That's a tough one. Bush has been acting in ways pretty inimical to America's interests. Doesn't that, arguably, make him one of America's enemies? Do we get to pick which one of the enemies to side with, or do they all have to join the League of Evil?Originally Posted by MichaelEaston
Very funny, but it's the entirety of France that needs a revolution. The enfants des ghettoes are merely the ones with the least to lose and thus the most reason to riot. Without implying any sort of endorsement of Marxism, it would nonetheless be accurate to say that their demographic fits (better than any other in France) the Marxist criteria for "proletariat". Given that fact, of course they are going to riot.
But it's the French system that has screwed up here, and the French suddenly realize it. If certain core assumptions about the nature of French society were true, these riots could not have happened.
I think the French will look back and see this as their 4T catalyst (approximately on time, as France should lag about four years behind our saecular rhythm) -- the moment they realized their worldview might not be correct. If you think this isn't so momentous, consider that a couple of months ago France was explaining patiently to us how implementing their system would have prevented lawlessness in New Orleans. Now it turns out that France's system is at least as bad, possibly worse...
A final point: I don't like rioters of any way, shape, or form. Nonetheless it occurs to me that these rioters are Millies -- yes yes of a different culture and upbringing but Millies nonetheless. I'm torn between feeling solidarity with their desire for a better system, my unhappiness with the systems being offered to them (which so far all suck), and my empathy with their confusion as to what would be a better world for them.
EDIT: On the "Euro lag" thread, it is suggested that this is not France's 4T at all, that France's 4T centered around the Algerian war. This is a very interesting idea; I'm not sure I believe it and I'm not sure I don't. Where does 1968 fit in then?
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
- - -
Napoleonic Wars, Franco-Prussian War, World War Two, upcoming crisis.
These are millenials.
And in the best tradition of France...
It occurs to me that these Millies have had a French education one and all -- the one that begins "We Gauloises..." and have been exposed to the founding narrative of Modern France, their Great Heroic Legend. Which they may well be, possibly unconsciously, acting out. "Aux armes, citoyens!"
How long before some French pundit sees that? Hey - I'm not French and I saw it.
Even lower-Canaille
These are not the proletariat. They are on a lower rung. A rabble Mr. Marx had very little use for when ordering Progress.Very funny, but it's the entirety of France that needs a revolution. The enfants des ghettoes are merely the ones with the least to lose and thus the most reason to riot. Without implying any sort of endorsement of Marxism, it would nonetheless be accurate to say that their demographic fits (better than any other in France) the Marxist criteria for "proletariat". Given that fact, of course they are going to riot.
But it's the French system that has screwed up here, and the French suddenly realize it. If certain core assumptions about the nature of French society were true, these riots could not have happened.
I think the French will look back and see this as their 4T catalyst (approximately on time, as France should lag about four years behind our saecular rhythm) -- the moment they realized their worldview might not be correct. If you think this isn't so momentous, consider that a couple of months ago France was explaining patiently to us how implementing their system would have prevented lawlessness in New Orleans. Now it turns out that France's system is at least as bad, possibly worse...
A final point: I don't like rioters of any way, shape, or form. Nonetheless it occurs to me that these rioters are Millies -- yes yes of a different culture and upbringing but Millies nonetheless. I'm torn between feeling solidarity with their desire for a better system, my unhappiness with the systems being offered to them (which so far all suck), and my empathy with their confusion as to what would be a better world for them.
EDIT: On the "Euro lag" thread, it is suggested that this is not France's 4T at all, that France's 4T centered around the Algerian war. This is a very interesting idea; I'm not sure I believe it and I'm not sure I don't. Where does 1968 fit in then?
Re: Even lower-Canaille
I believe that Marx's term for 'Canaille' was 'Lumpen-proletatiat'. (BTW, it's interesting that the 'New Left' of the 60s turned for support to said group, whom Marx did indeed have very little use for.
Re: Even lower-Canaille
That's because we're morally ahead of Marx. :twisted:I believe that Marx's term for 'Canaille' was 'Lumpen-proletatiat'. (BTW, it's interesting that the 'New Left' of the 60s turned for support to said group, whom Marx did indeed have very little use for.
