Marc - I'm not sure how to respond. From the start of one Third Turning War to the start of another is 158 years (the Seven Years War started in 1756). The start of Britain's next Third Turning War (the Crimean War in 1854) is 60 years before the start of World War I, and 98 years after the start of the last one. This clearly is not coincidental but I doubt that one can attribute much significance to numbers that end in zero.

As to 1834, I just yesterday started recording the votes in the House of Commons for the Parliament of 1833-1834. I have already completed 551 divisions from 1835 to 1868, and the 50 I have left to do here will make a grand total of 601 for the Reformed House of Commons. So I should be done with the most tedious part of this research project in a month and a half (these votes, by the way, are all in a data base and can be linked to 28 variables). 1834 for Britain is in the middle of a generalized reform period from 1827 to 1836, and is the poltical heart of the 1822-1840 Romantic Awakening. Poor Law Reform is just one of the many changes politically that were made in this Second Turning period (others include the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, Catholic Emancipation, Repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, the Great Reform Bill, and the Municipal Corporation Acts).

As to your thesis about 1914 being more about the end of the Pax Britannica than America, this is undoubtedly true (although I would argue that Britain had already started backing off with their 1902 Japanese treaty). The Pax Americana since 1945 I think will survive for some time to come although I think that if we don't get our fiscal house (and energy policy) in order pretty soon we may not be as lucky as Britain was with its 1857-1873 Fourth Turning.

HTH

Pax,

Dave Krein '42

P.S. Niall Ferguson, like A.J.P. Taylor before him, is making a career out of being controversial. A Conservative, his defense of 19th century British imperialism has politically correct post-modernists choking and spitting up in their beer.

Originally Posted by David Krein

Marc - I'm not sure how to respond. . .

With him, don't bother. His post was certainly meant to confuse, or to make some obsure point of Kool-Aidism, or were the ramblings of Ol' Nick via Johnny Barleycorn.

Originally Posted by David Krein

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

I wonder if the professor would care to comment on the seeming exactitude of years (in S&H terms) separating the French and Indian War (1754) and the Great War (1914), with regards to what was happening in Britain in, say, 1834 (eighty years after and before).

I am wondering, this, in light of my outrageous thesis posted earlier today (ie., our previous "third turning" was more about Pax Britannica than about the present-day U.S.).

Marc - I'm not sure how to respond. From the start of one Third Turning War to the start of another is 158 years (the Seven Years War started in 1756). The start of Britain's next Third Turning War (the Crimean War in 1854) is 60 years before the start of World War I, and 98 years after the start of the last one. This clearly is not coincidental but I doubt that one can attribute much significance to numbers that end in zero.

Ok, maybe "exactitude of years" was a bit strong (I was dating from Washington's surrender to de Villiers in 1754). No matter, my larger point was the issue of world leadership in the context Britain's rise, maturity (say, in 1763?) and fall. Namely that these conflicts of 1754/6 and 1914, and the subsequent events a generation later in 1776/1939 (or if you prefer 1787/1945) suggests several things: 1) the trend toward democratic self-governance, over monarchial rule, was deliberate with the march (or ebb and flow) of time. 2) And somewhere during this long ~160 year interregnum, Britain transformed itself from a monarchial society to one resembling a democracy (parliamentary style: ie., the King meant less and less, the lawmakers more and more).

Thus I wondered about the year 1834 (the midpoint), as being a sort of a predictive hinge year, wherein, like 1754/1914, something happened a generation later much like 1787 or 1945. But from I understand, nothing on this magnitude did happen in Britain at all, right?

This to me, sounds nearly as odd as S&H's "Civil War anomaly." Almost as if making null and void the idea that any correlation, at least generationally so, between 1754 or 1914 and what came to pass a generation later.

As to 1834, I just yesterday started recording the votes in the House of Commons for the Parliament of 1833-1834. I have already completed 551 divisions from 1835 to 1868, and the 50 I have left to do here will make a grand total of 601 for the Reformed House of Commons.

Are you talking about generational divisions here? I'm not clear on what you mean.

