I wasn't sure where to put this post, So I chose the Western Europe one. Since Greece is a part of Europe and pretty much a western european nation these days.

I have seen a few greek films, that seem the tell me that Greece seems to pretty much in sych with Western Europe on the saeculum. The first film I saw was about the sexual exploits of several women (Silents, Boomers and probably even X'ers), the film, reminded me a lot of Sex in the City.

The second film was about the experiences of one middle class teenage boy during the 1968 coup and military dictatorship of the 1970?s. The film striked me as an very awakening film, the teenage boy in the story was a Prophet rebelling against the establishment and discovering sex, drugs and rock and roll. It also feature the sort of Marxist revolutionaries and Hippies which were a feature of late 60?s in western Europe. The mood of many people fearing a impending communist coup, reminded of the kind of seige many Americans felt in the late 60's, fearing that some kind of revoultion would come.

I have been reading David Kaiser's essay called
Neither Marxist nor Whig: The Great Atlantic Crises, 1774-1962 It talks a lot about Europe's turnings since the American revoultion and how it has affected European politics. I agree with him on a lot of points and disagree on others, however it is a must read.

Tristan (and any others),

I can't get access to the old "Western Europe" posts (pre 6/01) but I am very interested in what T4Ter's say about the saeculum in Europe in the 19th century.

It seems very likely that the US and Europe got off synch at some point. I'm going to guess is was when America entered a 4T earlier than Europe did in the late 17th century -- for us it was 1675, for them 1688. I am going to wildly conjecture that the War of Spanish Succession was a 4T war for Europe, while it's American equivilent, Queen Anne's War, was a 1T war for us.

This discrepancy then echoes down the decades so that our next 4T is 1773 to 1794, while theirs is 1789 to 1815. It's the next 4T that really interests me. Again, we're still off, but not by as much. Our 4T ends in 1865, 1869, or 1877, depending upon who you talk to. Europe's ends sometime in the 1870's (1871 Bismark's great victory, 1877 the Communard nonsense). By the 20th century we're just about back on track with one another -- off by maybe 2-7 years instead of one or two decades.

Outside of Mike Alexander (and perhaps some others) we all believe that the Civil War 4T was shortened, and that a Hero generation was skipped. I believe this has to do with what I talk about in the Multi-Modal Saeculum thread. In brief, modernization, and most especially industrialization, shortened life phases, and therefore shortened the saeculum. The result was what I call a hiccup, aka the Civil War Anomaly.

I wonder if Europe had something similar. Our anomaly comes from the fact that we had an especially long 1T just prior to beginning industrialization in the subsequent 2T and 3T. So we had a very long Prophet archetype just before the generational compaction caused by shortened life phases kicked in. This created an overpowering Transcendental generation and the rest is, shall we say, history.

Yet Europe's 19th century 4T seems contrary to ours in that it was especially benign rather than especially harsh. This seems most true of Britain. Plus, the cycle seems to shorten at least as much as ours does, since both sides (i.e., America & Europe) come closer into synch afterward.

What gives?

Could the tempered quality of the European 4T have been caused by the lack of a Prophet archetype? Or a shortened Prophet generation? Could this be the explanation for why their 4T was opposite ours? And if so, is this because they had a shortened 1T whereas ours was elongated?

One poster recently claimed the Romantic Awakening started in 1815. Perhaps I misunderstood, but if I didn't, then that poster is claiming that the 1T was skipped.

I wish I had access to the old material, because I'm sure most of this was covered aleady. Could you shed any light on this??

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Tristan (and any others),

I can't get access to the old "Western Europe" posts (pre 6/01) but I am very interested in what T4Ter's say about the saeculum in Europe in the 19th century.

It seems very likely that the US and Europe got off synch at some point. I'm going to guess is was when America entered a 4T earlier than Europe did in the late 17th century -- for us it was 1675, for them 1688. I am going to wildly conjecture that the War of Spanish Succession was a 4T war for Europe, while it's American equivilent, Queen Anne's War, was a 1T war for us.

I think the turnoff point was in the early 19th century, Europe and America had their crisis at the same time in the late 18th century, which climaxed with the French revoultion. What I know of British history in the 19th century, the second great awakening started earlier in Britain and in Europe than in America around 1815, if you read British history after the Napoleonic wars you would know what I mean. In the 4T before the last in Europe finished around 1870-1872 and most likely started in the 1850's.

One poster recently claimed the Romantic Awakening started in 1815. Perhaps I misunderstood, but if I didn't, then that poster is claiming that the 1T was skipped

That was me; The Napoleonic era was a High era for Europe, an unusual High, however still a High. If you look at the French Revoultion/Napoleonic era, the early part of it with the revolution and perhaps the reign of terror was a 4T turning into a 1T. The Napoleonic era that followed it was a 1T (Napoleon was a classic Hero).