Re: Even lower-Canaille
I'm getting conflicting reports on whether these *really are* lumpenproles (i.e., the criminal elements), or proles feeling that they are being pushed towards lumpenproledom, or a combo of the two. However, i would agree that we are not dealing with people on the edge of escaping proledom. Those people despise the rioting, as it threatens their escape.That's because we're morally ahead of Marx. :twisted:I believe that Marx's term for 'Canaille' was 'Lumpen-proletatiat'. (BTW, it's interesting that the 'New Left' of the 60s turned for support to said group, whom Marx did indeed have very little use for.
However, the key point is that France had fooled herself into thinking she no longer had proles at all. Wake up and smell the coffee... and the burning cars...
'81, 30/70 X/Millie, trying to live in both Red and Blue America... "Catfish 'n Cod"
No. Not really.Perhaps The Dude was saying two things at once though.Way to miss the joke, dude. :?No Dude, if you are a foreigner and you were involved in the rioting - then, like, no duh you get deported.Spaying and neutering them will only make them angrier. It isn't right.
If I was rioting in Mexico City or Buenos Aires or Tokyo or France and burning cars - you don't think the authorities there would turn my sorry ass over to my consulate and be rid of me?
It makes sense. God, why do people get intimidated by those who burn cars and beat their chests? They shouldn't be rewarded for acting like assholes.
"Jan, cut the crap."
"It's just a donut."
- - -
Maybe that's true and maybe that isn't. The LA riots went on for days, and law enforcement was simply absent in many places, letting the city burn. I was present at one of the bigger protest cum riots after the King verdict (though not in LA) and it was really just a free-for-all. There was no coordinated response by law enforcement, just a lot of chaos; people were getting away with many, many things, and arrests were at best random. The kind of mass entrapment that took place at the 2004 RNC convention was nowhere in evidence. Half the cops were just standing around letting it happen, letting people blow off steam.
I think the theory is a useful way of looking at some of the bigger themes of history, but I don't take it with clinical seriousness, and many trends at any given time contradict what Strauss and Howe say.
My experience with protests in recent decades was that until the last couple of years law enforcement took a very hands off attitude in most cases, which was a trend sparked in part I think by the excesses of authoritarianism toward the protests of the 1960s and 1970s. Until recently, there were pretty strict policies on the books beginning in the late 1970s that gave people wide latitude to - umm - express themselves politically in public. It was actually an unusually free time in American history to protest, but unless people started lighting shit on fire and lobbing bricks at the Gap few people cared to pay attention.
If the millenials are such a beloved generation why are these kids being called "scum" by the French elite? As I said on another thread I think social class matters more than what generation you happen to come from. If you're a white middle class person the world is likely to be more kind to you - no matter when you happen to be born - than if you're poor, brown, and speak with an accent. Is anyone going to seriously argue that Hemingway was treated less generously by the world than Ralph Ellison?
But I'm getting off topic again...
"Jan, cut the crap."
"It's just a donut."
Or I'm just not especially funny.I've been fooled. By The Dude.
"Jan, cut the crap."
"It's just a donut."
Chirac calls on media to help promote integration
In a related story, former governor Jerry Brown calls on terrorists to get mood rings, and mellow out.
"Jan, cut the crap."
"It's just a donut."
I think 1968 proves that the Algerian War 4T idea is wrong. The death of the Fourth Republic could very well have been a 1T event just as the crisis surrounding the 1876 election and the massive strikes of early 1877 here in the US were.
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
Think 'unwelcome echoes of the recently ended 4T' for all three examples listed above. Also, the Andrew Johnson impeachment could be said to fall under this classification.
Well put.Think 'unwelcome echoes of the recently ended 4T' for all three examples listed above. Also, the Andrew Johnson impeachment could be said to fall under this classification.
Americans have had enough of glitz and roar . . Foreboding has deepened, and spiritual currents have darkened . . .
THE FOURTH TURNING IS AT HAND.
See T4T, p. 253.
This is a depressing article from Government Executive, an e-magazine targeted to Federal managers (I read it as a union rep).
If the world today faces challenges that call for strong leadership, it had better watch out. When did the governments of the big Western democracies last look this feeble -- and all at the same time?
At home, the Bush administration continues to watch its approval ratings sink. In last week's elections, Republicans could be observed delicately distancing themselves from President Bush -- and some who chose not to wish they had. Sen. Jon Corzine, who won the New Jersey governorship for the Democrats by a surprisingly wide margin, mocked his opponent as "George Bush's choice." You cannot help but wonder what so enfeebled an administration can achieve in its remaining three years.