Niall Ferguson, like A.J.P. Taylor before him, is making a career out of being controversial. A Conservative, his defense of 19th century British imperialism has politically correct post-modernists choking and spitting up in their beer.

I thought his article interesting mainly for it's historical re-telling the now long forgotten Great War, and it's important impact (overshadowed now by WWII).

Originally Posted by the United Kingdom Parliament

The House of Commons votes by dividing. Those voting Aye (yes) to any proposition walk through the division lobby to the right of the Speaker and those voting no through the lobby to the left. In each of the lobbies there are desks occupied by Clerks who tick Members' names off division lists as they pass through. Then at the exit doors the Members are counted by two Members acting as tellers. The Speaker calls for a vote by announcing "Clear the Lobbies". In the House of Lords "Clear the Bar" is called. Division Bells ring throughout the building and the police direct?anyone who is not an MP?to leave the vicinity of the Members? Lobby. They also walk through the public rooms of the House shouting "division". MPs have eight minutes to get to the Division Lobby before the doors are closed. Members make their way to the Chamber, where Whips are on hand to remind the uncertain which way, if any, their party is voting. Meanwhile the Clerks who will take the names of those voting have taken their place at the high tables with the alphabetical lists of MPs' names on which ticks are made to record the vote. When the tellers are ready, the counting process begins - the recording of names by the Clerk and the counting of heads by the tellers. When both lobbies have been counted and the figures entered on a card this is given to the Speaker who reads the figures and announces "So the Ayes [or Noes] have it". In the House of Lords the process is the same except that the Lobbies are called the Contents Lobby and the Not Contents Lobby. Unlike many other legislatures, the House of Commons and the House of Lords have not adopted a mechanical or electronic means of voting. This was considered in 1998 but rejected. Divisions rarely take less than ten minutes and those where most Members are voting usually take about fifteen.

Division

HTH

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Namely that these conflicts of 1754/6 and 1914, and the subsequent events a generation later in 1776/1939 (or if you prefer 1787/1945) suggests several things: 1) the trend toward democratic self-governance, over monarchial rule, was deliberate with the march (or ebb and flow) of time. 2) And somewhere during this long ~160 year interregnum, Britain transformed itself from a monarchial society to one resembling a democracy (parliamentary style: ie., the King meant less and less, the lawmakers more and more).

I would like to expound, just a bit, on this notion of Britain's transition from monarch to democracy during this ~160 year period. From www.britannia.com, the following quote, I think, illuminates my thesis:

• The Reform Act of 1832 had set the standard of legislative authority residing in the House of Lords, with executive authority resting within a cabinet formed of members of the House of Commons; the monarch was essentially removed from the loop.

While on a scale with such events as [name your bloody battle], this simple "Reform Act" may seem a bit out of place. For example, only now are some historians placing this period in it's proper historical context:

• Many historians, myself included, have put forward the case that 1832 was critical in understanding the evolution of modern British politics.

Alas, such is the problem of viewing any sort of predictive "cycle" in the vast black-hole of history. Nevertheless, one never tires of trying.

It seems to me, that this pre-Victorian Era reform speaks loudly in terms of the trend toward self-governing democracy. The old monarchial order was on the wane, but ever so slowly. The seemingly odd, ultra-destructive response that occurred after the June 28, 1914 assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary was but a fitting conclusion to all the inter-marrying among the nationalistic, land-owning elites in Europe. It was a fitting tribute to settling scores the old fashioned way, when the peasantry did the bidding of the spoiled-brat (or well-principled) monarch.

In contrast, one might compare the response of a republican democracy, circa 1963, when another gallant leader got his head blown off, in front of his wife, riding innocently in a carriage, in front of the world, in the backwoods of Dallas, Texas.

One has to wonder, why did a liberal democracy respond with a "Civil Rights Act of 1964" instead of a bloodbath? I think it more has to do with what defines a liberal democracy, as opposed to an unraveling of monarchs, or even a change of seasonal attitude (as promoted by S&H).