Originally Posted by Tristan

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Tristan (and any others),

I can't get access to the old "Western Europe" posts (pre 6/01) but I am very interested in what T4Ter's say about the saeculum in Europe in the 19th century.

It seems very likely that the US and Europe got off synch at some point. I'm going to guess is was when America entered a 4T earlier than Europe did in the late 17th century -- for us it was 1675, for them 1688. I am going to wildly conjecture that the War of Spanish Succession was a 4T war for Europe, while it's American equivilent, Queen Anne's War, was a 1T war for us.

I think the turnoff point was in the early 19th century, Europe and America had their crisis at the same time in the late 18th century, which climaxed with the French revoultion. What I know of British history in the 19th century, the second great awakening started earlier in Britain and in Europe than in America around 1815, if you read British history after the Napoleonic wars you would know what I mean. In the 4T before the last in Europe finished around 1870-1872 and most likely started in the 1850's.

One poster recently claimed the Romantic Awakening started in 1815. Perhaps I misunderstood, but if I didn't, then that poster is claiming that the 1T was skipped

That was me; The Napoleonic era was a High era for Europe, an unusual High, however still a High. If you look at the French Revoultion/Napoleonic era, the early part of it with the revolution and perhaps the reign of terror was a 4T turning into a 1T. The Napoleonic era that followed it was a 1T (Napoleon was a classic Hero).

Wow. What was the 4T aspect for Europe prior to 1789?

Assuming the Napoleonic era was 1T, and given it's unusual nature, to say the least, would that have had an impact on the Prophet archetype that the 1T was supposed to be nuturing? Would this explain the relatively benign nature of the 19th century 4T in Europe (again, esp. with Britain)??

Please elaborate. Also, do you know how to access the old material at the paleo site?

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Wow. What was the 4T aspect for Europe prior to 1789?

Certainly especially with the Dutch revolution which happended before the French revoultion. I know a lot about the biography of Wolfgang Mozart who was an adult in Vienna during this time. Vienna during the 1780's was in a 4T mood, there was a lot of reform of a sense of a new institutional order being built. Mozart himself was of the Hero archetype.

Assuming the Napoleonic era was 1T, and given it's unusual nature, to say the least, would that have had an impact on the Prophet archetype that the 1T was supposed to be nuturing? Would this explain the relatively benign nature of the 19th century 4T in Europe (again, esp. with Britain)??

Please elaborate. Also, do you know how to access the old material at the paleo site?

Tim Walker has an archive of the old posts, ask him about getting the paelo-archives, there are over a 1000 posts, however a lot of them are very insightful.

I discovered during the early years of the last 4T in Germany from the Wall Street Crash to Rise of Hitler. That the German people increasing supported extremist parties, which the overthrow of the Weimar republic like the Communists and the Nazi's. Also those political disputes had become large scale battles between organised armies with their own uniforms.

The European peers of the GI's seem have enjoyed wearing uniforms when doing their political activism in the 30's. I saw a picture in 1930's France showing young Popular front activists holding a picture of Leon Blum the leader of the popular front. They wore uniforms, I once posted this to people who thought France was on a different turning to us and I said Prophets or Nomads do not do anything like that.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Please elaborate. Also, do you know how to access the old material at the paleo site?

There is a site called web archive, I will start getting up the old western europe threads and putting them as links on this thread. I will start very soon and it will take a while, because there about 100 or 150 links to put on this site.

Originally Posted by Tristan

I have been reading David Kaiser's essay called
Neither Marxist nor Whig: The Great Atlantic Crises, 1774-1962 It talks a lot about Europe's turnings since the American revoultion and how it has affected European politics. I agree with him on a lot of points and disagree on others, however it is a must read.

I read it last night. It is quite fascinating.

I've got a question for Dr. Kaiser, though. I'm confused about France. I understand the case for the crisis lasting from 1940-1962, and ending in Charles DeGaulle's Fifth Republic in 1962. However, wasn't there a lot of Awakening type activity in 1968 in Paris? If so, what happened to the High?

This is also an issue, to a lesser extent, with England and Germany. The essay has the Crisis ending in the early 50s in the UK (with the establishment of the welfare state and the end of the Empire) and in the later 1950s in Germany. If we assume the Awakening started in 1968 in Western Europe, that only leaves about a dozen, or at most 15, years for the High.

Originally Posted by Hermione Granger

Originally Posted by Tristan

I have been reading David Kaiser's essay called
Neither Marxist nor Whig: The Great Atlantic Crises, 1774-1962 It talks a lot about Europe's turnings since the American revoultion and how it has affected European politics. I agree with him on a lot of points and disagree on others, however it is a must read.