The Bush administration's best friend in Europe, Tony Blair, is also in deep trouble. Last week, Blair's attempt to pass a new security law (which, among other things, would have allowed the government to detain suspects without charge for 90 days, up from the current 14) was defeated in the House of Commons.
This was a much more shocking development than most Americans probably realize. British prime ministers, who normally rule as elected dictators (a Tory minister who knew what he was talking about coined that phrase), are unaccustomed to losing votes in Parliament. And Blair had staked his reputation on this one. The fact that so many of his own Labor members in Parliament were willing to rebel against him is telling: It means that they think he is on the way out, and sooner rather than later.
German politics is in a state of something close to paralysis as well. An inconclusive election two months ago has produced, finally, a coalition of the unwilling: The conservative Christian Democrats have formed a power-sharing government with the leftist Social Democrats, under the leadership (bitterly resented on the left) of the Christian Democrats' Angela Merkel.
It is hard enough to see this coalition surviving, let alone getting anything done. And the list of things that need to be done in Germany is long.
But America, Britain, and Germany all look fine compared with France, which is still in shock after the sustained and widespread rioting of recent days. Jacques Chirac's government was slow to respond to the crisis, and it probably made matters worse with injudicious comments from on high (the interior minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, called the rioters "scum"). The government is none too clear on what to do next.
It is tempting to draw connections -- and why not, just for a moment, surrender to temptation? After all, some of the links are real, though not as tidy as you could wish.
One such link is Iraq. It goes without saying that Bush and Blair are both paying a heavy political price for the war. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction, which both leaders had emphasized as a primary reason for removing Saddam Hussein, and the costly, bungled execution of the postwar strategy, have bled support from both leaders.
Each is tainted by the suspicion of dishonesty. At a minimum, there was less than full disclosure of official doubts over the WMD intelligence. Many voters in both countries believe they were just plain lied to about it.
Both leaders' competence is called into question, too. In Bush's case, this is straightforward: Responsibility for the postwar mess rests ultimately with him. For Blair, the coalition's junior partner, the charge of incompetence has a different cast: The United States duped him into war, some say, or else he simply failed to identify and assert Britain's interests.
Last week, Sir Christopher Meyer, Britain's ambassador to Washington before the war, gave an account, splashed across Britain's front pages, that was less than flattering: In dealing with the White House, he said, Blair was meek, inattentive to detail, and carried away by self-righteousness.
Bush's troubles are about competence more broadly: Iraq is only part of what is dragging him down. The Democrats' charge that he is an ideological extremist never got them very far, because Bush seems too likable -- and too muddled -- for that description to fit. But the charge of incompetence certainly sticks, and if you go with that line, Iraq falls neatly into place.
Next, add the Hurricane Katrina fiasco. And while charges of incompetence and cronyism are still engulfing the presidency over that episode, the White House, as if to validate this whole line of criticism, goes and nominates Harriet Miers for the Supreme Court. Bush's opponents could not have scripted it more to their liking.
Iraq, and the issue of Islam and the West, also have a connection to events in France -- but it is tenuous, and one should not make too much of it. France opposed the war, of course. And although most of the rioters are Muslims (typically, immigrants from North Africa), they seem driven less by religious or even secular anti-Western zeal than by a straightforward sense of economic and social exclusion from mainstream French society.
France has tried harder than most European countries -- harder than multicultural Britain -- to assimilate its immigrants, but seems to have had no more success than the others. And France, like much of Europe (but again, unlike Britain), has a chronic unemployment problem, and the burden of this falls most heavily on African immigrants. Unemployment rates among young Muslims run as high as 40 percent.
When the failure to assimilate immigrants and their children -- and thus to create a sense of belonging and participation -- combines with a lack of jobs, the result is toxic. In a way, however, this is almost reassuring: Better to be dealing with fury arising from economic or racial disadvantage, bad as that may be, than from religious grievance. But, given the facts on the ground, it would not take much to give the riots in France an even more sinister, religious-war aspect.
High unemployment and a persistent sense of economic underachievement lie behind the political difficulties of many other European governments. Germany is a case in point. There, it is telling that the Social Democrats, who opposed the war in Iraq and thereby, in the eyes of most German voters, were on the right side of the argument, have gained very little from it politically. Germans understand that their economy needs to be fixed -- that unemployment is too high and growth too sluggish. And they agree that their economy, not Iraq, or security more broadly, is the key issue. But they are hopelessly confused about the measures needed to fix the problem -- hence this unstable and deeply divided governing coalition.