Thank you, Mr. Saari, for saving me the trouble. What I am doing now, and I'm almost done, is recording the Ayes and Noes on significant legislation from 1833 to 1868. Each division takes about 3-4 hours, and it is pretty mindless. I also don't know if, at the end, it will amount to anything, although I have already got one article out of it.

Marc - when you write " 1) the trend toward democratic self-governance, over monarchial rule, was deliberate with the march (or ebb and flow) of time.", I am not sure if deliberate is the right word. As late as 1860, the label "democrat" had the same connotation as "communist" did in 1950s America. Nobody in power, or even close to it, dared use the term until Disraeli came up with "Tory Democracy" in the 1870s. Your 2nd point here is unexceptional. By the way, in your 2nd post, the britannia quotation has it wrong. Far from being "out of the loop" the monarch was still a major player, especially on foreign affairs, until late in Victoria's reign. But the trend was toward concentration of power in the Commons (and, course, in the Cabinet). They are also wrong about the Lords and legislative authority; 1832 was the beginning of the end for the Lords as a legislative body, and Wellington knew it, The Parliament Bill of 1911 just ratified what had been a fact for more than a half a century before, even though Peers continued to be major players in the Cabinet. But as a legislative body it counted for less and less, which was highlighted by Gladstone's getting around their opposition ro rhe Tax on Knowledge with his unified budget of 1862.

Then you write "Thus I wondered about the year 1834 (the midpoint), as being a sort of a predictive hinge year, wherein, like 1754/1914, something happened a generation later much like 1787 or 1945. But from I understand, nothing on this magnitude did happen in Britain at all, right?" If you mean on the order of the U.S. Civil War or World War II, then you are right. But the Reform Bill of 1867 and the many reforms of the 1st Gladstone administration from 1868 to 1874 were the heart and soul of the "march towards democracy" you describe, and they were the product of the Idealist Generation born between 1800 and 1820. High Victorianism is the triumph of bourgeois democracy in Britain, and it is the work of Prophets. I have attributed the mildness of this mid-century crisis to the continued Adaptive control of the premiership (Palmerston and then Lord John Russell until 1866). As to S & H's "Civil War Anomaly" I have consistently challenged it on these boards going back to, I guess, 1997. There is, in my mind, very much of a generational correlation.

I am impressed that you found the review in the Institute of Historical Research, but I think you have misapprehended the Salmon book when you write "only now are some historians placing this period in it's proper historical context." It has been going on for a century and a half. What is relatively new is linking MPs legislative behavior to their constituencies. Much of this is driven by more sophisticated application of statistical techniques. One of my professors, Bill Aydelotte, tried, and failed, to demonstrate such a connection in the 1970s. But Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey and John Phillips have been successful in demonstrating this, and the Salmon book is very important in expanding the argument. John Phillips, by the way, was sadly killed in a car accident in California in, I think 1998. He is mentioned in the review you link to, and he was a good friend. He lived right across the parking lot from me in married student housing at the University of Iowa, and I acted as a kind of mentor his first year there (which was my last one on campus). He is sorely missed among British historians of a quantitative bent.

Pax,

Dave Krein '42



This to me, sounds nearly as odd as S&H's "Civil War anomaly." Almost as if making null and void the idea that any correlation, at least generationally so, between 1754 or 1914 and what came to pass a generation later.

Originally Posted by David Krein

I am impressed that you found the review in the Institute of Historical Research, but I think you have misapprehended the Salmon book when you write "only now are some historians placing this period in it's proper historical context." It has been going on for a century and a half. What is relatively new is linking MPs legislative behavior to their constituencies.

Ok, this threw me a bit when you talked about "divisions" without mentioning generations (as I knew this was of interest to you).

I am not a fan of S&H's Civil War "anomaly," but neither am I convinced generations have shortened. Seeing how Britain, and Europe, seemed to be following the trend toward "democracy" set forth by our representative constitution, but given the fact that Britain was still the financial and military center of the world during the 19th century, led me to think that a more truer sense of a generational cycle could be seen "over there" than over here (thus eliminating the "anomaly" or placing in a more proper picture).