I read it last night. It is quite fascinating.

I've got a question for Dr. Kaiser, though. I'm confused about France. I understand the case for the crisis lasting from 1940-1962, and ending in Charles DeGaulle's Fifth Republic in 1962. However, wasn't there a lot of Awakening type activity in 1968 in Paris? If so, what happened to the High?

This is also an issue, to a lesser extent, with England and Germany. The essay has the Crisis ending in the early 50s in the UK (with the establishment of the welfare state and the end of the Empire) and in the later 1950s in Germany. If we assume the Awakening started in 1968 in Western Europe, that only leaves about a dozen, or at most 15, years for the High.

And if so, an extremely short Prophet archetype, which may not be all that bad. :wink:

Originally Posted by Hermione Granger

I read it last night. It is quite fascinating.

I've got a question for Dr. Kaiser, though. I'm confused about France. I understand the case for the crisis lasting from 1940-1962, and ending in Charles DeGaulle's Fifth Republic in 1962. However, wasn't there a lot of Awakening type activity in 1968 in Paris? If so, what happened to the High?

Neil Howe has gone on record to oppose David's Kaiser's proposed turnings for France, he lived in the country for a few years during the 1970's and said that France then was in an awakening and it's generational lineup was more or less the same as neighbouring European nations (he also lived in Germany in that time).

I wish there was a file attachment thing, because I have Neil's quotes from the old France archive here, I will post them below.

[/quote]
This is also an issue, to a lesser extent, with England and Germany. The essay has the Crisis ending in the early 50s in the UK (with the establishment of the welfare state and the end of the Empire) and in the later 1950s in Germany. If we assume the Awakening started in 1968 in Western Europe, that only leaves about a dozen, or at most 15, years for the High.[/quote]

I agree with Neil Howe's assumptions that the 1930's and 1940's was a 4T for France. Personally I think basically the whole of Latin Christian Europe is on the same saeculum and has been since the Reformation, which makes a lot of sense.

Since Western Europe has always been closely connected and the political and cultural elite have moved around Western Europe a lot and had contacts all over western Europe.

Posted by: Neil Howe
Date posted: Sat Oct 24 2:50:53 EDT 1998
Subject: I'm Still in Ring
Message:
David, I simply will not let you keeping going down this road unopposed. The recent disturbances in France are neither Second nor Fourth Turning affairs--and the youth on stage are neither Prophets nor Heroes. From the 20something French I know personally, and from the polls coming out of France that I have seen, what stands at the top of a very bourgeois youth agenda (alienated immigrants excepted) is a better jobs, wages, and career security for those who have passed their dues and passed their exams. Larger political and ideological issues don't resonate at all. And if these kids don't see things opening up at home, they are turning (in unprecedented numbers) toward immigration--even (sacre blue!) to Britain and the U.S. The best-known name for this generation that I have been able to track down is "Bof" Generation (as in: Who Cares?) I defy you to name any violent social strife in the last two decades whose that can hold a candle to what occurred following the 1936 victory of Leon Blum and the First Popular Front. [Tristan's Note I have personally seen a picture taken during a political march of this period of young uniformed men holding a picture of Leon Blum (A Missionary peer) at the front of a political march, I can't imagine Propherts or Nomads or even Artists doing that, that is very Hero]

Let me not waste too much time going on about this. I must use what I have to comment on what you've said about French economic history in the 1930s. Yes, the 1929-1932 crash was much worse in the U.S. than in France (or pretty much anywhere else, for that matter). But then again, the U.S. recovery in 1932-37 was much more robust. Let me go straight to the longer-term bottom line (and I quote my figures from Charles Kindleberger here): Compared to 1929, real GDP in France from 1935 through 1938 was DOWN by over 15 percent--while real GDP in the U.S. overtook its 1929 value by 1936 and, by 1939, was UP by 10 percent. Thereafter, of course, the U.S. economy soared the the French economy went down the tubes along with the nation itself.