The encompassing theme, if there is one, is powerlessness. In all four countries, people feel that their governments are wrestling with issues that are beyond them. In no case, though, do they see a clear alternative to the government or policies they already have. It is a moment of maximum disenchantment with politics.
If the world needs strong leadership, this article began, it had better watch out. Does it, though? The question is worth asking. There are worse things than weak government: Strong government dedicated to (or inadvertently serving) bad ends, for instance. Inactivity is a seriously underrated trait in politics, in ordinary times at least. But these are not normal times.
All four countries face enormous domestic challenges, including (but not limited to) the need to provide incomes and health care to their rapidly aging populations. Planning for that demographic transition requires difficult balances to be struck, across generations and within them. Who is going to lead that effort in the United States, or in Britain, France, or Germany? The answer today would appear to be, none of the above.
The world faces too many other challenges that will not wait, many of them requiring international action -- on development, for instance, on the threat of pandemic disease, on international trade and finance, on climate change. And looming over everything is the fact that the West still faces implacable enemies who will, one day soon, get their hands on WMD.
One of the biggest costs of the misadventure in Iraq is that it has -- to some extent, as yet unknown -- inhibited and disarmed America and its friends in that life-or-death struggle. If you doubt this, watch Iran's continuing defiance of the world over its nuclear program.
So, yes, the world as a whole needs strong leadership -- especially in the United States. The failure of France and Germany to adopt policies that are friendly to private enterprise and good for jobs is costly, to be sure, but mainly for citizens of those countries. Blair's difficulties are an absorbing human and political drama, with much at stake for Britain's future direction; but again, it is mostly a local issue.
For the world as a whole, the indispensable actor is the United States. The enfeeblement of the Bush administration is a setback not just for Americans but for everybody else as well -- except, of course, for those enemies of the West.
Somewhere in there, maybe, is a consoling thought. If the reason that terrorists attack is to destabilize Western governments, why bother just now? Our leaders are doing so well unassisted.
I want people to know that peace is possible even in this stupid day and age. Prem Rawat, June 8, 2008
That article brings to mind the situation that obtained when the two primary leaders of the Roman world were Arcadius in the East, and Honorius in the West. :shock: :cry:
Of course... one could argue that the Crisis wasn't over in the South until 1876.Well put.Think 'unwelcome echoes of the recently ended 4T' for all three examples listed above. Also, the Andrew Johnson impeachment could be said to fall under this classification.
"Better hurry. There's a storm coming. His storm!!!" :-O -Abigail Freemantle, "The Stand" by Stephen King
The trouble I think is that in the multicultural countries of the west (the US, Canada, increasingly the UK and Australia) beneath the nationalist rhetoric of politicians there is too much fragmentation for a re-assertion of central government authority, or national cohesion. Beneath the surface, I think the emerging consensus in these countries is toward decentralization of power. Congress can't even get its bloody act together to rebuild a drowned city in its own borders, let alone another country, or protect its citizens against the worst aspects of globalization (pillaging corporations, pandemics, and trans-national criminal and terror networks), and prevent further balkanization of the country.
In the nationalist countries of the west (France, Germany, Japan, and much of the rest of continental Europe) they have little choice today but to follow the model of the Anglo-American world, and open themselves up to the forces of tribalization and globalization. If they don't liberalize their economies and integrate their immigrant populations they will face slow to no growth, and civil unrest, and if they do liberalize their economies and integrate their immigrant populations they will begin down the road of weakening central governments, cultural fragmentation, and ultimately perhaps dissolution.
"Jan, cut the crap."
"It's just a donut."
So it looks right now, in late 3T. In a few years, I suspect we'll be seeing so much effective action on the part of the Western nations that the world will be feel like its caught up in a quake. The question is whether that action will be constructive or destructive.The trouble I think is that in the multicultural countries of the west (the US, Canada, increasingly the UK and Australia) beneath the nationalist rhetoric of politicians there is too much fragmentation for a re-assertion of central government authority, or national cohesion. Beneath the surface, I think the emerging consensus in these countries is toward decentralization of power. Congress can't even get its bloody act together to rebuild a drowned city in its own borders, let alone another country, or protect its citizens against the worst aspects of globalization (pillaging corporations, pandemics, and trans-national criminal and terror networks), and prevent further balkanization of the country.