It seems to me, though, aside from both experiencing the Industrial Revolution, that Europe and America greatly diverged paths during this time. Almost as if two entirely different worlds existed, with Europe transforming itself from a monarchial society and the U.S. expanding westward with democracy (sometimes bloody, sometimes idealist -- freeing slaves -- sometimes brutish -- killin' injuns) in tow.

Needless to say, these two worlds met a bit prematurely in 1914, and again, later, in 1941.

Neil Howe once laid out a a basis upon how to look at history when applying a generational cycle to it, to Professor McGuiness some years ago.

• First, there is no requirement that you be chronologically and geographically comprehensive. Let's face it: In these eras, there are many centuries and regions where we know precious little for certain about what actually happened in any meaningful and precise chronological sense (beyond, say, the serial names of kings of whom we often know zilch). What can we really say for certain about five centuries of Kassite civilization in Mesopotamia? Why not focus first on those regions and eras where we really have some feel for the texture of politics, society, and culture--generation by generation, turning by turning?
  
  Second, even after choosing your region and era with care... Rather, we've always done best by focusing first on those special generations and eras where we feel most certain that something very special is happening--the things that just seem to leap out at you from the chronology or birthdates or literature. We look at them carefully, trying to trace the lifecycle of all generational participants backwards and forwards and refining as best we can all of our cohort and turning boundary dates. Only then do we move laterally to "fill in" the generations or eras that don't define themselves so well.

One has to wonder what if S&H were Brits, and had begun with British history (and not Chance and Circumstance), would they have junked this theory because of a lack of umph! in the post-Napoleon Europe?

With an "anomaly" in mind, and nothing to even closely resemble a "fourth turning" in Europe circa 1860-1870 (save for some peaceful demographic political reorganization), one has to wonder, had America not fought a civil war would S&H have even considered a generational theory to history with such a big hole in it?

There may be a cycle out there, but I'm not so sure we can see it with mere mortal eyes. Or without a heavy dose of wishful thinking.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

With an "anomaly" in mind, and nothing to even closely resemble a "fourth turning" in Europe circa 1860-1870 (save for some peaceful demographic political reorganization), one has to wonder, had America not fought a civil war would S&H have even considered a generational theory to history with such a big hole in it?

What about the wars for German and Italian unification? Also, they were effected by the major economic collapse in the 1870's as were we, in fact I believe that started over there.

Europe was pretty well socially/economically/politically stable at that time. Maybe countries at the peak of their powers are able to blunt the impacts of the 4T part of the cycle, while younger developing countries and nations in decline are more vulnerable to volatility in times of crisis.

The 1700's in Europe were very volatile and the 1900's beat them all, so maybe just because we don't see anything during this time that gets our adrenaline going doesn't automatically mean important changes did'nt occur.

Originally Posted by DKG 1962

The 1700's in Europe were very volatile and the 1900's beat them all, so maybe just because we don't see anything during this time that gets our adrenaline going doesn't automatically mean important changes did'nt occur.

Changes yes, but let's purge the fourth turning lexicon with words like "spark," sudden or otherwise. Clearly, without convoluting the very meaning of the word, one cannot deny that Britain or Europe experienced no such "spark" in the ninety-some years preceding the one experienced on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary.

Whilst the politicians argued and bargained the people resorted again to violence. The Duke of Wellington, always eager to avoid bloodshed, ordered the Tory Lords either to vote for the Bill or to absent themselves from the session when the vote was taken.

Originally Posted by Devil's Advocate

Changes yes, but let's purge the fourth turning lexicon with words like "spark," sudden or otherwise. Clearly, without convoluting the very meaning of the word, one cannot deny that Britain or Europe experienced no such "spark" in the ninety-some years preceding the one experienced on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary.

You are probably right. From what I've read about the British during this period, nothing could have ruffled their feathers. They ruled the better part of the world and were sure it was meant to be so. And in general, I think Western Europe shared this confidence.