As for the war itself, this was a military, social, and political catastrophe on par with the final collapse of Napoleon or the aftermath of Agincourt (certainly worse than 1870). It represented the culmination of polarized class hatred (in the 1930s) that practically gave rise during the Vichy-Resistance years to an underground civil war. Pop trivia question: During WWII, in what nation did most Frenchmen die in combat? Answer: Not in France (because the nation collapsed so fast)--but in the Soviet Union, among the ranks of the pro-fascist "Charlemagne" units that fought side-by-side with the Nazi invaders. Decades had to pass before France could acknowledge, much less resolve, the deep divisions left behind by this catastrophe--yes, I would say, this Crisis.
________________________________________
Posted by: Neil Howe
Date posted: Thu Dec 3 3:26:59 EST 1998
Subject: Strange Defeat
Message:
David:
About the casualty figures. Well, thus far I can't confirm them. According to William Shirer in The Collapse of the Third Republic some 84,000 French soldiers were killed in the 46 days between May 10 when Germany launched its Panzers and June 25 when Vichy signed an armistice with Mussolini. That's pretty small by WWI standards of course (didn't Verdun kill that many in a day or two?), but it's obviously more than the French (fascist) SS and auxiliaries could have lost in Russia--unless, perhaps, one counts the total uniformed casualties of Vichy. Anyway, I can't locate any of the latter figures. So I may well be wrong. So much for repeating things that one has heard second-hand!
I must say, though, that when I look back at things on my bookshelf touching on this era, the mood of crisis seems thick enough to cut with a knife. You probably recall all those amazing posters (Vichy and Resistance) shown in the Ophuls documentary: glistening with rows of soldiers and fleets of bombers, wholesome teamworking young men and women, and stern directives from glowering faces "Join the struggle!" or "Say Not a Word"--i.e., the French equivalent of the American "loose lips sink ships" which does not exactly bring an Awakening to mind. And the very way Ophuls presented his case, and the way it was received by the French public in 1972 (when '68 was still on everyone's mind), struck me as very Boomer-on-G.I. The young were sticking their parents' faces in past horrors, shaming them, and blaming their bland generational conspiracy of silence about all the awful things that were done at a moment of historical exigency of which the young had no understanding.
Most interesting was an old testamentary I've kept, called "Strange Defeat," by the great French historian Marc Bloch. (He wrote it in a profoundly angry mood in late 1940--and, after joining the Resistance, was caught and executed by the Germans in 1942.) Bloch was born in 1892, was a veteran of WWI, and betrays many of the hallmarks one might expect of his Lost Generation. "The generation to which I belong has a bad conscience," he wrote. "It is true that we emerged from the last war desperately tired, and that after four years not only of fighting, but of mental laziness, we were only too anxious to get back to our proper employments and take up the tools that we had left to rust upon the benches. So behindhand were we with our work that we set oursleves to bolt it down in indigestible mouthfuls. That is our excuse. But I have long ceased to believe that it can wash us clean of guilt." Bloch's central message is that the old (including his own generation) let down the innocent and eager young by their incompetence, timidity, selfishness, and bickering. Repeatedly, he talks of the young as a wonderful and committed generation led to ruin by the defects of Third-Republic fossils (of which, of course, there were many). He hopes that "a great surge of national feeling will develop swiftly." Then he says, "My only hope, and I make no bones about it, is that when the moment comes we shall have enough blood left to shed, even though it be the blood of those who are dear to us (I say nothing of my own, to which I attach no importance). For there can be no salvation where there is not some sacrifice, and no national liberty in the fullest sense unless we have ourselves worked to bring it about. The duty of reconstructing our country will not fall on the shoulders of my generation. France in defeat will be seen to have had a Government of old men. That is but natural. France of the new springtime must be the creation of the young. As compared with their elders of the last war, they will have one sad privilege: they will not have to guard against the lethargy bred of victory. Whatever form the final triumph may take, it will be many years before the stain of 1940 is effaced. It may be a good thing that these young people will have to work in a white heat of rage."
2nd Turning looking toward a 3rd--or 4th Turning looking toward a 1st?
P.S. As always, you are a delight to read--and to joust with!

________________________________________
Posted by: Neil Howe
Date posted: Thu Dec 3 3:26:59 EST 1998
Subject: Strange Defeat
Message:
David:
About the casualty figures. Well, thus far I can't confirm them. According to William Shirer in The Collapse of the Third Republic some 84,000 French soldiers were killed in the 46 days between May 10 when Germany launched its Panzers and June 25 when Vichy signed an armistice with Mussolini. That's pretty small by WWI standards of course (didn't Verdun kill that many in a day or two?), but it's obviously more than the French (fascist) SS and auxiliaries could have lost in Russia--unless, perhaps, one counts the total uniformed casualties of Vichy. Anyway, I can't locate any of the latter figures. So I may well be wrong. So much for repeating things that one has heard second-hand!

I must say, though, that when I look back at things on my bookshelf touching on this era, the mood of crisis seems thick enough to cut with a knife. You probably recall all those amazing posters (Vichy and Resistance) shown in the Ophuls documentary: glistening with rows of soldiers and fleets of bombers, wholesome teamworking young men and women, and stern directives from glowering faces "Join the struggle!" or "Say Not a Word"--i.e., the French equivalent of the American "loose lips sink ships" which does not exactly bring an Awakening to mind. And the very way Ophuls presented his case, and the way it was received by the French public in 1972 (when '68 was still on everyone's mind), struck me as very Boomer-on-G.I. The young were sticking their parents' faces in past horrors, shaming them, and blaming their bland generational conspiracy of silence about all the awful things that were done at a moment of historical exigency of which the young had no understanding.