Right now, the Silent still set the tone, though their power is fading. Our political situations are one of precarious, elaborately balanced equilibrium, motion in any direction by any faction is blocked by some other, nobody is yet storng enough to force someone aside...but that'll happen.
I would compare our current late 3T situation to a huge reservoir behind a dam: tremendous potential energy, held back in an illusion of placid stasis. As long as the dam holds, the potential energy can't manifest and everything stays quiet. But if the dam cracks, or the foundations give, or the water undercuts the banks, the transition from stability to chaos is spectacular and sudden, and can sweep aside everything in its path.
The 'dam' is the Silent domination of society and culture and government and above all else of 'mood'. It was erected when the Silent entered Elderhood, turning the rapidly flowing G.I. River into a vast quiet reservoir. That reservoir has been filling all through the 3T, and everything stays quiet as long as the dam is in place. But the water level keeps rising and pressure building, the dam won't hold forever, either it'll break or the water will overtop it, undercut it, or work around it, and once it gives it'll give suddenly and completely.
I don't think it'll be long now, when I listen closely I can hear the dam straining, and leaks are appearing all over the river valley.
I wouldn't rule it out, but I am more inclined to think you're making the mistake of believing this crisis will be like the last one. The structural themes of this crisis - fragmentation and globalization - were well-established by the first years after the end of the Cold War, and will take on crisis dimensions in the coming years. Fragmentation is taking its toll on Iraq, and it could elsewhere as well. Trans-national terror networks are taking their toll on us, and elsewhere as well. There could be other troubles, from resource shortages to natural disasters caused by global warming, but neither they nor the solutions will be national in dimensions. In some places that could mean states that appear strong today will have weaker central governments, become looser federations by the 2020s. In other places nation-states could dissolve altogether, becoming multiple nation-states or failed states.So it looks right now, in late 3T. In a few years, I suspect we'll be seeing so much effective action on the part of the Western nations that the world will be feel like its caught up in a quake. The question is whether that action will be constructive or destructive.The trouble I think is that in the multicultural countries of the west (the US, Canada, increasingly the UK and Australia) beneath the nationalist rhetoric of politicians there is too much fragmentation for a re-assertion of central government authority, or national cohesion. Beneath the surface, I think the emerging consensus in these countries is toward decentralization of power. Congress can't even get its bloody act together to rebuild a drowned city in its own borders, let alone another country, or protect its citizens against the worst aspects of globalization (pillaging corporations, pandemics, and trans-national criminal and terror networks), and prevent further balkanization of the country.
Right now, the Silent still set the tone, though their power is fading. Our political situations are one of precarious, elaborately balanced equilibrium, motion in any direction by any faction is blocked by some other, nobody is yet storng enough to force someone aside...but that'll happen.
I would compare our current late 3T situation to a huge reservoir behind a dam: tremendous potential energy, held back in an illusion of placid stasis. As long as the dam holds, the potential energy can't manifest and everything stays quiet. But if the dam cracks, or the foundations give, or the water undercuts the banks, the transition from stability to chaos is spectacular and sudden, and can sweep aside everything in its path.
The 'dam' is the Silent domination of society and culture and government and above all else of 'mood'. It was erected when the Silent entered Elderhood, turning the rapidly flowing G.I. River into a vast quiet reservoir. That reservoir has been filling all through the 3T, and everything stays quiet as long as the dam is in place. But the water level keeps rising and pressure building, the dam won't hold forever, either it'll break or the water will overtop it, undercut it, or work around it, and once it gives it'll give suddenly and completely.
I don't think it'll be long now, when I listen closely I can hear the dam straining, and leaks are appearing all over the river valley.
What could the federal government have done to stop 9/11? What could they really do to curb illegal immgration? What power do they really have against trans-national crime networks? How can they prevent multi-national corporations from moving assets and jobs abroad? How can they curb, let alone roll back, the cultural fragmentation of the last forty years? There is much nationalism still on the left and right, and it is often magical thinking.
The course of Iraq has both literal implications for the remainder of the crisis, but symbolic ones as well; it has worn away certain illusions in Washington, and the country as a whole. Iraq was going to be an American protectorate, with Bremer and then Chalabi at the helm. Then it was going to be a liberal democracy, like Japan or Germany in the post-war era. Then it was going to be a loose federation, with peoples living separate but equal, and at peace. Now there is talk of partition, even among some war supporters. The elites should listen more closely to the postmodern realists.