But I wonder what effect the Paris Commune would have had on the French society. Also, I have read that Bizmark and German unification triggered a rapid industrialization and urbanization in Germany (as in transformed from a dominantly rural nation into possibly the leading industrial power in Europe) from the 1870's to 1914.

I was not surprised to see Islamics use cultural Marxism as a weapon, any more than it surprises me to watch cultural Marxists use mass immigration as a weapon. Both have the same objective, the destruction of the Christian West, and the equivalent of a Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between them makes sense. No matter that the cultural Marxists hate Allah as much as they hate J-hw-h or the Holy Trinity, or that the Islamic scimitar would quickly be put to the necks of the cultural Marxists; until the Christian West is dead and buried, each can use the other.

Here was the second, and more surprising, dynamic of the conference: a number of participants (not just myself, old Templar that I am) dared defy the rules of cultural Marxism and call upon the Christian West to defend itself. The Islamics' frantic waving of the "racism" and "discrimination" bugaboos did not entirely work. By the end of the conference, I thought the Islamics seemed beaten. It certainly did not go according to their plan, with the West groveling in the dirt and praising the "benefits" of Islamic immigration. ?

Originally Posted by NickSmoliga

I was not surprised to see Islamics use cultural Marxism as a weapon, any more than it surprises me to watch cultural Marxists use mass immigration as a weapon. Both have the same objective, the destruction of the Christian West, and the equivalent of a Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between them makes sense. No matter that the cultural Marxists hate Allah as much as they hate J-hw-h or the Holy Trinity, or that the Islamic scimitar would quickly be put to the necks of the cultural Marxists; until the Christian West is dead and buried, each can use the other.

Here was the second, and more surprising, dynamic of the conference: a number of participants (not just myself, old Templar that I am) dared defy the rules of cultural Marxism and call upon the Christian West to defend itself. The Islamics' frantic waving of the "racism" and "discrimination" bugaboos did not entirely work. By the end of the conference, I thought the Islamics seemed beaten. It certainly did not go according to their plan, with the West groveling in the dirt and praising the "benefits" of Islamic immigration. ?

FWIW, when quoting verbatim, quotation marks and attribution are the norm.

Originally Posted by NickSmoliga

I was not surprised to see Islamics use cultural Marxism as a weapon, any more than it surprises me to watch cultural Marxists use mass immigration as a weapon. Both have the same objective, the destruction of the Christian West, and the equivalent of a Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact between them makes sense. No matter that the cultural Marxists hate Allah as much as they hate J-hw-h or the Holy Trinity, or that the Islamic scimitar would quickly be put to the necks of the cultural Marxists; until the Christian West is dead and buried, each can use the other.

Here was the second, and more surprising, dynamic of the conference: a number of participants (not just myself, old Templar that I am) dared defy the rules of cultural Marxism and call upon the Christian West to defend itself. The Islamics' frantic waving of the "racism" and "discrimination" bugaboos did not entirely work. By the end of the conference, I thought the Islamics seemed beaten. It certainly did not go according to their plan, with the West groveling in the dirt and praising the "benefits" of Islamic immigration. ?

Your post makes it seem like you are the one who attended the conference.

Originally Posted by NickSmoliga

I was not surprised to see Islamics use cultural Marxism as a weapon ?

Gee, funny how a woman gets free reign to determine what is "right" with regards to her "body," but a guy who wants to "get rich" by using body-building steriods is hauled before congress as a sub-human. "Yes, ma'am, you can kill that baby. No, sir, you, as a role-model for the children, cannot abuse yourself with enhancing drugs."

What would a guy like Charley Martel say about this hypocrisy: Bad role-modeling dads are good while good baby-killer moms are bad?

The political elites of France and the rest of Europe were shocked yesterday by an opinion poll that for the first time suggested a majority of French voters will reject the European Union Constitution in a referendum in 10 weeks.

http://www.rediff.com/money/2005/jan/21guest.htm

India a giant economy? Yes, by 2035!

January 21, 2005


For over a century the United States has been the largest economy in the world. Major shifts have, however, been under way since then.