Most interesting was an old testamentary I've kept, called "Strange Defeat," by the great French historian Marc Bloch. (He wrote it in a profoundly angry mood in late 1940--and, after joining the Resistance, was caught and executed by the Germans in 1942.) Bloch was born in 1892, was a veteran of WWI, and betrays many of the hallmarks one might expect of his Lost Generation. "The generation to which I belong has a bad conscience," he wrote. "It is true that we emerged from the last war desperately tired, and that after four years not only of fighting, but of mental laziness, we were only too anxious to get back to our proper employments and take up the tools that we had left to rust upon the benches. So behindhand were we with our work that we set oursleves to bolt it down in indigestible mouthfuls. That is our excuse. But I have long ceased to believe that it can wash us clean of guilt." Bloch's central message is that the old (including his own generation) let down the innocent and eager young by their incompetence, timidity, selfishness, and bickering. Repeatedly, he talks of the young as a wonderful and committed generation led to ruin by the defects of Third-Republic fossils (of which, of course, there were many). He hopes that "a great surge of national feeling will develop swiftly." Then he says, "My only hope, and I make no bones about it, is that when the moment comes we shall have enough blood left to shed, even though it be the blood of those who are dear to us (I say nothing of my own, to which I attach no importance). For there can be no salvation where there is not some sacrifice, and no national liberty in the fullest sense unless we have ourselves worked to bring it about. The duty of reconstructing our country will not fall on the shoulders of my generation. France in defeat will be seen to have had a Government of old men. That is but natural. France of the new springtime must be the creation of the young. As compared with their elders of the last war, they will have one sad privilege: they will not have to guard against the lethargy bred of victory. Whatever form the final triumph may take, it will be many years before the stain of 1940 is effaced. It may be a good thing that these young people will have to work in a white heat of rage."
2nd Turning looking toward a 3rd--or 4th Turning looking toward a 1st?
P.S. As always, you are a delight to read--and to joust with!


Posted by: Neil Howe
Date posted: Fri Dec 11 16:56:14 EST 1998
Subject: Marc Bloch and France circa 1942
Message:

As for Bloch's generational self-loathing and his contrition for all the time and energy his peers had frenetically wasted during the interwar years--I think this is very Nomad, and very similar to much of how many luminaries of the contemporaneous U.S. Lost Generation were expressing themselves. Indeed, F. Scott Fitzgerald said almost the same thing in the same words. There is a fatalistic air about Bloch's brand of self-sacrifice (run the plow over me, it makes no difference) that does not really sound Prophet to my ear.
Yes, Boomers blamed elders for the mess in Vietnam--but they blamed them mainly for doing too much, not (as Bloch blamed his elders) for basically giving up and not doing anything.

By the way, I'm not sure if it has been mentioned yet on this thread, but a few months ago all the Paris litterati had a huge 30th anniversary of '68--and the whole thing so reeked of 50something self-preening idealism that it had young Xers holding their noses and running for the exits. When I have time, I'll post a few of the more memorable quotes from this extravaganza.

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

[
And if so, an extremely short Prophet archetype, which may not be all that bad. :wink:

The European generation 68' is about the same length as the Boomers are.

Originally Posted by Tristan

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

[
And if so, an extremely short Prophet archetype, which may not be all that bad. :wink:

The European generation 68' is about the same length as the Boomers are.

I was just saying that if the 4T ended c. 1960 and the 2T began c. 1968 you'd be dealing with one heck of a truncated Prophet group.

My guess is that Western Europe is saecularly 2-7 years out of synch with(behind) us, depending upon the nation and how one interprets each situation.

Hey, thanks for the quotes from Neil.

Originally Posted by Tristan

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

Tristan (and any others),

I can't get access to the old "Western Europe" posts (pre 6/01) but I am very interested in what T4Ter's say about the saeculum in Europe in the 19th century.

It seems very likely that the US and Europe got off synch at some point. I'm going to guess is was when America entered a 4T earlier than Europe did in the late 17th century -- for us it was 1675, for them 1688. I am going to wildly conjecture that the War of Spanish Succession was a 4T war for Europe, while it's American equivilent, Queen Anne's War, was a 1T war for us.

I think the turnoff point was in the early 19th century, Europe and America had their crisis at the same time in the late 18th century, which climaxed with the French revoultion. What I know of British history in the 19th century, the second great awakening started earlier in Britain and in Europe than in America around 1815, if you read British history after the Napoleonic wars you would know what I mean. In the 4T before the last in Europe finished around 1870-1872 and most likely started in the 1850's.

