leading to consequential changes in both countries.

If you have a chance, take a look at the crisis war criteria in
Chapter 4, and see if all this makes sense to you.

John

Dear Billy,

I'd like to ask you another question -- about Russia's war with
Afghanistan in the 1980s.

What kind of war was that? Did the Russian people want to fight this
war? Or was this war led by the political leaders, with a lot of
opposition from the people?

In the case of America's Vietnam war, as I recall we were well into
the war before most people even learned how to find Vietnam on the
map. By contrast, when we went to war with Japan in WW II, most
people were ready, willing and able to go.

John

Originally Posted by John J. Xenakis

Dear Billy,

I'd like to ask you another question -- about Russia's war with
Afghanistan in the 1980s.

What kind of war was that? Did the Russian people want to fight this
war? Or was this war led by the political leaders, with a lot of
opposition from the people?

In the case of America's Vietnam war, as I recall we were well into
the war before most people even learned how to find Vietnam on the
map. By contrast, when we went to war with Japan in WW II, most
people were ready, willing and able to go.

John

i am not billy

and i dont play billy on tv

but i know billy

and you john are no billy

i pervert have said it

so let it be written so let it be done

Dear John,
I am really sorry for not replying in such a long time. Not only was I out of town, but I was cut away from the web for many days. Actually, your timetables for Russia make a lot of sense to me. In fact, i can almost fully agree with you. Later, I'll explain why.
Thank you,
Billy

New Book Cover and New Book Description

Scroll below the book cover to see the book description (wording will
appear on the back cover).



America's Manifest Destiny

Suddenly it's America's destiny to lead the world from terrorism to
Freedom and Democracy. How did we get to this point? Is this a good
thing or a bad thing?

John J. Xenakis answers these questions in a book that spans
centuries of world history, showing how societies and nations change
as generations pass. Using numerous historical comparisons, he shows
how generational changes have changed America: From the great G.I.
Generation that fought and won World War II to the Baby Boomers that
rebelled against the Vietnam War in the 60s and 70s, and who are now
leading America in the war against terrorism.

History tells us that there are dangers. There will be shocks and
surprises, and economic difficulties. And the greatest danger of all
is that America will try to do too much -- overextend itself to the
point where freedom and democracy themselves might appear to be in
danger.

But history also tells us that we can win over terrorism. By
proceeding with caution, America can fulfill its manifest destiny,
can defeat terrorism, and can remain the greatest country the world
has ever known by bringing freedom and democracy to the rest of the
world!

---

I'll be sending the manuscript to the publisher within a couple of
weeks. Corrections and comments are still welcome. The entire book
can be found online at:

http://www.ww2010.com/cgi-bin/D.PL?d=ww2010.book

Thanks,

John

John J. Xenakis
40 Wilson Drive
Framingham, MA 01702
Phone: 508-875-4266
E-mail: john@ww2010.com
Web site for Generational Dynamics: http://ww2010.com/