During the last 30 years the weight of the world economy has shifted from the US and the rich countries of Europe to China and India.

These trends will continue in the 21st century, bringing about a historic transformation of the world economy. The global economy will change from a uni-polar to a bi-polar one with the emergence of China.

This will be followed a decade and a half later by the emergence of India, converting the world economy into a tri-polar one.

The rich countries of Europe have seen the greatest decline in global GDP share by 4.9 percentage points, followed by the US and Japan with a decline of about 1 percentage point each.

Within Asia the declining global share of Japan since 1990 has been more than made up by the rising share of China and India.

During the seventies and the eighties, ASEAN countries and during the eighties South Korea, along with China and India, contributed to the rising share of Asia in world GDP.

Between 1975 and 2002, Japan's share of world GDP fell by 1 percentage point while that of South Korea, ASEAN, India and China rose by 1 percentage point, 1.2 percentage points, 2.2 percentage points and 9.2 percentage points, respectively.

Thus, India's gains since 1980 have been much larger than ASEAN's and South Korea's but much less than those of China (Arvind Virmani, 'Economic Performance, Power Potential and Global Governance: Towards a New International Order,' ICRIER Working Paper No. 150, December 2005).

Uni-polar Global Economy: 2002

At the start of the new millennium, the US -- the largest economy -- is almost twice the size of the next largest economy, China, and about three times the third largest economy, Japan.

Thus, the size of the US economy is larger than the next two economies combined, revealing clearly the uni-polar nature of the global economy.

The fourth largest economy, India, is a little over one-quarter the size of the US economy.

The next five positions are taken by the big four of Europe: Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Brazil and Russia bring up the rear with their joint size less than that of India.

In turn, the size of these three economies together is less than that of China.

Bi-pole China

Within 10 years, the global economy will be transformed from a uni-polar to a bi-polar one. China is projected by us to become the largest economy in the world within 15 years.

Though India, like the rest of the world, has been falling behind China, its share in world GDP will continue to grow. Before the end of the current decade, India's economy will become larger than that of Japan, thus taking it to the third place, behind the US and China.

We measure the incremental impact of an economy on the rest of the world through trade and financial flow by change in GDP at the current exchange rate.

By the end of the decade, China will become a larger driver of global growth than the European Union's six largest economies. Similarly, India will be a larger growth driver than the United Kingdom, the most significant growth pole in the EU.

At this time the combined impact of the three Asian giants (including Japan) will exceed that of the US.

The global impact of other emerging economies is relatively small. In 2015, Canada and Russia are ranked 11th and 12th in terms of impact, which is less than a third of that of India at that time.

The South Korean economy in contrast comes in at the 7th rank with an impact that is half that of India's. Brazil's impact is projected to be much lower than that of Mexico.

India: 3rd Pole & Growth Driver

As the share of the US in world GDP falls (from 21 per cent to 18 per cent) and that of India rises (from 6 per cent to 11 per cent in 2025), the latter emerges as the third pole in the global economy.

By 2025 the Indian economy is projected to be about 60 per cent the size of the US economy. The transformation into a tri-polar economy will be complete by 2035, with the Indian economy only a little smaller than the US economy but larger than that of Western Europe.

China's economy is projected to become 50 per cent larger than the US economy by 2025, and almost double that of the US by 2035. At this point, China's share in the world economy will be equal to the share of the US and Indian economies taken together.

All the other countries that are either currently members of the Security Council or aspire to become so will therefore have relatively small shares.

Japan, the largest among them, will have a share of about 5 per cent while the others (including Russia) will each have 2.5 per cent.

This scenario assumes that China will be able to sustain the "FDI-export" cum "zero capital cost" model of fast growth. The "FDI-export" model transformed ASEAN countries into "miracle" growth economies, but the Asian crises showed that it was heavily dependent on creating and sustaining optimistic expectations.

China's risk is heightened by it combining with "zero capital cost" to producers inputs including infrastructure that bury inefficiencies in the government banking system (implicit fiscal subsidies).