One poster recently claimed the Romantic Awakening started in 1815. Perhaps I misunderstood, but if I didn't, then that poster is claiming that the 1T was skipped

That was me; The Napoleonic era was a High era for Europe, an unusual High, however still a High. If you look at the French Revoultion/Napoleonic era, the early part of it with the revolution and perhaps the reign of terror was a 4T turning into a 1T. The Napoleonic era that followed it was a 1T (Napoleon was a classic Hero).

The unrest trend data support the idea that the Awakening could have started earlier in Europe than in America. On the other hand the religious trends push it later. The Kondratiev-based model I use would give the European dates as 1814-1849, which is very long. S&H's 1822-44 is a subset of this and works fairly well for me. This also dovetails with the early start of the Crisis (around 1860) more than a decade before the (European) Kondratiev peak in 1873. In fact most folks have the Crisis over by 1873 and put all the labor unrest afterward in a High.

Yet I too see the High in the middle of rising unrest--this just seems to be the way things played out politically--its a manifestation of the Civil War anomaly--except it shows up in Europe too so it can't really reflect the US Civil War.

Unless referring specifically to the USA...perhaps it would be sensible to speak of a 19th century Anomalous Period that played out differently in different countries.

Originally Posted by Tim Walker

Unless referring specifically to the USA...perhaps it would be sensible to speak of a 19th century Anomalous Period that played out differently in different countries.

I'll buy that.

If my little foray into multi-modal musings is right, then there was a SNAP in the West in the 19th century when the shortening of life phases affected the way the saeculum worked.

Interestingly, other, non-Western societies would've experienced this later, in the 20th century, or possibly even right now.

Study Finds Craftsmen Might Be Neanderthal
Archaeologists Reexamine Bones From Ancient Cave

Originally Posted by Mr. Guy Gugliotta

For decades, evidence from ancient caves suggested that the world's first works of art were created by modern humans when they arrived in Europe about 40,000 years ago, but new research has revived the possibility that the early craftsmen may have been Neanderthals.

Were the original Red Zoners the world's first artists? Will the galleries of Paris, Frankfurt, San Francisco, New York, Tokyo become Bush Country at last? Oh, the humanity, er Neanderthality! :shock: :shock: :shock:


Or, perhaps we Blue Zoners are the true heirs of the cave man? And, the Red Zone is that artless human place. Have any of you fellow Blue Zoners had dreams of art and yet a certain fond feeling for a roaring fire in a small darkening space? Do admit. :? :? :?

Originally Posted by William Jennings Bryan

I'll buy that.

If my little foray into multi-modal musings is right, then there was a SNAP in the West in the 19th century when the shortening of life phases affected the way the saeculum worked.

Interestingly, other, non-Western societies would've experienced this later, in the 20th century, or possibly even right now.

I believe this snap has happened more than once. John Xenakis has noted that the Glorious Revolution does not fit the description if a Crisis given by S&H, in which they compare the effects of a Crisis as a raging typhoon. There was a "frame shift" at thihs time resulting in a shortening of the saeculum. Prior to the GR, Kondratiev upwaves (ca. 1460-1485, 1520-1550, 1580-1600, 1620-1650) tended to align with social moments (awakenings and crises). After the GR, Kondratiev downwaves (ca. 1718-1740, 1770-1790, 1815-1843) tended to align with social moments.

Two 50-60 year Kondratiev cycles fall into one saeculum meaning that the saeculum should be about 110 years long with 27 year generations. The period from the end of an upwave in 1650 to the end of the down wave in 1740 spans 1.5 60-year K-cycles, but a complete saeculum. In other words, the saeculum shortened from close to 110 years before 1700 to 90 years in the 18th century (1704-1794, crisis end to crisis end). As a result of this shift we had the Glorious Revolution anomaly in which a very mild period in English history serves as a Crisis.

By the end of the 18th century the new pattern is established. We should expect the next crisis after the Revolution to come about 110 years later or in the 1880-1905 period, with a European crisis maybe a decade later, encompassing WW I. This didn't happen, instead the saeculum abruptly shortened and the Crisis came in the third quarter of the 19th century. The result is the Civil War anomaly in the US and the World War anomaly in Europe in which a huge war is fought, three great empires fall and its not a Crisis. Instead the whole damn thing is repeated 25 years afterward, but this time it is a Crisis and it doesn't have to be repeated a third time.

To determine what the new saeculum length is one merely notes the frequencies of social moments after the change. The last "old-style" long turning was the one from 1794-1822, so the change happend after 1822. So we can look at the spacing of the five social moments since then:

1822-1837, 1857-1865, 1886-1903, 1932-1945, 1967-1980. The spacings are 31, 34, 43, and 35 years for an average of 36 years. Since these spacings represent 1/2 of a saeculum they suggest a saeculum length of 72 years.