Perhaps the American empire will endure, or perhaps regional and or global structures will replace it; who knows. Either way though sub-national and trans-national forces will continue to erode national borders, and the primacy of central governments. Tribe, sect, and city-state will become the bulwarks against the forces of globalization, rather than central governments. The nation-state will become a quaint relic. It may be that some kind of corporate neo-feudalism largely replaces democracy in the twenty-first century, and arbitration replaces politics.
A dated Cold War mindset still pervades the Washington elite, liberals internationalists and neoconservatives alike; both believe wrongly that relations and conflicts between states, and the actions of central governments, are the guiding hands of the new history. That will increasingly not be the case. The nationalists are lying to us, if not to themselves as well.
If you're asking what the Federal Government could do, the answer depends on how ruthless they were willing to be, and how much ruthlessness the majority was willing the stand. Fourth Turnings are marked by levels of ruthlessness unthinkable in the Third.What could the federal government have done to stop 9/11? What could they really do to curb illegal immgration? What power do they really have against trans-national crime networks? How can they prevent multi-national corporations from moving assets and jobs abroad? How can they curb, let alone roll back, the cultural fragmentation of the last forty years? There is much nationalism still on the left and right, and it is often magical thinking.
The illegal immigration problem, for ex, is simply a shortage of will on the part of the elites. Change the citizenship law so that children born to illegals don't automatically gain citizenship, punish employers caught using illegals as employees with some serious penalties (major fines and jail time), and triple or more the number of agents on the border, with greater resources, and you'll have the illegal alien problem largely under control. If necessary, second-offender illegals could be imprisoned rather than deported.
(Yes, that sounds harsh, but 4T periods are ruthless.)
The exact course of the other problems you mention depends on what kind of response you want. I agree that the nation-state in the form we've known it probably won't thrive in the 21st century, but it's at least as likely to be displaced by larger, less tolerant units as it is by greater 'looseness'. Too much chaos tends to provoke a response of extreme order.
This is what I mean by unrealistic thinking. When I talk about sub-national forces I am talking about primarily about the fragmentation of societies, and what that fragmentation will allow for politically. There are numerous fault lines today in the American electorate, and to the extent that there is a new politics of unity possible, it will be a politics of fragmentation, rather than cohesion (unlike the last fourth turning). Mr. Bush has tried repeatedly to impose a "red state" nationalist vision in America and abroad, and it is slipping through his fingers here and there; the forces of postmodernity are overriding his will. Even in fragmented countries with autocratic governments the possibilities are limited. In theory Saddam could have coordinated a robust response to the American invasion, but there was limited will among the Iraqi army, and deep division within the country. People need to stop projecting their own wishes upon the world in order to see it clearly. History always places limits on the possible, and the limits this time will be circumscribed by the sub-national and trans-national forces shaping the postmodern world, regardless what the nationalists and populists want. Nation-states and nationalism will wither under a more robust American empire, or a more robust internationalism.If you're asking what the Federal Government could do, the answer depends on how ruthless they were willing to be, and how much ruthlessness the majority was willing the stand. Fourth Turnings are marked by levels of ruthlessness unthinkable in the Third.What could the federal government have done to stop 9/11? What could they really do to curb illegal immgration? What power do they really have against trans-national crime networks? How can they prevent multi-national corporations from moving assets and jobs abroad? How can they curb, let alone roll back, the cultural fragmentation of the last forty years? There is much nationalism still on the left and right, and it is often magical thinking.
The illegal immigration problem, for ex, is simply a shortage of will on the part of the elites. Change the citizenship law so that children born to illegals don't automatically gain citizenship, punish employers caught using illegals as employees with some serious penalties (major fines and jail time), and triple or more the number of agents on the border, with greater resources, and you'll have the illegal alien problem largely under control. If necessary, second-offender illegals could be imprisoned rather than deported.
(Yes, that sounds harsh, but 4T periods are ruthless.)
The exact course of the other problems you mention depends on what kind of response you want. I agree that the nation-state in the form we've known it probably won't thrive in the 21st century, but it's at least as likely to be displaced by larger, less tolerant units as it is by greater 'looseness'. Too much chaos tends to provoke a response of extreme order.