It is however hard to predict what kind of exogenous shock will knock such an economy off the high-growth knife-edge path to more normal sustainable growth rates.

By around 2025, China's impact (in terms of GDP at prevailing exchange rates) on world growth is likely to be larger than that of the US and India's impact larger than that of Japan.

By 2035, India is likely to be a larger growth driver than the six largest countries in the EU, though its impact will be a little over half that of the US.

China's impact will, however, be about 40 per cent more than that of the US.

Conclusion

The projected changes in the relative size of economies will have profound implications for global governance, the global balance of power, and the stability of Asia.

This phenomenal change in relative power poses a major challenge to the economies of Europe, North America, and Asia that very few seem to fully understand or appreciate.

The author is director and chief executive, ICRIER. The views expressed are personal.

And Bush looked into Putin's eyes and saw "good."

1981 attack on pope planned by Soviets: report

Wed Mar 30, 9:40 AM ET

ROME (AFP) - New documents found in the files of the former East German intelligence services confirm the 1981 assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II was ordered by the Soviet KGB and assigned to Bulgarian agents, an Italian daily said.

The Corriere della Sera said that the documents found by the German government indicated that the KGB ordered Bulgarian colleagues to carry out the killing, leaving the East German service known as the Stasi to coordinate the operation and cover up the traces afterwards.

Bulgaria then handed the execution of the plot to Turkish extremists, including Mehmet Ali Agca, who pulled the trigger.

The daily said the documents had been handed over to Bulgaria and would be made available to the Italian parliamentary commission inquiring into the activities of formerly Communist eastern European regimes in Italy.

The newspaper said the documents consist mostly of letters from Stasi operatives to their Bulgarian counterparts seeking help in covering up traces after the attack and denying Bulgarian involvement.

Ali Agca, who is now in jail in Turkey, claimed after his arrest that the operation was under the control of the Bulgarian embassy in Rome. The Bulgarians have always insisted they were innocent and argued that Agca's story was part of an anti-communist plot by the Italian secret service and the CIA.

The paper said the documents back up the pope's own memories of the assassination attempt in May 1981 in his book "Memory and Identity: Conversations Between Millenniums," in which he said he was convinced that the attack was not planned or directed by Ali Agca.

VIVE LA FRANCE?

Originally Posted by Mr. Alex Duval Smith in the [i

Observer[/i](UK)]'Everywhere in Europe I come across a feeling of serious concern. People thought the problem would come from the British, but are discovering it is coming from a founding (EU) member state without which you cannot imagine the European project continuing,' Borrell told Le Monde .

'The "no" supporters in France think their rejection will cause a salutary crisis or even salvation without a crisis. I think there will be a crisis and it will not be salutary.'

Originally Posted by Virgil K. Saari

VIVE LA FRANCE?

Originally Posted by Mr. Alex Duval Smith in the [i

Observer[/i](UK)]'Everywhere in Europe I come across a feeling of serious concern. People thought the problem would come from the British, but are discovering it is coming from a founding (EU) member state without which you cannot imagine the European project continuing,' Borrell told Le Monde .

'The "no" supporters in France think their rejection will cause a salutary crisis or even salvation without a crisis. I think there will be a crisis and it will not be salutary.'

Perfidious Gaul.

Here is a interesting poll from Germany. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,350457,00.html
I post it because I think it shows a changing point of view between the generations and shows were german Millenials and younger GenX (or 89er like I call them) sheeds from older 89er.
The question was, if the germans want a reform-pope or a pope following the tradition of JPII. German between 30 and 49 preffered a reform-pope with 67%. Just 27% wanted a pope in JPII tradition.
People 29 or younger preffered in majority still a reform-pope, but just with 48%. 38% want a pope in the tradition of JPII.

Originally Posted by freivolk

Here is a interesting poll from Germany. http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/0,1518,350457,00.html
I post it because I think it shows a changing point of view between the generations and shows were german Millenials and younger GenX (or 89er like I call them) sheeds from older 89er.
The question was, if the germans want a reform-pope or a pope following the tradition of JPII. German between 30 and 49 preffered a reform-pope with 67%. Just 27% wanted a pope in JPII tradition.
People 29 or younger preffered in majority still a reform-pope, but just with 48%. 38% want a pope in the tradition of JPII.