We can test this by projecting when the next crisis turnings should happen. By adding 36 years to 1964, 72 years to 1929, 108 years to 1886 and so one we get the following estimates for the beginning of the next crisis: 2000, 2001, 1994, 2004, 2002 for an average of 2000, plus or minus 4 years. This means >95% probability that the crisis will come before 2009.

This was done using S&H's 1886-1908 awakening that assumes a truncated Civil War crisis. If we go with my 1896-1917 awakening then the 1994 date changes to 2003 and the projection becomes 2002 plus or minus 2 year with the 95% probability data in 2006.

2006 is not so far away. By then we should be able to sense a change in mood that in retrospect will have begun years earlier. Or we won't.

If it still feels 3Tish at the end of 2006, I think it will be time for me to pack it in on this saeculum stuff.

Checking the Bellwether

Originally Posted by Mike Alexander '59

2006 is not so far away. By then we should be able to sense a change in mood that in retrospect will have begun years earlier. Or we won't.

If it still feels 3Tish at the end of 2006, I think it will be time for me to pack it in on this saeculum stuff.

One might be wise to check the typical bellwether for a taste of this "sense a change in mood" business. One could start in New York of 1928, for instance. In more modern times, one might study the west coast circa 1966, when California rejected Pat Brown for Ronald Reagan. Or, maybe, the tax revolt of 1978, out there, serves as a better bellwether for a mood change?

California recently rejected a Clintonian liberal in favor of a more conservative Arnold recently. And from what I hear they aren't screaming bloody-murder because they made the wrong choice.

2006 ain't so far away... the GOP blowout of 2002 is closer than that, and the the squashing of a typical west coast liberal in 2003 is even closer. As properly interpeted bellwethers, this "sense a change in mood" circa 2006 may be closer than you think.

Nah, bellwethers just don't fit in my liberal puzzle. :wink:

Ironically, the geographic divide between England & the colonies permitted the same generations to play out two different alternative histories.

Has anybody figured out the saeculum of Western Europe by looking at Western Europe* as a whole instead of single countries like Britain, Germany or France.

*Western Europe is basically the Latin Christian nations of Europe

I have been reading David Kaiser's essay called
Neither Marxist nor Whig: The Great Atlantic Crises, 1774-1962 It talks a lot about Europe's turnings since the American revoultion and how it has affected European politics. I agree with him on a lot of points and disagree on others, however it is a must read.

I have read part of the article and I find it interesting that David have
agreed with some of the information that I use to post here in the past.
Although I don't know if I be prepared to call William Pitt's the elder's
prophet generation Augustans like their American counterparts yet, but
I would be willing if convinced.

Anyway, hi guys, for those who'll remember me.

I'm going to leave you guys with a couple of things. For those of you who might recall an old promise, I was going to see if I could find the generational set up for the English/British. For the most part I think I have, and here is it:

English Puritan (Prophet) - 1588-1617
English Cavaliers (Nomad) - 1618-1650
English Glorious (Hero) - 1651-1676
Hanoverians (Artist) - 1677-1701
Evangelicals (Prophet) - 1702-1727
Radicals (Nomad) - 1728-1754
Britons (Hero) - 1755-1780
Romantics (Artist) - 1781-1800
Victorians (Prophet) - 1801-1824
Imperials (Nomad/Hero) - 1825-1852
Edwardians (Artist) - 1853-1869
Ecumenicals (Prophet) - 1870-1886
Contemptibles (Nomad) - 1887-1905
Fews (Hero) - 1906-1926
Blitzs (Artist) - 1927-1943
Mods (Prophet) - 1944-1962
Hooligans (Nomad) - 1963-1981
Millenials (Hero) - 1982-????
New Artists (Artists) - ????-????

For anyone asking why I don't know where the present British Millenials end and the present New Artists start, it's very simple, I just do not know what is going on in Britain at the present time.

Now, no. 2. the era and turnings, and how each generation fit inside each turning. Be warn, it's a long one. :

Eras and Turnings

European Power Era - 1594-1708

Generations:

Puritans (Prophets) - (1588-1617)
Cavaliers (Nomads) - (1618-1650)
Glorious (Heros) - (1651-1676)
Hanoverians (Artists) - (1677-1701)

Merrie Ole England High - 1594-1621

Reprisals entering elderhood
Elizabethans entering midlife
Parliamentarians entering young adulthood
Puritans entering childhood

Puritan Awakening - 1621-1653

Elizabethans entering elderhood
Parliamentarians entering midlife
Puritans entering young adulthood
Cavaliers entering childhood

Restoration Unraveling - 1653-1678

Parliamentarians entering elderhood
Puritans entering midlife
Cavaliers entering young adulthood
Glorious entering childhood

Glorious Revolution Crisis - 1678-1708

Puritans entering elderhood
Cavaliers entering midlife
Glorious entering young adulthood
Hanoverians entering childhood

First Empire Era - 1708-1806

Generations:

Evangelicals (Prophets) - (1702-1727)
Radicals (Nomads) - (1728-1754)
Britons (Heros) - (1755-1780)
Romantics (Artists) - (1781-1800)

Oligarphic High - 1708-1733

Cavaliers entering elderhood
Glorious entering midlife
Hanoverians entering young adulthood
Evangelicals entering childhood

Evangelical Awakening - 1733-1757

Glorious entering elderhood
Hanoverians entering midlife
Evangelicals entering young adulthood
Radicals entering childhod

Macaroni Unraveling - 1757-1783

Hanoverians entering elderhood
Evangelicals entering midlife
Radicals entering young adulthood
Britons entering childhood

French Revolutionary Crisis - 1783-1806

Evangelicals entering elderhood
Radicals entering midlife
Britons entering young adulthood
Romantics entering childhood

Pax Britannica Era - 1806-1874

Generations:

Victorians (Prophets) - (1801-1824)
Imperials (Nomads/Heros) - (1825-1852)
Edwardians (Artists) - (1853-1869)

Regency High - 1806-1828

Radicals entering elderhood
Britons entering midlife
Romantics entering young adulthood
Victorians entering childhood

Victorian Awakening - 1828-1843

Britons entering elderhood
Romantics entering midlife
Victorians entering young adulthood
Imperials entering childhood

Hungry Forties Unraveling - 1843-1857

Romantics entering elderhood
Victorians entering midlife
Imperials entering young adulthood
Edwardians entering childhood

Reform Crisis - 1857-1874

first wave Victorians entering elderhood
first wave Imperials entering midlife
first wave Edwardians entering young adulthood
first wave Ecumenicals entering childhood

Second Empire Era - 1874-1947

Generations:

Ecumenicals (Prophets) - (1870-1886)
Contemptibles (Nomads) - (1887-1905)
Few (Heros) - (1906-1926)
Blitz (Artists) - (1927-1943)

Imperial High - 1874-1890

Victorians entering elderhood
Imperials entering midlife
Edwardians entering young adulthood
Ecumenicals entering childhood

Ecumenical Awakening - 1890-1910

Imperials entering elderhood
Edwardians entering midlife
Ecumenicals entering young adulthood
Contemptibles entering childhood

Great War Unraveling - 1910-1931

Edwardians entering elderhood
Ecumenicals entering midlife
Contemptibles entering young adulthood
Few entering childhood

World War Crisis - 1931-1947

Ecumenicals entering elderhood
Contemptibles entering midlife
Few entering young adulthood
Blitz entering childhood

Modern Britain Era - 1947-????

Generations:

Mod (Prophets) - (1944-1962)
Hooligans (Nomads) - (1963-1981)
Millenials (Heros) - (1982-????)
New Artists (Artists) - (????-????)

Commonwealth High - 1947-1965

Contemptibles entering elderhood
Few entering midlife
Blitz entering young adulthood
Mod entering childhood

Mod Awakening - 1965-1984

Few entering elderhood
Blitz entering midlife
Mod entering young adulthood
Hooligans entering childhood

Unraveling - 1984-????

Blitz entering elderhood
Mod entering midlife
Hooligans entering young adulthood
Millenials entering childhood

This is what I'd gotten after I would say over 5 years of research. I'm still doing research and some changes might need to be made, and I have a feeling Dr. Kaiser's article will help a lot either to keep things the way they are or make little changes. Anyway, hope you folks will enjoy.

************************************************** **************

Tim Walker wrote:

Well done!

Interesting that the Imperials ended up-like the Gilded-as a Nomad/Hero generation, even though the Reform Crisis was mild rather than severe.

As for the division between this saeculum's Civics and Adaptives it is just too early to tell.

Thanks, but as I'd said, I still have work to do.

That is just tenative on whether the Imperials are a Nomad or Hero generation. My guts feeling keep telling me Hero, but I planning to get
a little more indepth at the generation by individual members and in
history before I decide to leave that generation in its present place or
a Nomad or a Hero Generation. As for the Reform Crisis being a mild
one, that does make it so interesting if you think about. Reforms made
in Britain without it being involved in a major war (outside of the Indian Munity) and the only outside interference being the American Civil War (slavery) and maybe the Franco-Prussian War.

As for the division of the present Hero/Artist generation in Britain, I know its to early to tell, but there is always some one who likes to find something to complain. I just felt like beating them to the punch. :P

Stanley '61