The young did not want at reforming Pope as badly eh? Interesting.

Paul Gibbons wrote:

Perfidious Gaul.

I'm sure the Brits are all laughing right now. But have you'd noticed the age of those who support the new constitution? Those over 65. French silents anyone?

Stanley

Originally Posted by Stanley Alston '61

Paul Gibbons wrote:

Perfidious Gaul.

I'm sure the Brits are all laughing right now. But have you'd noticed the age of those who support the new constitution? Those over 65. French silents anyone?

Stanley

If the "Europe" is weakened by all of this, and if France and Germany keep cheating on their monetary pact, I imagine the Euro's position as a potential reserve currency replacement declines. This could only help the dollar structurally, I imagine.

But if the strain on the dollar becomes great enough, what happens? Would people go to the Euro anyway, or would gold go through the roof??

For those of you that might recall the argument about when the Awakening hit Britain in the '60s, I myself believe it was 1965 at the earliest. One bit of evident which i myself have forgotten, but I'm sure a lot of Boomers and other early 13ers might remember was a TV show that was produced in Britain but also shown in the US in 1967. The show? The Prisoner. I got this from a web site of a person who'd remembered seeing the show as a young kid (and from the evident of reading what she is saying, I think she's (yes she) is a young 13er. Anything, this is what she said about The Prisoner:

The Prisoner [1967]: This amazing British series only lasted one season, though I suppose it's amazing that it ever aired at all. It has a Kafkaesque plot where the prisoner in question doesn't really know why he is kept in prison (the prison, for those who haven't seen the series, is actually a charming village with some very weird and sometimes very frightening features). On top of that, his captors are there to extract information from him, but his "crime" is more along the lines of the fact that the prisoner had used his free will, rather than any crime against the government or society. So the plotline though convoluted, gives one a lot of food for thought. The interior and exterior sets are exquisitely unique and eerie, and the special effects (particularly the terrifying giant bubble that scared the socks off me as a kid) provide just the right amount of chills and thrills.

Take a real good look at what I'd underlined. The main character's crime was that he was using his free will. Sounds like a young prophet who was going against the conformist ideas of his hero elders and in turn his elders trying to force him to follow their imposed rules, or to use a more familair term, to not upset the apple cart with his new ideas, and the prophet refusing to follow those rules, doesn't it?

From what I can recall of the series, the main points are this: The agent suddenly resigns from a secret agency in Britain, and is just as suddenly kidnapped. He wakes up in a very well kept, pristine, clean village (start cueing GI-style music folks). But this village is not as clean and nice as it appears. The former agent finds out that he's there because he has information that they want (in fact, what they want to know is why did he quit his job.) and they will do everything in their power to get it. He is also assigned a number, which in his case is no. 6. His main adversary (who changes every few episode since he always defeat this person), is called no. 2. He in turn wants to know who is no. 1, but no. 2 refuses, and always refuses to tell him. Of course, no. 6 always attempts to escape the island, but all but 1 is a failure, while him mainly being caught by this giant balloon which is nicknamed (I'm trying to remember from memory) Rover. But, at the end of the run, (it lasted less than a full year) he does escape and the village is destroyed in chaos and he escapes back to London, once again free.

The main catch phrase of the series is: I am not a number, I am a fee man.

Sounds like a Boomer '60s phrase, doesn't it?

For those of you who don't know, the star in this series had appeared in an earlier series, also from Britain, that was called Secret Agent Man (Danger Man in Britain). It lasted two seasons, 1965-1967. The interesting thing that I have heard over the year is that some folks believe that the main character in The Prisoner, is the same character in Secret Agent (Danger) Man. I myself have no idea if he is or not since its been some time since I'd seen both The Prisoner, and Secret Agent Man.

The website where I got the information from is located here:

http://www.cinerhama.com/tvpage/sixties/60cult.html

Stanley '61